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movements accessible to a wide readership, as tools to help inform strategies and 
initiatives that promote greater autonomy of women worldwide. 
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WOMEN LIVING UNDER MUSLIM LAWS
Women Living Under Muslim Laws is an international solidarity network that 
provides information, support and a collective space for women whose lives 
are shaped, conditioned or governed by laws and customs said to derive 
from Islam. 
For more than two decades WLUML has linked individual women and 
organisations. It now extends to more than 70 countries ranging from South 
Africa to Uzbekistan, Senegal to Indonesia and Brazil to France. It links:
 • women living in countries or states where Islam is the state religion, 
secular states with Muslim majorities as well as those from Muslim 
communities governed by minority religious laws;
 • women in secular states where political groups are demanding religious 
laws;
 • women in migrant Muslim communities in Europe, the Americas, and 
around the world;
 • non-Muslim women who may have Muslim laws applied to them directly 
or through their children;
 • women born into Muslim communities/families who are automatically 
categorized as Muslim but may not define themselves as such, either 
because they are not believers or because they choose not to identify 
themselves in religious terms, preferring to prioritise other aspects of their 
identity such as political ideology, profession, sexual orientation or others.
Our name challenges the myth of one, homogenous ‘Muslim world’. 
This deliberately created myth fails to reflect that: a) laws said to be Muslim 
vary from one context to another and, b) the laws that determine our lives 
are from diverse sources: religious, customary, colonial and secular. We are 
governed simultaneously by many different laws: laws recognised by the 
state (codified and uncodified) and informal laws such as customary prac-
tices which vary according to the cultural, social and political context.
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Foreword: A Long Time in the Making
As an anthropologist, my inclination is always to start with the story of how 
a particular project started. The history of this book, which has been a long 
time in the making, stretches back some 15 years. It is a product of much 
research, several workshops, and many meetings with women activists 
across the globe. The initial idea was discussed among many of the Women 
Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML) network members present at the 1995 
Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women. After listening to Charlotte 
Bunch’s speech1 on women’s many advances since 1985, we mulled over our 
growing realization that despite considerable progress there was still much 
room for improvement, and that one very significant arena where women’s 
presence remained limited was in the governing bodies of our nation-states: 
parliaments, senates, constitutional courts, and other top-level decision-
making bodies. Without women’s presence in such legislative bodies, the 
realization of women’s full and equal citizenship rights would remain lacking. 
As part of the Beijing conference, the Collectif 95 Maghreb-Egalité 
coalition organized a mock World Parliament in collaboration with several 
other organizations, including WLUML and Shirkat Gah Women’s Resource 
Center.2 Based on Collectif 95 Maghreb-Egalité’s publication “One Hundred 
Steps and Provisions for an Egalitarian Codification of the Personal Status 
Codes and Family Law in the Maghreb (One Hundred Steps),”3 the mock 
Parliament debated a proposed universal Family Law Bill which would 
democratize marriage, making it an equal partnership. The day-long session 
drew some 2000 women from across the world, particularly from Muslim 
 1. Charlotte Bunch is the founding director of the Centre for Women’s Global Leadership, and since 
the 1970s has been one of the foremost pioneering activists, authors, and organizers in the trans-
national women’s, civil, and human rights movements.
 2. Collectif 95 Maghreb-Egalité is a coalition of organizations across Tunisia and Algeria working for 
women’s democratic rights. Shirkat Gah Women’s Resource Centre has been a leading women’s 
rights organization in Pakistan since 1975, with offices in Lahore, Islamabad and Karachi (see 
http://www.shirkatgah.org).
 3. At the time, Islamists were calling for “the Muslim World” to be governed by a single unified family 
law. Women activists responded by creating their own document: One Hundred Steps (http://
www.wluml.org/node/467), which outlined the egalitarian and gender-sensitive principles that 
such a Universal Family Law should guarantee.
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contexts. It provided us with new horizons and strategies for the reform 
of family law across Muslim contexts, which to this day remains the most 
significant obstacle to many Muslim women’s empowerment.4 Further, the 
mock Parliament demonstrated clearly the role that a critical mass of women 
in parliament can play in shaping societies’ futures.
The debates among WLUML networkers after this session focused more 
critically on key strategies to achieving higher rates of women’s political 
representation. We all agreed that if women were present in their national 
parliaments in large numbers, a family law bill embodying the spirit of 
equality outlined in One Hundred Measures would indeed pass in many 
Muslim nations, having at least the support of the female constituency, as 
well of more progressive male constituents and parliamentarians. WLUML 
had already launched an International Research Program on Women and Law 
in 1991, which focused on women and their formal and informal political 
participation, as well the ways in which family law regulates sexuality and 
thus defines and confines women’s bodily autonomy.5 As such, WLUML was 
acutely aware of the significance of the link between political representa-
tion and woman-friendlier legislation and the reality that altering any family 
law through parliamentary processes would require women’s active formal 
political participation in large numbers. At the time, Pakistan civil society 
seemed to be at the forefront of these debates, and it was suggested that our 
networkers there start the initial work of investigating this topic. Shirkat Gah 
and the Aurat Foundation subsequently engaged in extensive research and 
activism, effectively highlighting the importance of gender quotas in formal 
electoral processes, the central topic of this book, as one of the most impor-
tant means of mobilizing women into decision-making bodies. As a result of 
their research and much activism by the Pakistani women’s movement and 
civil society, today Pakistan has a relatively well thought-out gender quota 
for both local and parliamentary elections.6
 4. In 1997 a coalition of diverse organizations and activists from Muslim contexts and scholars of 
Islam launched a collective campaign for a universal guideline for democratic Muslim laws where 
women’s rights are protected based on rights drawn from Islam and international human rights 
documents (see www.Mausawah.org).
 5. See the international hand-book Knowing Our Rights: Women, family, laws and customs in the 
Muslim world, which is based on some 10 years of field experience, research and analysis by multi-
disciplinary teams of networkers in over 20 countries across Asia, Africa and the Middle East (see 
http://www.wluml.org/node/588).
 6. For more information on women’s political representation in Pakistan, please see chapter four of 
Krook (2009), Shaheed, Zia, and Warraich (1998), and Hanif (2009). 
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In pursuing the Women and Law research program, I myself was in Iran 
during the lead-up to the 1997 presidential elections, and heard the news 
that Azam Taleghani, a one-time female Member of Parliament (1980-1984), 
subsequently banned from running in future parliamentary elections, was 
putting herself forward as a presidential candidate. Not surprisingly, she was 
also rejected as a valid presidential candidate by many conservative religious/
political leaders, who decried the notion that a woman could hold a posi-
tion of authority over men, and thus argued that the presidential position 
could only be held by a man. Nonetheless, Taleghani’s bold move presented 
a challenge to the status quo, and the thought of even the possibility of 
a woman president electrified Iranian women from all walks of life. They 
relished imagining various scenarios and discussed these at dinner parties, in 
buses and taxies, and in grocery stores (Hoodfar 2000). Many women noted 
that Benazir Bhutto had been popularly elected, as were two Bangladeshi 
Prime Ministers, Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina. The issue was also widely 
discussed in both liberal and conservative magazines and newspapers, both 
in and outside of Iran.
Apart from the potential for women leaders, the debates extended to 
examine more broadly the role of women in electoral politics generally. Some 
of my interlocutors at a women-only religious gathering in a very modest 
neighborhood in south Tehran claimed that women’s political representa-
tion under the Islamic Republic should be much higher, for the good of the 
nation as whole. A grandmother present at the gathering, visiting from a 
small town, commented that “a true Islamic parliament would have more 
than 50% women because, we as mothers of men who gave birth to them 
will look after them, but as the marriage laws show men have not looked 
after our interests.” Her remark was met with cheers from other guests. 
Looking across these debates in Iran and elsewhere in Muslim contexts, I 
found these perspectives very intriguing given that the general literature 
indicated that women were largely disinterested in politics, and that Muslim 
women were among the least politicized women globally.
Some two years later, in 1999, I was invited to an informal workshop 
in Cairo to discuss women’s political representation in Egypt. The debates 
focused on the global discourse on gender quotas. Interestingly, it was not 
the pros and cons of gender quotas that dominated discussion; most partici-
pants appeared very familiar with such ongoing debates in Pakistan, India, 
Sweden, the UK, and especially in France (a country whose philosophical 
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and constitutional underpinnings of male privilege bore particular resem-
blance to the exclusion of women in Muslim contexts, despite France’s very 
secular history). Rather, the most heated discussions focused on whether, in 
a country like Egypt, ruled by tyranny and an autocratic regime, a demand 
for gender quotas was even meaningful. While some participants argued 
that regardless of the political regime women’s presence in electoral politics 
was crucial, others were less certain that the channeling of activists’ energy 
towards promoting gender quotas would not come at the expense of other 
crucial issues requiring action and change. 
Yet a third group pointed out that the Mubarak regime would not be in 
power forever, and the groundwork needed to be laid out for future mean-
ingful women’s political representation, in conjunction with mobilization of 
women for a truer democracy. (Interestingly, as this book is being launched, 
the regimes both in Tunisia and Egypt have fallen, and we are all anxiously 
watching and hoping to see whether a democracy that includes women’s 
voices and upholds human rights for all will prevail).7 In the end we agreed 
that the struggles are simultaneous, and that promoting the use of gender 
quotas should be a long-term project incorporated into subsequent activities 
and strategies, while keeping focused on the struggle for real democracy at 
grassroots levels.8 
As a networker and researcher with WLUML, the participants in this  Cairo 
workshop asked me to convey to the network the importance and centrality 
of the issue of women’s political representation in ongoing programming 
and research. This is particularly because WLUML, as a transnational network, 
is well-positioned to keep abreast of developments in this area, and to link 
struggles across contexts. WLUML subsequently took up this task. 
The interest in gender quota debates in the Middle East and North 
African (MENA) region were further heightened after the dominant Moroccan 
parties entered into a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ in 2002 reserving 30 seats 
 7. Egypt experimented with parliamentary gender quotas as early as 1972, before they were popu-
larized in Muslim contexts. However the quota measure was canceled in 1986, during a general 
revision of the electoral laws. Later, in 2007, Egypt did re-enact a similar quota provision for its 
parliamentary election with the hopes to address the dismal percentage of women parliamentar-
ians, currently a mere 2%. However although gender quota discourse are very much part of the 
public debates, in the post 2011 revolution/refolution that overthrew Mubarak, it is not clear that 
gender quotas are being considered seriously by the constitutional committee. 
 8. Since then several large regional conferences on gender quotas have been organized in Egypt, in 
which many women parliamentarians have participated.
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for women candidates on a special National List. Similarly in South Asia, 
activists followed closely the government’s promises to increase the number 
of reserved seats in Bangladesh, as well as the revision of the existing quota 
system in Pakistan. Knowing my interest in the subject, the network asked 
me to prepare an overview of the debates for training workshops, and later 
this initiative expanded to the preparation of a booklet on gender quotas 
as a tool for interested networkers and activists in 2002. I invited Nazanin 
Shahrokni, a young Iranian scholar who had completed her Master’s thesis 
on the question of women and politics, to work with me. However, the 
work that Nazanin and I began stopped as I suddenly became occupied by 
several developments, including the demand, by some self-appointed male 
Islamist leaders, for the recognition of Shari’a courts for Muslim communities 
in Canada and several European countries.
By the time I was able to turn my attention back to the matter of elec-
toral gender quotas in 2007, Nazanin had left for doctoral studies at Berkeley 
and the debates had entered into a new phase, with much more research 
and publications based on various case studies available. To re-establish 
the research on gender quotas and bring the discussion to activist circles, 
I organized a 3-day workshop in Tehran, Iran with the support of “Women’s 
Empowerment in Muslim Contexts” (WEMC) project of WLUML in May 
2009 on “Discourses of Women’s Electoral Politics and Quota Systems”. For 
this workshop, I invited Mona Tajali, a PhD student who had researched 
parliamentary gender quotas around the world, to present her findings on 
some of the most and least successful cases. The amount of interest and 
insight that this workshop generated inspired both of us to organize this 
book as a kind of guidebook for activists currently advocating for women’s 
political representation. WLUML thus invited Mona Tajali, who is also writing 
a comparative doctoral research on the evolution of women’s political repre-
sentation in Iran and Turkey, to join this project to co-author this book with 
me, back in 2009. She graciously accepted, even though it meant slowing 
her own thesis research. 
Together we have poured over the vast literature and scrutinized various 
implemented gender quotas to identify their strengths and flaws, trying 
to highlight the most important lessons for quota advocates. As gender 
quotas are for the most part a rather new strategy, they continue to evolve 
through trial and error, and we have tried in this book to capture some key 
insights from past experiences. Apart from examining case studies, we also 
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benefited from the workshop participants’ insights and responses to the 
most pressing questions around the implementation of gender quotas. The 
present work is thus the result of the review of the work of many scholars, 
to whom we are deeply indebted, as well as of the feedback we have 
received from women activists, and colleagues with whom we have shared 
our many drafts, in full or in part.
Homa Hoodfar
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Introduction: Women  
and Representative Democracy
Arguably the most appealing aspect of representative democracy is that the 
interests of the majority are represented within the political decision-making 
apparatus; thus, at least in theory, policies and decisions support the inter-
ests of the majority of the nation. After all, the core of democratic politics is 
theoretically about the distribution of resources amongst the nation as fairly 
as possible, with an eye to protecting the interests of future generations as 
well (Singerman and Hoodfar 1996). As such, a democratic political system 
should provide space for the involvement of all citizens in decision-making 
and neither deny nor capitulate to a particular group (Phillips 1993, p. 5). 
However, despite acceptance of this feature of democracy, it remains at best 
an ideal waiting to be actualized. Throughout political history, the exclusion 
of various groups has been systematically built into political structures, partic-
ularly based on markers of identity such as gender, race, ethnicity, class, or 
property ownership. It is only as a result of great struggles by diverse groups 
and constituencies that democracy in practice has expanded to include the 
demands and rights of non-elites.
As women have well understood, the sphere of politics has always 
been primarily male-oriented and dominated, and to this day male elites 
continue to employ sophisticated and subtle strategies to protect their privi-
lege and to influence political decisions. Male dominance in politics which 
has created an unfriendly environment for women to access political posi-
tions is evidenced in myriad ways, one simple example being how informal 
meetings amongst political power-brokers are often held at hours that make 
them almost impossible for women to attend.1 It is also apparent that the 
rights to vote and to be elected are not sufficient guarantees for substantive 
 1. In many societies this is due to women’s domestic responsibilities. Other mechanisms to exclude 
women include holding informal meetings in all-male clubs, or, as we have observed in some 
Muslim contexts, formal political meetings are organized in mosques, where women are either 
prohibited from entering or must sit apart from the men and thus cannot actually participate. 
Campaign financing is also a major factor in the exclusion of women in politics, especially for 
those with modest means and less social networks, as wealthy contributors support candidates 
whose positions will protect their own interests. 
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democracy. The history of women’s political representation makes this abun-
dantly clear. It took more than a hundred years of political activism and 
lobbying for women in the longest-established democracies (such as France, 
the United Kingdom, the United States) to gain full political rights; decades 
later there still remain major gaps in their parliamentary representation. Thus 
for those of us continuing the struggle, identifying the mechanisms of exclu-
sion and control is a crucial step to successfully mobilizing for reforms that 
will remove the obstacles to true representation in the political process.
Almost a century has passed since women gained suffrage in the West2 
and some 50 years since they gained full democratic rights in many parts 
of Latin America, Asia and Africa. In the last few decades, as more research 
has led to greater understanding of the mechanisms by which women are 
excluded from political processes and power, there has been a swell of 
momentum-building and action to launch campaigns for women’s political 
inclusion. The rising chorus of voices from around the globe objecting to 
women’s political marginalization made it clear that the problem is a global 
one. This led to the realization that women must organize not only nation-
ally but also across nations to more successfully end systematic political 
exclusion. The swell of efforts and momentum to address women’s political 
marginalization coincided with the United Nations (UN) Decade for Women 
(1976-1985), during which a series of international and regional meet-
ings brought together women scholars, activists and policymakers from 
around the globe (Tinker and Jaquette 1987; Molyneux and Razavi 2006). 
Never before had so many politicized women from such diverse contexts 
come together to share and exchange their lived experiences. The archi-
tects of these international conferences had intended to focus specifically 
on strategies to include women in the promotion of economic growth 
and development. However participants made these gatherings their own, 
exchanging ideas and debating and networking on a diversity of issues, 
including more equal representation of women in political institutions. 
Through subsequent conferences, the publication of books and papers, as 
 2. The term “West” alludes to a political region rather than a geographical one. Geographically, 
Western states are located on different continents of Europe, North America and Australia; politi-
cally, these states are established representative democracies, with a relatively high socio-economic 
status of women. Although we are aware of the problematic nature of West versus non-Western 
categorization, since it can imply homogenization of otherwise heterogeneous regions and states, 
for the purpose of this book these categories are used to merely distinguish between the overall 
economical and social status of the two political regions.
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well as petition and letter-writing, women lobbied not only their own states 
but also the United Nations. They insisted that the issue of women’s political 
underrepresentation was a global phenomenon that needed to be tackled 
at the international and national levels simultaneously. Their voices did not 
go unheeded.
In 1990 the United Nations Economic and Social Council endorsed a 
target of 30 percent women in decision-making and parliamentary posi-
tions, to be respected by all member states.3 Additionally, in 1995 the United 
Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing, presented 
its Platform for Action, emphasizing the need for government measures to 
increase women’s representation. These actions and the subsequent interna-
tional agreements further validated the decades-long feminist demand for an 
end to discriminatory practices and regulations that hinder women’s  access 
to politics. Signed unanimously by all 189 UN member states, the Beijing
Platform for Action shifted the discourse of women’s underrepresentation 
from blaming women for their lack of general political will to holding the 
state responsible for ending exclusionary practices and integrating women 
into politics (Dahlerup 2006b, p. 4-6). 
Although the UN has no mechanism other than “naming and shaming” 
to force member states to honor their commitments, the Beijing document 
affirmed and promoted the legitimacy of women’s movements to demand 
reforms of their political systems. High-profile conferences discussed the 
various ways, within different contexts, that women have been and continue 
to be excluded. Women activists from developing nations argued that 
political underrepresentation signaled that women’s concerns had not been 
sufficiently addressed, and that inadequate resources were being allocated 
to issues directly affecting women or to removing obstacles to societal devel-
opment. This has been evidenced with regard to inefficient attention to the 
promotion of women’s education, health, job training or skill building, or 
to addressing issues of violence against women in the public and private 
spheres, or to the reform of family law which in most contexts makes women 
subjects of their husbands. Activists arguing for substantive change across 
these spheres concluded that it could only come about if women were 
elected in appropriate numbers to legislative parliaments.
 3. For more information please visit http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/cn6/1995/ecn61995-
3add6.htm
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One measure that women activists lobbied around was quotas in 
national parliaments. Although political quotas were first adopted in India 
in the 1930s and later in Bangladesh and Egypt, it was the quota systems in 
the Nordic countries – particularly Sweden and Norway – that succeeded in 
increasing women’s political representation on a national scale during the 
1980s. This success caught the imagination of activists around the world, 
and the adoption of gender quotas in politics has since become widespread. 
In the 1990s about 50 states adopted quotas, followed by 40 states since 
2000. More than 75 percent of all countries that have ever adopted such 
quotas did so only in the last fifteen years. Interestingly, the majority of 
states adopting gender quotas in recent years have been from non-Western 
contexts, particularly non-industrialized states.
It is of the utmost importance to note that quota systems have been 
understood and applied very differently in different societies. For instance, in 
some countries the quota system has been applied to the candidacy level of 
elections, while in others it has been applied to the final make-up of parlia-
mentary seats. Indeed, as we will explore, the particular type of quota applied 
in a state’s electoral system, and its implementation process, have important 
implications for democracy as well as for women’s substantive representation.
Clearly, as women around the world have come to realize, the right to 
vote in and of itself does not result in equal representation of both genders in 
politics. Today, despite close-to-universal suffrage, long-established in many 
cases, women are still organizing and struggling for equal political rights, and 
are increasingly monitoring the workings of the political system in order to 
make sure that political gender equality is actually attained and protected. 
Women activists have researched and documented the experiences of diverse 
political systems, assessing the pros and cons of each, in order to push for 
reforms and policies, including gender quotas that would work best in their 
national contexts. Informed activism and learning from each other’s expe-
rience is necessary to promote gender equality in politics. Not surprisingly, 
given the diversity of experiences with quota systems in different countries, 
many lively debates among feminist scholars have arisen on this topic.
In this publication we hope to outline an overview of these debates, 
and to provide an examination of various case studies in order to inform 
and support activists and policymakers currently working to promote 
women’s political equality. However, it is necessary to first outline why and 
how women have been excluded from political structures, as well as how, 
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often through mythology, their exclusion prior to and after they gained the 
right to vote has been justified.
The Long Struggle against Women’s Political Exclusion
The struggles for women’s access to political participation began with the 
demand for women’s right to vote, since suffrage was originally conceived 
as the exclusive right of men. Justified by various assumptions of women’s 
intellectual, psychological, and physical inferiority, the political domain was 
argued to be no place for this weaker sex (Pateman 1988; Scott 1996a). 
Thus, throughout most of the major political, philosophical, and social shifts 
in human history that targeted the advancement of human rights, women 
were not considered completely human. Instead they were regarded as 
second-class citizens requiring male protection and guidance. Furthermore 
the cultural and ideological beliefs that relegated women to the private 
sphere were codified into political thought and practice.
A telling example of women’s marginalization was particularly evident 
in the aftermath of the 1789 French Revolution, which radically enhanced 
human rights through the promotion of the ideals of liberty, equality and 
fraternity. None of these gains were, however, extended to the female 
sex. Women, who had participated widely in the revolution, protested, 
demanding the same citizenship rights granted to men, including the right 
to political participation and the recognition of the equality of men and 
women. They formed political groups, organized petitions and lobbied the 
intellectuals (Mousset 2007; Scott 1996b). In 1791, Olympe de Gouges, a 
radical revolutionist who fought alongside her male peers, outlined these 
demands in a statement titled Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the 
Female Citizen, calling for equal citizenship. That women’s exclusion was not 
a mere oversight by the male elites of the Enlightenment, but rather an 
active attempt to dehumanize women, is evidenced by the fate of Olympe 
de Gouges. Her efforts to achieve women’s citizenship rights, including the 
right to political participation, resulted in her execution by guillotine in 1793 
on charges of hysteria and wanting to be a “statesman” (Tomasevski 1993; 
Bauer 1996). Her execution however did not silence women’s voices or 
stifle their actions; after more than one hundred years of demands for legal 
reforms supporting equal rights, women’s political rights were gradually 
recognized. Olympe de Gouges’ declaration not only serves as a testimony 
to women’s long and difficult struggle, it also served as a model for other 
women’s charters of rights created two hundred years later; much of its spirit 
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is reflected in the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Form of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).4
The history of women’s struggle against exclusion from the political 
sphere deserves our attention and analysis. Indeed many of the same excuses 
and practices that marginalized women more than a century ago remain 
today. Women’s political exclusion has not been accidental, or unintended, 
or due to a lack of interest on the part of women to participate, nor are 
any of these the case today. This exclusion was deliberately engineered by 
male political leaders at the “dawn of democracy”, with the signing of the 
American and French revolutionary declarations of 1776 and 1787 respec-
tively. In a historical sense these declarations, which claim equality amongst 
all human beings and citizens, are considered to mark the birth of the first 
democracies, despite the fact that they did not grant voice to more than 
half of the population, namely women and racial minorities.5 Their under-
lying assumption was that women’s primary duties lay within the domestic 
sphere, and that participation in the public and political spheres was beyond 
a woman’s biological capacity and destiny - tropes that continue to prevail, 
even in some modern democracies. Though such assumptions are not overtly 
mentioned in the official policies of these states,6 they are nonetheless an 
ingrained aspect of many cultural beliefs and practices, and easily translated 
into the framework of government policies and the way women’s economic 
and productive activities are viewed (Waring 1999; Nash 1995). 
To justify such discrimination, political elites have referred to a series 
of assumptions ranging from women’s intellectual deficiency to patriarchal 
ideology whereby men are considered the “natural” heads of the household 
 4. Olympe de Gouges’ declaration was not the oldest, the first, or the only feminist declaration of 
its time. But because of its comprehensive nature and the manner in which it protested women’s 
exclusion, it has today come to symbolize women’s resistance to male dominance. 
 5. To better illustrate this, we can point to the Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology published in 
2007, which under the category “democracy” notes: “The US was the first democracy, estab-
lished in 1776. It was followed, in order, by Norway (1815), France (1815), Belgium (1831), the 
UK (1832), Germany (1848), Switzerland (1848), the Netherlands (1849), Denmark (1849), Italy 
(1861), Sweden (1866), and Japan (1889)…” (Sanderson 2007). The listed states are considered 
democratic at these dates, despite the fact that they did not grant citizenship or the right to vote 
to the female segment (and in some case to minorities) of the population. This of course, goes 
against the definition of democracy, a system that is based on public participation. 
 6. Relegating women to the private sphere, in which their roles as mother and wives are prioritized 
over all other duties, has been and continues to be part of state legislation and constitutions of 
various states.
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and the community at large. For instance, a common claim made at the time 
of the revolutions (and which continues to be made today by many men in 
diverse countries) is that women’s interests will be protected by their husbands 
and fathers. On the other hand, various intellectuals of the Enlightenment 
justified women’s exclusion by developing a theory that argued women lack 
the necessary political imagination and intelligence to participate in politics 
(Scott 1996b).7 Although some political theorists viewed women as having a 
vital role to play in society, this was not as citizens and political actors, but as 
the upholders of the private foundation of the political world of men.
Intellectual, political and scientific discourses penned by feminists and 
women’s rights activists, as well as women’s longstanding political activism, 
have long demonstrated the fallacy of women’s inferior intellectual capacity 
and unsuitability for politics and public life. One of the earliest transnational 
movements, formalized in the first transnational congress of women’s rights 
in Paris in 1878, created a network of suffragettes supporting one another 
in their efforts and political activities (Rupp 1997).8 Over the course of many 
decades women from various countries began to win the right to vote (see 
Appendix A). They had hoped that their political rights would gradually 
bring a large enough number of women into electoral politics to reformulate 
and reshape the institutions that had evolved as male-only clubs. However, 
the goal of equal representation of both genders has yet to materialize in the 
majority of global political institutions within the 21st century, illustrating a 
slow progress since the 19th century.
Therefore, the dearth of women in the political structures of modern 
democratic societies has been a major obstacle to the removal of other 
forms of social and legal discrimination against women and has negatively 
impacted other aspects of women’s rights, including health, education, 
employment and much more, since women’s interests in such debates have 
often been overlooked. After all, politics is really about the distribution of 
a nation’s resources. In response to the lack of female representation and 
the neglect of issues of concern to women, feminists began to strategically 
 7. Among others Scott (1996) discusses how Rousseau justified the exclusion of women from 
politics. 
 8. The debates around how to achieve women’s rights and political equality, how to adopt appro-
priate strategies to enhance women’s political rights as well as providing transnational solidarity 
and support by sharing the experiences of women’s movements across diverse countries led to 
this first transnational congress of women, held in 1878 in Paris (Rupp 1997, p. 14).
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politicize women’s issues, beginning with the domestic sphere. The notion 
that the “personal is political”9 was one such approach to this particular 
divide, introducing the idea of the centrality of the personal and domestic 
to the body politic and a thriving society (Phillips 1998a).10 In sum, despite 
having secured their political rights in the early decades of the twentieth 
century, at least in Europe and North America, by the mid-1970s women 
were still far from the goal of gender balance, or a 50-50 representation of 
both sexes in elected offices. This underrepresentation on a global scale 
spurred many women activists and scholars to re-examine the causes of 
low female political representation (see Table 1.1). As this table indicates, 
although women constitute at least half of the world’s population, they are 
represented by only about 19 percent of female parliamentarians worldwide.
What Keeps Women Out of Politics? 
A common assumption held by proponents of suffragette movements and 
other social commentators interested in women’s equality was that women’s 
right to political participation would automatically lead to increased represen-
tation as societies developed and modernized. Such an assumption, particularly 
in developing countries, was rooted in the belief that modernization and 
democratization are pre-requisites for achieving gender balance in political 
representation. However, evidence from many of the strongest and longest 
democracies and industrialized nations, such as the United States, France, and 
the United Kingdom, does not support this assumption, given that the levels 
of female political representation remain low despite women in these societies 
having obtained formal political rights in the early twen tieth century.11
 9. ‘Personal is political’ is a powerful phrase which was coined by feminist Carol Hanisch (1969) in her 
essay with the same title, and refers to the theory that personal problems deserve political attention.
 10. Such efforts have included lobbying governments concerning childcare at the workplace, healthcare 
and maternity systems, and other domains previously deemed outside the scope of government 
concern. It has been successfully proven, for example, that child welfare support for working 
mothers is a political issue in that a state support system leads to more prosperous economies. As 
well, feminists in many nations have been able to politicize domestic violence, previously considered 
a private “personal/family/domestic” matter. 
 11. As Pamela Paxton states, most definitions of democracies as presented by renowned political 
scientists, such as Larry Diamond, Samuel Huntington and Seymour Martin Lipset, consider 
universal male suffrage as the initiation of a democratic state, with no regard for women’s delib-
erate exclusion, yet, all authors acknowledge that a fundamental aspect of democracy is popular 
control. Paxton concludes that such false representation of democracies distorts the democratic 
waves that came over Europe, the transition dates of various states, and the actual causes of 
democratization (2000, p. 92). 
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Table 1.1 Women in national parliaments, regional differences  








Nordic countries 41.6% --- ---
Americas 23.1% 23.7% 23.2%
Europe – OSCE member 
countries excluding Nordic 
countries
20.1% 19.5% 19.9%
Sub-Saharan Africa 19.0% 20.9% 19.2%
Asia 18.7% 17.0% 18.5%
Pacific 12.6% 15.4% 12.6%
Arab states 12.4% 8.4% 11.6%
World Average* 19.4% 18.2% 19.2%
Source: Adapted from Inter-Parliamentary Union as of 30 November 2010 http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm
* The World average is as calculated by the international organization Inter-Parliamentary Union
Notes: Regions are classified by descending order of the percentage of women in the Lower or Single House. 
More emphasis is placed on the Single or Lower House, as these are the members often democratically 
elected, whereas in the Upper House, members are often appointed.
Another common assumption concerning women’s low levels of 
political representation has been women’s limited access to material and 
social capital, including low levels of women’s labor market participation, 
education, and access to significant social networks. But findings from 
recent studies reject this simple equation, suggesting other forces at work. 
For instance, countries with high percentages of women’s enrollment in 
secondary or tertiary education, such as Iran or the Republic of Korea, have 
extremely low levels of female parliamentarians (below 10 percent); while 
some states with extremely low levels of female literacy, such as Pakistan 
and Nepal, have high levels of female representation (above 20 percent). 
Similarly, the level of female economic activity does not correlate with a 
state’s percentage of women in national parliaments. While female economic 
activity in Cambodia and Gambia ranges from 70 to 80 percent according 
to UNDP estimates, the percentage of female representatives in parliament 
is below 10 percent. Such studies indicate the complexity of factors that 
mitigate women’s political participation (UNRISD 2005).
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Similarly, the fact that some communist bloc and non-industrialized 
countries have had some of the highest percentages of female parliamentar-
ians, and that India, a country known for its discrimination against female 
children, was ruled by an elected female prime minister as early as 1966, 
also complicate the neat equation that suggests “democracy + develop-
ment” will lead to gender equality. More recently in 2003, Rwanda also 
stunned the world by surpassing the percentage of female parliamentarians 
in  Nordic countries, which until then ranked the highest in the world, by 
electing 48.8 percent female representatives. Hence, it appears that the level 
of women’s political representation is not necessarily related to a country’s 
level of formal democracy or to economic advancement.
These observations have led to considerable new research and debate 
attempting to map out the various factors that hinder or promote women’s 
access to political decision-making power within democratic societies 
(Phillips 1993; Phillips 1991; Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 2007; Howell 
2006; Lovenduski 2005; Sapiro 1998; Rule 1994; Zimmerman 1994; Varma 
1997). Based on extensive review of these studies, we have identified three 
broad and overlapping zones that lead to women’s exclusion from the polit-
ical sphere. These are: the gender ideology of the state, cultural and social 
barriers, and institutional and structural barriers. Although such categoriza-
tion may appear rather reductionist given the multiplicity of reasons and 
contexts that cause women’s underrepresentation in the political sphere, 
they nonetheless will help us to outline practical strategies that women have 
adopted to address these obstacles. 
State Gender Ideology: Until recently the existence of a democratic structure 
(defined as a system that holds fair and open elections) was viewed as the 
most important element for women’s incorporation into political structures; 
state gender ideology and the political will to include women received 
little attention (Paxton 2007, p.135). However, state gender ideology, 
commonly reflected in a society’s constitution and legal framework, can 
endorse, tolerate or even oppose women’s presence in politics and public 
life, greatly impacting the extent of women’s access to political office and 
the larger public sphere. As discussed earlier, the much-celebrated American 
and French revolutions denied women citizenship and excluded them from 
politics. Conversely, the revolutionary ideologies of communist China and 
Cuba deemed women as essential political participants and promoted the 
inclusion of all citizens. Furthermore, the collapse of communist states and 
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their move towards “democratization” in the early 1990s resulted in a drop 
in the percentage of female political representatives. Clearly the levels of 
women’s representation are significantly related to state ideology on gender, 
rather than to the prevailing political system. Although one may argue that 
under “non-democratic” systems representatives are not able to influence 
political decisions, this does not always hold true. In fact, some evidence 
suggests that under such systems various women-friendly laws, particularly 
in the area of family law, have more often undergone greater reform, and 
given women more rights than previous systems had afforded them, even if 
they failed to achieve complete equality.12
Furthermore, one can argue that politics of presence matter. That is, 
regardless of the political system, the presence of significant numbers of 
women in the political arena leads to the normalization of women as part 
of the political landscape, which helps break taboos about women in power 
and can in turn improve women’s status (Phillips 1995). 
Cultural and Social Barriers: A second cluster of obstacles to women’s polit-
ical participation is cultural and social barriers including religious ideology.13 
These obstacles discourage women from entering politics in a variety of 
ways and degrees, but mostly include socialization and cultural and religious 
attitudes that consider politics an exclusively male domain.14 In this regard, 
it is important to keep in mind that public opinion matters greatly in elec-
tions and thus how the public perceives women’s place in society can be 
decisive. Similarly, prevailing religious beliefs also shape women’s presence 
in the public sphere. For instance, if a common belief is that women’s voices 
should not be heard by unrelated males, or that women need their husbands’ 
permission to leave their homes, women’s entry into politics will be severely 
constrained and men will continue to dominate the political sphere. And 
when societal norms suggest that women’s roles should be limited to the 
 12. For instance, immediately after the Chinese revolution women were given the right to divorce, 
which they took advantage of in great numbers as many of them had been married off as chil-
dren without their consent. And, although women did not get equal access to decision-making 
positions, they still had relatively higher access to education, the labor market and independent 
income than women in many other countries.
 13. Culture here is generally understood as webs of the dominant beliefs and attitudes of a society at 
a given time. Various scholars researching women’s public roles argue that culture matters greatly 
in determining women’s position in the public sphere (Inglehart 2003).
 14. The route to political office in many countries is very often through the legal profession, a field in 
which women often hit the so-called glass ceiling and are unable to obtain elite positions of power 
and leadership.
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domestic sphere as mothers and wives, then women acting in the public 
sphere may be viewed as rebels harming their families and undermining the 
fabric of society in order to fulfill their own ambitions. Similarly if women are 
considered apolitical, irrational, emotional, inferior, or incapable of acting 
independently from men, they will not be taken seriously as candidates for 
political power (Paxton 2000). A receptive state gender ideology, an active 
women’s movement, and influential role models are among the most impor-
tant means of counteracting these obstacles. As the experiences of women 
everywhere indicate, to bring about such conditions requires unflagging, 
continuous, vigilant effort on the part of women activists and those inter-
ested in social justice for all. Such efforts are even more crucial and demand 
more commitment and strategic analysis under states such as Iran or Saudi 
Arabia, whose governments oppose outright the presence of women in 
public life.
However, despite the many cultural, religious, and social obstacles that 
women face when attempting to access a political position, it is important 
to be cautious of simplistic explanations that consider culture/religion as 
the key factor in women’s exclusion from public life. It is important to 
keep in mind that religions are understood and practiced very differently 
by the various communities that adhere to them. Furthermore cultures 
are not static. They are contested by various social forces and are continu-
ously evolving.  After all, historically, democracy was not an inherent part of 
European culture or religion, and only came about as the result of organizing 
and agitating by civil society. An essentialist and reductionist approach to 
culture, particularly when scholars deal with non-Western societies, ignores 
the considerable complexity of social and political changes that are shaping 
the world and women’s lives. For instance some scholars researching Muslim 
societies focus only on a few variables and disregard the vast differences 
between various Muslim cultures (ranging from Indonesia, to Saudi Arabia, 
to Iran and Turkey), concluding that Muslim nations have the most conser-
vative attitude towards women as political leaders (Fish 2002; Inglehart, 
Norris, and Welzel 2003; Inglehart 2003). This approach cannot account for 
the fact (among others) that many Muslims have popularly elected female 
heads of state. Indeed, four of the five biggest Muslim-majority countries, 
namely Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Turkey, have elected women 
as leaders. Neither can a culturally reductionist approach explain why many 
of these societies have adopted features of republicanism, but have in some 
cases resisted addressing the issue of gender equality. Simplistic analyses 
24176.indb   13 16/09/11   11:37 AM
Electoral.Politics:.Making.Gender.Quotas.Work.for.Women
14
problematically divert researchers from recognizing and seeking to under-
stand the complex web of factors involved. 
Cultures ascribing a more rigid sexual division of labor, particularly in rela-
tion to domestic chores and childrearing, also disadvantage women in terms 
of the time required to participate in formal politics. In almost every context 
worldwide, women still perform the majority of domestic and childrearing 
tasks, based on the historical cross-cultural sexual division of labor (Paxton, 
Kunovich, and Hughes 2007; Folbre 2001; Martínez Franzoni 2010; Benería 
and Roldán 1987). Randall’s 1982 survey of women politicians in New York 
concluded that the most serious and enduring obstacle for women in office 
is responsibility for children still at home. The survey also noted women do 
not find politics boring or corrupt. Motherhood as a situational constraint 
was also echoed in a study of British women Members of Parliament (MPs); 
out of the twenty-seven women MPs elected in 1974, only two had children 
under 10 years old (Randall 1982, p. 85-87). It is likely that over time, as 
mothers become adamant about participating in formal politics, fathers will 
become more involved in child-raising and domestic chores, and states will 
provide more services to support families.
Institutional or Structural Barriers: The third and possibly most significant 
cluster of obstacles we address here are identified as institutional or structural 
barriers. These constraints include political systems, electoral rules, political 
party structures, and institutional cultures, such as campaign financing 
trends which tend to discriminate against women. Many scholars argue, 
for example, that mechanisms within the structure of political parties work 
to limit qualified and experienced female candidates’ entry into top deci-
sion-making positions (Paxton 2007; Kittilson 2006; Phillips 1998b). The 
increasing realization that political parties often work to undermine efforts 
to make politics more inclusive has greatly influenced the strategies that 
women’s movements have adopted to promote female political representa-
tion, as the various case studies in this work will discuss. This area has been 
the focus of women’s rights research and activism in recent decades; thus 
proponents of gender quotas have devoted their energies to opening up the 
political space available to women.
It has taken more than half a century of observation and research, 
and often immense frustration, for women’s political rights proponents to 
recognize that once a right is secured, its implementation must be rigor-
ously monitored and legal reforms and refinement must follow to ensure the 
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gains become operational. Achieving rights is in a sense a means to an end; 
removing embedded structural obstacles and achieving true reform of the 
political system requires critical refocusing and consistent organizing within 
women’s rights movements. Indeed studies indicate that institutional reform 
often leads to the dissolution or modification of cultural and social obstacles, 
while the reverse does not necessarily hold true (Rule 1994).
Over the decades, increasingly refined strategies have been crafted to 
promote the participation of women in politics and public decision-making 
bodies. Context-appropriate strategies based on understanding the specific 
obstacles in a given socio-political environment are crucial to crafting effec-
tive campaigns to end women’s exclusion from political decision-making 
structures. Though we have referred to three broad and overlapping zones 
that hinder women’s access to formal politics – state gender ideology, 
cultural and social barriers, and institutional and structural obstacles – in this 
work we focus mostly on the latter, as this is where the discourse on gender 
quotas is most relevant. Institutional and structural obstacles are more easily 
addressed, mostly through legislation and policy, and can eventually help 
disarm or dissolve other obstacles, including socio-cultural biases and state 
ideology. Furthermore, context-specific cultural and religious obstacles do 
not necessarily lend themselves to strategies that can be adopted easily in 
multiple contexts. As activists and others concerned with political equality, 
we must critically examine lessons from the broadest spectrum possible in 
the struggle against women’s political exclusion and be profoundly mindful 
of the key features of both successes and failures so that we can move 
towards gender equality in politics and elsewhere. It is to this effort that 
this work is devoted, in the hope that it will support the organized struggle 
against discrimination by women fighting to have their voices and the voices 
of their daughters heard. 
Organization of the Book
While political participation encompasses many activities which directly 
and indirectly influence politics, in this book we focus exclusively on three 
aspects of political participation – voting, running for political office, and 
holding political office – with emphasis placed on women’s representation 
in national parliaments. We deal primarily with women’s participation in 
formal politics, while acknowledging the significance of women’s historical 
involvement in informal politics, including many grassroots organizing and 
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campaigning initiatives.15 Thus, nations that do not hold regular elections 
are not addressed by this work, though it is important to recognize that 
there is a great deal of political participation by women in such societies, 
through organized movements or individual dissident activities that support 
democratization and reform.
As noted earlier, institutional and structural barriers are the greatest 
obstacles to women’s access to formal political involvement, and at the same 
time lend themselves more easily to reform. Women’s organizations have 
thus often focused on such barriers, particularly with regard to reforming 
electoral laws, and political party structures and practices. Chapter two 
thus outlines some of the debates and strategies of women’s movements 
in different types of electoral systems in different democracies, and their 
impact on women’s political representation.
In this work we have defined democracy as an inclusive form of political 
participation through regular and fair elections, in which no major (adult) 
group is excluded (Paxton 2000, p. 93). Chapter two defines and discusses 
the differences between the three broad types of electoral systems: propor-
tional representation (PR), majoritarian/plurality, and mixed. Not only will 
each of these electoral systems be defined in detail in the following chapter, 
but also each system, along with their variations, will be further explained 
in the case study chapters. Academic research concerning women’s access 
to politics has increasingly focused on the type of electoral system in place, 
as this determines how the public’s votes are represented by seats in the 
parliament. Data from around the world strongly suggests that some elec-
toral systems can be more women-friendly than others, depending on 
the competitive atmosphere they engender between political parties and 
between candidates (Larserud and Taphorn 2007a; International IDEA and 
Stockholm University 2010). Overall, much of the research suggests that 
proportional representation systems are more likely to support women’s 
access to the formal political arena; however, even the most women-friendly 
electoral systems have not resulted in gender balance at the parliamentary 
level. In fact, Rwanda has been the only country in the world to achieve 
gender equality in its national parliament, in 2003. Historically, overall male 
 15. Instances of participation in informal politics include, for example, involvement in local or national 
civil society activities, organizing or campaigning to pressure governments on social issue, and 
participating in awareness-raising activities. Participating in rallies, establishing NGOs or asso-
ciations to work collectively for a common goal, or promoting educational facilities all influence 
politics as they impact social structure and human life. 
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dominance of the political sphere has given rise to institutional obstacles that 
inherently discriminate against women. 
Chapter three introduces our central topic: gender quotas, a measure 
advocated by many feminist researchers as a strategy to address women’s 
underrepresentation. Gender quotas are measures that set a minimum 
percentage of political seats or candidacies for either sex in order to increase 
women’s representation in national legislatures. The success of a quota 
system is evaluated according to the popular election of female representa-
tives at national level assemblies and women’s political empowerment for 
future elections. Thus we limit our scope of analysis to national level rather 
than local elections, due to the available statistical data on percentages of 
women participating in politics at the national level and their presence in 
national legislatures. Aside from the lack of data at local and provincial levels, 
many countries have yet to establish electoral processes for local and provin-
cial bodies.
Chapter three also outlines the history of political quotas, describes the 
international perspective and reactions to such quotas over recent decades, 
and provides an overview of the debates around gender quotas as a strategy 
for addressing women’s underrepresentation. Different types of gender 
quotas, namely voluntary party quotas, legislative quotas, and reserved seats 
quotas, are explained and analyzed in terms of their particular advantages 
and disadvantages – particularly in terms of how they fit the given electoral 
system, how clearly they specify the quota rule to be applied and what sanc-
tions they specify in cases of non-compliance. We also examine who the 
true advocates of quota adoption have been, as well as their intentions, 
in order to try and ascertain what makes the implementation of a quota 
system successful and what the real impact of gender quotas is on female 
representation. 
Chapters four, five and six respectively present case studies from coun-
tries illustrating one of the three types of gender quotas. In order to best 
illustrate the complexity of quotas and their implementation mechanisms, 
we introduce both successful cases (where gender quotas resulted in higher 
numbers of female parliamentarians), as well as unsuccessful cases (where 
gender quota measures did not result in a significant rise in women parlia-
mentarians). Our research clearly shows that no matter what the type of 
quota system, we must also look at how their adoption and implementa-
tion has come about, since top-down imposition of quotas may lack the 
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sincerity to truly address female participation compared with bottom-up 
efforts demanded and organized by women’s movements. Each chapter 
looks at various features that have contributed to the successful or unsuc-
cessful implementation of gender quotas, so that activists and researchers 
may better understand where and when quota systems can benefit women.
Chapter four presents voluntary party quotas, which are the most 
widespread type of quota worldwide. Such quotas are voluntary measures 
adopted by political parties without any legal enforcement, to increase the 
chances of women’s nomination, and thus their election, to national parlia-
ment. These types of quotas are often applied to party lists, which are lists of 
candidates presented to the electorate ahead of elections, in which a certain 
percentage of the party candidates are women. Such quotas thus target 
potential candidates hoping to run for parliament, rather than the final 
make-up of the parliament at the end of the election. These types of quotas 
are most applicable to proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, in 
which the parties are the main competitors. The case studies in this chapter 
include Sweden and England. Sweden is an example of a successful case 
of voluntary party quota adoption which aligned well with the state’s elec-
toral system, while in England the Labour Party chose a type of quota that 
encountered legal opposition from male party members and was incompat-
ible with the state’s majoritarian electoral system. 
This chapter also discusses Finland, which has achieved very high 
percentages of female representation without ever adopting any type of 
gender quota for parliamentary elections. We conclude this is due primarily 
to the continuous efforts of the Finnish women’s movement regarding all 
aspects of society. Additionally, Finnish women won the right to vote at the 
same time as their male counterparts, unlike women in other early democ-
racies, and this has certainly played a role in the egalitarian trajectory of 
Finnish society, enabling women to be part of the political scene from early 
on. Women currently make up 40 percent of Finnish parliamentarians, and 
although this is still short of 50 percent female representation (also referred 
to as descriptive representation), they have achieved women’s substan-
tive representation16 in that women’s interests are well reflected in the 
state’s many women-friendly laws and maternal welfare systems (Celis and 
Childs 2008).
 16. According to Pitkin (1972), substantive representation refers to “acting in the interest of the 
represented, in a manner responsive to them”. (p. 209)
24176.indb   18 16/09/11   11:37 AM
19
Chapter.1.–.Introduction:.Women.and.Representative.Democracy
Chapter five looks at legislative quotas, which differ from voluntary 
party quotas in that they legally require political parties to adopt gender 
quotas in their list of candidates. Legislative quotas are adopted by national 
parliaments either through constitutional reform or changes in electoral 
laws that require all parties to nominate a certain proportion of female 
candidates. Because they are legally mandated, legislative quotas are 
considered more powerful than voluntary party quotas. However, as this 
chapter discusses, in practice they are not always more forceful since they 
do not always enjoy the commitment of party leaders. As well, such quotas 
must be supported by effective sanctions and penalties for non-compliance, 
otherwise they are ineffective. The case studies included in this chapter 
are Argentina, France, and Indonesia. While Argentina and France both 
adopted legislative quotas around the same time, and when each country 
had a similar number of female parliamentarians, today Argentina has 
more than 38 percent female representation, while France lags far behind 
with less than 19 percent as of 2010.
Argentina’s success has been credited to a viable women’s movement 
that successfully politicized the issue of female political representation and 
allied with other political forces. When the initial quotas adopted were weak 
in enhancing the number of women in parliament, Argentinean quota advo-
cates pushed for reforms that ensured parties nominated women for the 
seats that they expected to win, and not just to any seats across the nation. 
This reform ensured that the nomination of women candidates was not 
merely symbolic whereby the actual number of female representatives did 
not increase. On the other hand, quotas in both France and Indonesia have 
been unsuccessful for various reasons. In France, the so-called parity law 
politicized the issue of women’s political representation, but was not a good 
fit with the majoritarian17 electoral system, and was weak in its wording 
and sanctions for non-compliance. Thus the major French parties were not 
sufficiently pressured to comply with the legal mandate to field successful 
 17. France uses the Two-Round System (TRS) electoral system, in which voters vote for a single 
candidate among several, and the candidate that receives an absolute majority (or 50%+1) of 
the vote in the first round of elections enters the parliament. However, if no candidate receives 
more than 50% of the vote, a run-off election is held between the two candidates with the most 
votes. Therefore, TRS as used in France ensures that the candidate elected has the support of the 
majority of the electorate, hence referred to as a majoritarian electoral system. A rare variation of 
TRS results in plurality voting, in that more than two candidates compete in the second round of 
elections, and the candidate that simply receives the most votes (simple majority as opposed to 
absolute majority) is elected. 
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women candidates. Indonesians lobbied for a law similar to the one in 
Argentina whereby female candidates would run in winnable ridings (for 
winnable seats); however, male political leaders who objected succeeded in 
getting the constitutional court to declare such a law unconstitutional. This 
has weakened the present legislative quota for women in Indonesia.
Chapter six discusses reserved seats quotas, with brief case studies of 
Rwanda and Bangladesh. Reserved seats refer to setting aside a percentage 
of parliamentary seats for women. This type of quota only applies to the final 
make-up of the parliament rather than the candidacy level. These quotas 
are legally mandated, generally in the national constitution, but differ from 
legislative quotas in that they are meant to guarantee a minimum level of 
women in the parliament after elections, though in rare cases states fail to 
fill the seats reserved for women. States can adopt these quotas in different 
ways. Rwanda, the only country in the world that has ever reached gender 
parity in the national parliament, did so through the adoption of reserved 
seats quotas for women.
Chapter six briefly describes the process of quota adoption in Rwanda 
and the main features that contributed to its success. It argues that the 
Rwandan women’s movement played a key role in ensuring that the new 
constitution acknowledged the importance of women’s political representa-
tion, lobbying for a women-only council to choose the female representatives 
for these seats in an effort to ensure that they would remain accountable to 
female constituents. In this regard, the women’s council that elects female 
parliamentarians is an institutional structure meant to ensure the voices of a 
previously silenced and marginalized group, in this case, Rwandan women. 
Such institutional reforms as well as Rwanda’s reserved seats are measures 
towards women’s empowerment that ultimately create a more democratic 
state. The reserved seats quotas in Rwanda were a result of vigilant and 
informed activism on the part of the women’s movement, as we will explain 
in the chapter, along with very carefully worded constitutional provisions.
Conversely, reserved seats in Bangladesh have not been very successful. 
Among the main reasons is that such quotas are not a good fit with the 
country’s majoritarian electoral system, whereby extreme party competi-
tion discourage parties from nominating many women candidates, who are 
considered too risky despite reserved seats being allocated to each party in 
proportion to its share of the vote. While 45 out of 345 parliamentary seats 
are reserved for women, the quota was intended to result in much more than 
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this minimum. Currently only 64 women serve in the Bangladeshi parliament. 
Nevertheless Bangladesh’s quota system is fairly new as it was reenacted in 
2004 after having been expired, and there is potential for growth and reform, 
especially in light of the grassroots activism of Bangladeshi women’s groups. 
Therefore, it is this book’s intention to provide an introductory analysis of 
the significance of women’s political representation, the adoption of gender 
quotas, and the experiences and lessons learned from various states that have 
experimented with such measures. It is our aim that women’s rights activists 
and political participants will find such information useful towards their  efforts 
to address women’s political underrepresentation, a reality that is widespread 
everywhere and increasingly demands policy attention and action.
24176.indb   21 16/09/11   11:37 AM
24176.indb   22 16/09/11   11:37 AM
Chapter 2
Electoral Systems and their Impact 
on Women’s Representation
Political Parties
Key Elements of Electoral Systems





List Proportional Representation (List PR)
Single Transferable Vote System (STV)
Majoritarian/ Plurality Systems
First Past the Post (FPTP)
Block Vote (BV)






24176.indb   23 16/09/11   11:37 AM
Electoral Systems and their Impact  
on Women’s Representation
In formal democracies, people elect representatives who best reflect their 
ideals and purport to defend their interests. A state’s electoral system 
determines how often elections may be held, who is eligible to vote, who 
is eligible to run for office, as well as the structure of the ballots and how 
votes are translated into seats won by candidates or political parties. In short, 
electoral systems are the means by which the idea of a democratic system 
is operationalized. Cross-national research has identified electoral systems 
as the most important influence on the recruitment of women candidates 
for legislatures (Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 2007, p. 269). Thus, under-
standing a given electoral system is of utmost importance for those interested 
in bringing gender parity to the political system. 
The degree to which an electoral system is perceived as truly representing 
the views of the electorate and as translating votes into government poli-
cies and legislation reflecting the wishes of the majority greatly influences 
the degree of public support for the democratic system itself. If the public 
perceives that policy, government programs and legislation do not in fact 
represent its choices following an election, voter-turnout, support for the 
government, and respect for elected representatives and politicians declines 
(O’Neal 1993). Thus, a fair electoral system that fulfills the expectations of the 
public is important for the maintenance of democracy and political stability.
Different types of electoral systems allow for different degrees of direct 
representation; some allow citizens more of a voice than others. Reform of 
a given political system is difficult, but in some cases may be instrumental 
to increasing true democratic representation. This is because the particular 
electoral system in place is the most important factor influencing the deve-
lopment/existence of political organizations, the party system, and the 
ways in which citizens may engage in political activities. In fact the type 
of electoral system adopted by a state impacts a wide range of elements 
that make up the political character of that society, including for example 
whether  emphasis is on regional or national concerns, how political parties 
operate, and who may stand as a candidate.
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For example in some electoral systems the nation is treated as one 
united entity, and representatives do not necessarily represent a particular 
riding or district; other systems divide the country into political districts 
and elected members of parliament represent the interests of their partic-
ular ridings within a national framework. These two systems represent 
very different characteristics of democracy, and civil society strategies for 
bringing concerns to parliament will differ greatly from one system to the 
next. As well, in countries that function with a majoritarian electoral system 
– that is where winning an election is based on 50% + 1 of the votes – a 
two-party system tends to dominate the political scene, with little chance 
for smaller parties or independent candidates (those not allied with any 
party) to successfully compete and break in to the political structure. This 
is evident in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States where 
smaller parties have not managed to break into the political system except 
through alliance with larger parties. In practice such systems limit the 
options of voters whose views do not align with either dominant political 
party to influence the decision-making process. On the other hand, elec-
toral systems based on proportional representation – whereby parties win 
parliamentary seats relative to the percentage of votes they received - tend 
to encourage multi-party systems, in which members from multiple parties 
are commonly elected to the parliament. However it is also true that repre-
sentatives may feel more accountable to their respective political parties 
than to their constituencies. The majority of European and Nordic coun-
tries is multi-partied, and functions under the proportional representation 
system, including Sweden, Italy, and Austria.
The complexities of electoral systems vary, and each system has impli-
cations for women’s political representation. Here we will examine the three 
most common democratic systems currently operating in the world and 
their respective influence on women’s representation. Although there is 
variation within a given type of system from country to country, a review 
of the general characteristics of each will help to identify why and how 
each systems supports or obstructs the degree to which women are able 
to access the formal political structure, and will allow us to examine the 
experiences and strategies of women activists in different countries working 
for change. This chapter also outlines the debates around current quota 
systems as they relate to particular electoral systems, along with sugges-
tions of a best-fit approach.
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Along with the given electoral system, other elements play a role in 
a state’s democratic practices. Political parties, the primary political bodies 
in most countries, campaign for votes on the basis of platforms of action, 
national policy proposals, and effective candidates who will best represent 
the nation. Aside from the role that party politics plays in operationalizing an 
electoral system, three other key elements that shape an electoral systems 
are: 1) district magnitude, or how many representatives from each district 
are elected; 2) the formula for how seats are allocated; and 3) the ballot 
structure, which determines what a ballot looks like and how voters vote for a 
party or candidate (Larserud and Taphorn 2007a, p. 5). All of these elements 
directly impact the successful implementation of a quota system to improve 
women’s political representation. For instance, the way a ballot is structured 
is critically important, since candidates who appear at the top of a party list 
have a higher chance of getting elected than those – often including women 
candidates – ranked lower by the party. Below we touch on each of these 
elements of electoral systems, and their impact on the election of women, 
before we resume our discussion on various electoral systems and explore 
them in more detail concerning women’s political representation. 
Political Parties
Some early proponents of democracy envisioned a non-partisan parliament 
where election resulted solely from merit, and the legislature was a non-
partisan institution functioning to represent the true needs of the public 
rather than representing any organized institution or ideological platform. 
However, except for the first few US Congresses under the first president of 
the United States, George Washington (1789 to 1797), this system has never 
been implemented.1 In the case of the United States voluntary networks 
linked by ideals soon evolved into organized political parties. Within most 
current democracies political parties are the key players in galvanizing public 
participation in electoral politics. Political parties generally articulate and 
advocate a particular ideology, policies and platforms of actions for running 
the state, promoting what they view as the priority issues of the nation. Party 
 1. This is true even for countries where political parties are outlawed, since politicians often form 
factions that act as de facto political parties. Such factions work in a similar fashion to parties 
in that they organize and group the electorate for political support; however they do not have 
an official party platform and in most cases are not under any obligation to be transparent or 
accountable to the public (Moslem 2002).
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members work to gain the support of the electorate and if elected work to 
influence the laws and policies of the country. 
Political parties aim to influence politics directly by promoting some of 
their most influential supporters or members to political decision-making 
positions, and indirectly by appealing to the public for support, such as by 
engaging in public awareness-raising activities or campaigning on various 
issues and reforms. To be successful in acquiring public support as well as 
attaining and maintaining political power within the government, parties 
have to clarify their mandates and goals in the form of a party platform, 
and then participate in electoral campaigns, educational outreach or protest 
actions. In this regard, parties are important in democratic regimes as they 
provide a channel through which ideas are discussed in the public sphere 
and then brought to the governmental level. Often as the number of political 
parties increase, the political system is considered to be more democratic as 
it allows more diverse political positions to be represented.
However, research on institutionalized parties indicates that their 
nominees are often powerful individuals and/or members of the elite; nomi-
nations are thus not necessarily merit and/or platform commitment-based 
(Ballington 2004). One of the reasons for women’s underrepresentation in 
party politics, particularly in high ranking positions, is due to class/power-
based discrimination; such practices impede women’s (and often minorities’) 
access to powerful positions, prioritizing the rise of elite males to power 
within party structures (Kittilson 2006). 
Thus, political parties can be both instrumental in political democrati-
zation through their manifestation of diverse views, and at the same time 
can stifle the voices of certain groups, in particular women and minorities, 
who are often considered potentially risky choices for higher positions by 
their parties. Candidates considered “safe” nominees for leading positions 
are generally well-connected, male, middle-class individuals. Since a party’s 
main goal is to achieve power and win seats, potentially “risky” candidates 
are often over looked regardless of merit. This rationale is often a convenient 
way for male leaders to justify their hold on power through the exclusion of 
women. However, history has shown that in fact the public has often chosen 
to elect women and individuals from minority groups who are put forth 
as candidates, as is illustrated by the various female presidents and prime 
ministers that have come to power, despite party reluctance to nominate 
them in the first place.
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One example of this is Eva Peron of Argentina, whose popularity surprised 
the Peronist party, matching if not exceeding that of her husband, Argentinean 
president Juan Peron. In the mid-1900s, at a time when women in Argentina 
did not even have the right to vote, the First Lady began addressing the 
public and advocating for female suffrage, which was achieved in 1947. 
In the first elections following female suffrage, in 1951, Juan Peron ran for 
re-election and a crowd of more than 2 million mostly working-class people 
gathered in front of the presidential office calling for Madame Peron to 
run for Vice president, chanting “Evita, Vice-Presidente!” and then “ Ahora, 
Evita, ahora!” (“Now, Evita, now!”). Clearly there can be a significant gap 
between the practices of political elites and the readiness of the public to 
elect a female politician, as this incident illustrates. But such incongruities 
are gradually changing across the world as increasing numbers of minorities 
are able to access key political decision-making positions, due to political 
activism, lobbying, and the implementation of quotas.2
To reiterate, while political parties can potentially collaborate with civil 
society, they can also operate in such a manner as to limit the representation 
of diverse views and interests. Larger and more established parties can and 
often do act as gatekeepers to exclude minorities or non-organized groups, 
mostly through the process of nominating particular members for specific 
political positions. The bottom line is that the people who run for office in any 
election are candidates by virtue of being selected to run by their party. This 
selection process has not generally been favorable to women party members. 
Proponents of gender parity in political systems need to have a clear under-
standing of party structures and operations in order to target party reform and 
see how parties can be made more receptive to women candidates.
 2. Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan and Indira Gandhi of India are other examples (amongst many) of 
elected female political leaders in patriarchal societies where male colleagues deemed their 
chances of success unlikely. Benazir Bhutto, a prominent opponent of the military dictatorship 
of Zia ul-Haq, replaced the dictator in 1988, becoming Pakistan’s Prime Minister through a 
democratic election. She was elected to office twice, even though two of her brothers were also 
potential candidates as members of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), founded by their father. 
Indira Gandhi also came to power in a popular election, in one of the world’s largest democracies. 
As the world’s longest serving prime minister she gained her political experience in various leader-
ship positions, including as President of the Indian National Congress prior to becoming Prime 
Minister in 1966. Although in an attempt to belittle these developments some commentators 
indicate that these women were well connected and were members of elite families; it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that most elected leaders do come from elite and strong political networks, 
regardless of them being male or females. The public, even in such overtly patriarchal societies, is 
willing to vote for female candidates, and for multiple terms, if given the chance.
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Key Elements of Electoral Systems
As mentioned earlier, district magnitude, which refers to the number of 
seats up for election in a given district, is significant in that it directly affects 
the strategies that parties and candidates adopt in an election. District 
magnitude directly impacts the chances that may be afforded to women to 
be nominated as candidates. Single-member districts are represented by one 
parliamentarian, whereas multi-member districts are represented by more 
than one parliamentarian – which is to say they have a higher magnitude 
than single-member districts. Scholars argue that women have higher rates 
of nomination and election in multi-member districts (Rule and Zimmerman 
1994). In other words, when parties can nominate more than one person, 
they are more likely to nominate a balanced slate in terms of sex. In fact, in 
contexts where gender equality has more currency, inclusion of a woman 
may be a party strategy to attract more votes. Conversely, research suggests 
that in single-member districts, parties tend to nominate male candidates 
due to assumptions of electoral liability of women candidates as discussed 
above. Also, male incumbents – MPs wanting to run for re-election – are 
often privileged over new female candidates, especially in single-member 
districts, where it is unlikely for a party to nominate a female candidate 
to run against a male incumbent. The higher the district magnitude, the 
more candidates fielded by each party for the district, the greater the likeli-
hood that women may be put forward as candidates for attractive positions 
(Larserud and Taphorn 2007b, p. 38).3
Related to district magnitude is party magnitude. This simply means 
that smaller, weaker parties may not be able to run candidates for all the 
available seats, while bigger, stronger parties have a better chance of 
winning more of the seats up for election in a given district and are thus 
less reluctant to field women candidates. Smaller parties that expect to win 
only a few seats tend to nominate leaders and high ranking party members, 
typically men, since women are considered risky candidates who may cost 
them even those few votes.
 3. Both the media and political parties have encouraged the notion that the public will not support 
women candidates, by emphasizing the belief that people do not vote for women as they fear 
that their vote will be ‘wasted.’ This belief in the non-electability of women is thus self-fulfilling, 
as parties therefore do not nominate women. Research suggests that this is somewhat less true in 
multi-member districts, where voters seem to feel there is less risk of their votes going to a losing 
candidate, since multiple candidates are competing rather than one.
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The formula used to allocate parliamentary seats, and the ballot 
structure, which defines how voters can express their choice, are the 
other elements of concern to us in the discussion of influences on women’s 
access to formal politics in democratic systems. Modern electoral systems 
use various formulas to allocate seats to parties; one is the simple-majority 
formula (used in so-called majoritarian systems) whereby the candidate who 
receives 50%+1 of votes (an absolutely majority) wins a parliamentary seat. 
A more complex formula is one that establishes a quota of votes per seat, 
whereby for example the candidate that receives 35% of total votes allo-
cated for that seat is directly elected to parliament, while a second round of 
elections is held between the remaining candidates until all of the seats in 
that district are filled.
Finally, the ballot structure defines how voters can express their choice. 
The way the ballot is structured shapes the level of choice given to the elec-
torate and the degree of information provided to enable an informed vote. 
Different types of ballots are associated with the various types of electoral 
systems. While some electoral systems require voters to vote for parties (and 
not individual candidates from within parties), others require voters to vote 
for individual candidates within parties. Thus, voters may be presented with 
a ballot that requires them to merely vote for a party with no choice on indi-
vidual candidates, or one that allows them to vote for one or more individual 
candidates across parties. For instance, in the majoritarian system used for 
elections in the United States, voters choose one candidate from the few 
presented to them on the ballot (these candidates may be either a party 
nominee or an independent), while in Indonesia, since 2008 voters have the 
choice of either voting for a party, or for an individual candidate within a 
party list, or for both. Although voters are encouraged to vote for individual 
candidates rather than parties, the freedom to vote for a party instead allows 
less educated voters, who are often less familiar with individual candidates 
and more familiar with party platforms, to also express their wishes.
As is now clear, electoral systems comprise various elements and struc-
tures, all of which influence the degree of access women have to political 
representation. Gender quota advocates must pay close attention to these 
variable elements in order to achieve a “best-fit” quota system that works 
with a given electoral system and addresses the features that hinder women’s 
political representation. For example, in France, where the candidate with 
the absolute majority of the votes (50%+1) wins a seat, it is not effective to 
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adopt a gender quota system that applies to party lists (or tickets), requiring 
half the candidates on a party’s lists to be female, since in France’s majori-
tarian system voters elect individuals rather than a party ticket. Unfortunately 
in France the women candidates put forth by their parties under the quota 
system were for districts that their parties considered unwinnable, as party 
leaders felt otherwise they risked losing seats. This does not at all serve the 
objective of gender quotas, which is to increase levels of female representa-
tion. We discuss and analyze the French quota situation and surrounding 
debates in chapter five. 
The Three Dominant Electoral Systems
Having discussed the three main elements of electoral systems – the district 
magnitude, seat allocation formula, and ballot structure – it is now time 
to further discuss the three dominant electoral systems and some of their 
variations. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, electoral systems are 
broadly divided into three types, adopted either wholly or in some combina-
tion by contemporary representative democracies. Each of these variations 
has different implications for the political representation of women and 
other marginalized constituencies. These basic systems are: 
Proportional Representation (PR): This system generally applies to multi-
member districts represented by more than one Member of Parliament. 
In this system citizens often vote for political parties rather than individual 
candidates. Following an election, parties receive seats in proportion to 
the overall share of votes they obtained – for example a party that receives 
20 percent of the vote in a given riding/district is allocated 20 percent of the 
parliamentary seats for that riding or district, and so on. Thus more than one 
party may have members of parliament elected in a given riding, with the 
party with the most votes holding most of the seats for that riding. Generally 
in these types of systems the party with the largest percentage of seats forms 
the government. Countries that use this system include Sweden, Argentina, 
and Indonesia. 
Majoritarian/Plurality Systems: These systems mostly apply to single-
member districts (SMD), which elect only one representative per district and 
where the candidate with the most votes wins the parliamentary seat for that 
district. This parliamentary system often leads to large numbers of citizens 
feeling that their views are not represented in parliament. Research from 
various countries (see Graph 2.1 on page 32) indicates that this system gives 
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less opportunity for women to run as candidates since parties tend to put 
forward well-connected middle and upper-class male candidates to maxi-
mize the perceived odds of winning the seat. Countries that use this system 
include the United States, the United Kingdom, and India. 
Mixed System: This is a system which mixes the features of both propor-
tional representation and majoritarian/plurality systems. For instance, this 
could include allotting half of the parliamentary seats to be filled using the 
proportional representation system, while the other half is filled using the 
majoritarian/plurality system. Some of the countries that use mixed systems 
are Germany, Mexico, and Philippines. 
It is important to keep in mind that within each of these three basic 
systems there are variations. As stated earlier, each system – proportional 
representation, majoritarian/plurality, and mixed – has implications for 
women’s political representation. A more detailed discussion presented 
below of their general characteristics will help to identify why and how each 
systems supports or obstructs the degree to which women are able to access 
the formal political structure.
Graph 2.1 Percentage of Women in Parliament:  
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Source: Reproduced from Matland, Richard. “Enhancing Women’s Political Participation: Legislative 
Recruitment and Electoral Systems” in Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers © International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2005: p. 102. 
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Proportional Representation (PR) 
Under the proportional representation (PR) system, each party presents a 
list of candidates for a multi-member district to the electorate (though there 
may also be non-aligned independents running for seats). Within the most 
common form of PR, seats are allotted to each party relative to the percentage 
of the total votes that they receive. The principle is that the parliament will 
accurately reflect the choices and preferences of the electorate – in other 
words, mirror the various groups, interests, and demands of the citizenry.
This system is considered to be the most favorable to women’s repre-
sentation in parliaments (Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 2007; Rule and 
Zimmerman 1994; Larserud and Taphorn 2007b), because the associated 
electoral elements (namely, district and party magnitudes, the formula 
used in allocation of seats, and the ballot structure) are more responsive 
to increasing women’s access to political participation. For instance, district 
magnitude is largest in PR systems, increasing women’s chances for nomi-
nation as they are less likely to be considered “risky” candidates by their 
parties. Perhaps more significantly, in this system parties are more likely to 
include gender-balanced lists of candidates as a strategy to appeal to women 
(who make up at least 50% of the electorate). Since PR means that parties 
run more than one representative per riding, they can “afford” to include 
women candidates.
Often, in response to increased activism on the part of more marginal-
ized social groups, a political party will attempt to appeal to a wider spectrum 
of voters than a competing party by nominating candidates whose profiles 
accord with the gender, class, or ethnicity of a particular constituency. For 
example, in the 1970s in Norway and the 1980s in Germany, Green and 
Leftist parties voluntarily adopted gender quotas. The parties’ successes in 
elections encouraged the more main-stream and conservative parties to 
adopt similar policies in order not to lose votes. Therefore, by the mid 1980s, 
party quotas became increasingly common in these two states as a strategy 
to attract women’s votes (Phillips 1998a).4
 4. For instance, for the 1986 elections, the German Green Party decided to alternate women and 
men on its party lists. Adoption of this quota forced larger and more conservative parties to also 
follow suit out of fear of losing votes to a weaker and smaller party. Hence, the German Christian 
Democrats as well as German Social Democrats both adopted quotas for women on their party 
lists (Phillips 1998a). 
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Within the PR system, voters are not forced to choose “either/or”, as 
they do in a single-member constituency, but can vote for multiple represen-
tatives, which decreases competition between female and male candidates. 
Statistically the adoption of the PR system correlates with a relatively high 
proportion of women in the legislatures of Scandinavian countries and the 
Netherlands, while its termination in France in 1958 may have contributed 
to the decline in women’s representation in the French National Assembly 
(Randall 1982, p. 98). In fact, political scientists point to France as an illus-
tration of the impact of a proportional representation system on women’s 
representation. The level of elected women parliamentarians in France 
dropped from 5.7 to 1.5 percent when in 1958 the electoral system changed 
from a PR system to a majoritarian system. Scholars agree that the modifica-
tion of the electoral system was among the main factors that led to this drop, 
as parties were unwilling to nominate many women under the majoritarian 
system (Allwood and Wadia 2000, p. 146).
Aside from higher district and party magnitudes, both of which enhance 
women’s representation, the PR system can also easily incorporate a gender 
quota into its structure. The two basic types of PR system are: List propor-
tional representation (List PR) and single transferable vote (STV) systems 
(O’Neal 1993), both of which are discussed here.
List Proportional Representation (List PR): Under proportional representation 
systems political parties present the electorate with either closed or open 
lists, and each has significant implications for the election of women. In 
closed party lists, political parties rank candidates, without input from the 
electorate. In this system, depending on the proportion of the votes received 
for the entire party in a given district, seats are allocated from the top of the 
list, moving towards the bottom. If for example a party receives 25 percent 
of the votes in a district, the highest ranked 25 percent of its candidates for 
that district get elected to the parliament.
A major criticism of this system is that too much power lies in the hands 
of the political parties, which determine the ranking order and thus the order 
in which candidates’ names appear on the list. The candidates named at 
the top of the list, usually male, have better chances of acquiring seats – in 
a sense restricting voters’ choice and rendering the ballot less meaningful. 
However, closed lists can be argued to be more woman-friendly than open 
lists if parties abide by a gender quota in addition to a rank order rule, such 
as the provision that was temporarily adopted in Indonesia. In this case, 
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parties are required to field a minimum number of female candidates, and 
to place them in winnable positions; this way a set number of women are 
guaranteed seats in the legislature. We discuss these processes further in the 
next chapter.
Open party lists or “free lists” are generally considered to be more 
democratic than closed lists since they allow individual voters to choose a 
specific candidate regardless of his or her party ranking. With open lists indi-
vidual candidates receiving the highest percentage of votes in proportion 
to the total party vote in a given district are granted seats (O’Neal 1993). 
Depending on the specific allocation formula, voters cast ballots for candi-
dates only, or for both a party and a candidate by voting twice. For instance, 
if a party receives 25 percent of the total vote in a district, 25 percent of the 
candidates that received the highest preferential votes will be elected. It is 
argued that under this system, elected representatives are more accountable 
to constituents, who directly select individual parliamentarians.5 
Single Transferable Vote System (STV): The second type of PR system, or 
the single transferable vote system, emphasizes voting for the individual 
candidate rather than the party (although a party-list option is possible). 
Similar to open party lists, this system also grants voters freedom of choice 
in electing individual candidates, rather than entire parties, by enabling 
them to rank candidates according to their preference. Thus, if in a multi-
member district five candidates are running for a total of three seats, voters 
are asked to vote for three candidates according to their preference. Once a 
vote threshold is set, those candidates who receive the threshold in the first 
round are declared elected and all excess votes are redistributed or trans-
ferred to other candidates according to the percentage of second choice 
that the voters marked. This process continues, until three candidates are 
elected (O’Neal 1993).
 5. In addition to following a closed or open list system, most proportional representation democ-
racies also decide on a minimum threshold of votes each party must attain to win a seat in 
parliament. For instance, in Germany each party must receive at least 5% of the vote, while in 
Israel it is 1%. Vote thresholds play a key role in determining the dominance of political parties 
in the legislature. Jurisdictions with low party thresholds allow multiple small parties to win seats, 
and result in coalition governments in which small fringe parties may exercise an influence out of 
proportion to the support they received during elections. On the other hand, too high a threshold 
leads to the monopolization of power in the hands of a few, and the silencing of minority voices 
(O'Neal 1993). Any party that receives at minimum the quota-specified amount of votes is eligible 
for seats. The dominant formula used for determining the quota is to divide the number of votes 
cast by the number of seats to be filled.
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The significant aspect of single transferable vote system is that it encour-
ages the electorate to vote for any candidate of their choice, with little fear 
of wasting their vote if they vote for a female candidate. Wasted votes are 
votes that were cast for the losing candidate (individual or party). A desirable 
electoral system is one that systematically reduces the amount of wasted 
votes mostly through incorporation of rules that enable the voters to choose 
a candidate that he or she truly desires. The higher the amount of wasted 
votes the more the electorate loses confidence in the democratic process, 
since their votes made no difference. Under this system, voters mostly vote 
for candidates rather than party lists, although a party-list option is avail-
able. Due to such emphasis on individual candidates rather than party lists, 
particularly closed party lists, those elected according to STV system tend to 
be more responsive to the electorate than the party, since voters have much 
control over who specifically gets elected. 
This pattern of preferential voting can also send a message to parties and 
the state by providing better indication the electorate’s likelihood to vote for 
a minority. Voters who might otherwise be reluctant to vote for women or 
minorities for fear they would not be elected in any case in this system are 
confident that in such an event their vote then goes to their second choice, 
then third choice, and so on. In other words, their preferences are ranked 
on their ballot and this information paints a picture of the views of the elec-
torate. Women are thus more likely to get elected under an STV system. 
STV is most often used in districts with lower magnitudes (districts with less 
than four seats) due to the difficulty in ranking larger numbers of candi-
dates. However, with the increasing use of computerized ballot counting 
this system is becoming increasingly viable and in many instances electoral 
reformers are advocating for STV so that the votes of women, minorities, and 
the citizenry will actually impact the final make up of parliament and better 
express their wishes (Rule 1994, p. 19). 
In general, under proportional representation systems voter turnout 
tends to be higher as the electorate feels its votes are meaningful. PR also 
supports the formation of smaller parties alongside larger mainstream ones, 
which in turn supports representation of a wider spectrum of public opinion. 
Most importantly, in terms of the concern for gender representative polit-
ical structures, PR has the potential to provide the greatest opportunities 
for legislative representation of women and minority groups. However, as 
suggested by a 1991 report of the Canadian Royal Commission on Electoral 
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Reform, even more important than PR for women’s representation is the 
use of gender quotas within political parties. “In this respect, the behavior 
of political parties, especially in List PR systems, is crucial to women’s ability 
to gain seats in elected assemblies,” (O’Neal 1993). The Commission also 
re-affirmed findings that PR systems without gender quotas have similar or 
worse results for women’s representation than non-PR systems. In fact, the 
most effective system for ensuring women’s representation is the List PR 
system, with large district magnitudes that also incorporates a quota regula-
tion; for example 30% of seats allocated to each party must go to women. 
Although some parties have voluntarily adopted such quotas, they can also 
be legislated by the state, whereby those parties that do not abide by quotas 
can be legally sanctioned (Larserud and Taphorn 2007b). 
Majoritarian/Plurality Systems 
The second most common electoral system is the majoritarian/plurality 
system, which is often used for elections in single-member districts (SMD), 
with the exception of Bloc Vote (BV) which is used for multi-member districts. 
Under this system, the winning candidates must either receive an absolute 
majority vote, or a plurality of votes, depending on the country context 
(Rule 1994). An absolute majority vote refers to the number of votes that 
constitute more than half of the total of all members of a group (50% + 1 
of the votes), while plurality (simple majority) refers to the highest number 
of votes received by the leading candidate in an election between three 
or more candidates. Since competition is between individual candidates 
rather than party lists, women are particularly disadvantaged within these 
systems. The primary limitations to women’s access to politics is overarching 
male domination in the political arena, and political parties are less willing 
to support women’s electoral campaigns when they have to nominate them 
against male contenders. These realities, plus the fact that women have less 
material and social capital and also face cultural and religious obstacles, 
mean that women are systematically disadvantaged in electoral competi-
tions under this system. 
There are various forms of majoritarian-plurality systems – each of which 
has bearing on the levels of democracy and women’s representation. In 
the following section we discuss those types that have the most impact on 
women’s representation, which is the primary concern of this work.
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First Past the Post (FPTP): The simplest majoritarian system is the First 
Past the Post (FPTP) system, used in single-member district elections where 
voters cast a ballot for one candidate among the several from different 
parties who may be competing, and the candidate with the highest number 
of votes is the winner. Canada, India and United States are examples of 
countries that use the FPTP system for their parliamentary elections. When 
more than two candidates compete in a FPTP election, the winner is not 
required to secure majority of the votes (simply the highest amount of 
votes is sufficient).
Block Vote (BV): When the simplest marjoritarian system is used in multi-
member districts, it becomes the Block Vote (BV), in which voters vote for 
as many individuals are there are seats to be filled. They may vote for indi-
viduals from different parties or may choose to vote for candidates from a 
single party. The winning candidates are those with the highest number of 
votes (plurality). 
Party Block Vote (PBV): The Block Vote system – with the modification that 
voters vote for party lists instead of individual candidates – is referred to as 
the Party Block Vote (PBV). The party with the most votes wins all the seats in 
the district, and its list of candidates is adopted accordingly. In these systems 
candidates with highest votes (plurality) will be elected (ACE Project 2008).
The majoritarian electoral system includes two other voting schemes. 
These are the Alternative Vote (AV) and the Two-Round System (TRS), 
both of which intend to ensure an absolute majority for the winning candi-
date (50% +1 of total votes). Hence, voters vote for individuals rather than 
for political parties. 
Alternative Vote (AV): Under the Alternative Vote system, which applies to 
single-member districts, voters’ second preferences are utilized to produce a 
winner with an absolute majority if one does not emerge from the first round 
of voting (ACE Project 2008). Hence, under this preferential voting system, 
if no candidate achieves an absolute majority of first preferences, the least 
successful candidates are eliminated and their votes reallocated according 
to their second preferences until one candidate has an absolute majority. 
 Australia and Fiji use the Alternative Vote systems for their parliamentary elec-
tions, while the president of Ireland is also elected according to this system. 
In 2011, UK will hold a referendum to reform its electoral system from a FPTP 
system to the Alternative Vote. 
24176.indb   38 16/09/11   11:38 AM
39
Chapter.2.–.Electoral.Systems.and.Their.Impact.on.Women’s.Representation
Two-Round System (TRS): Under the Two-Round System (TRS), voters cast 
their first ballot by choosing one candidate among several. If a candidate 
in the first round of elections receives an absolute majority (50% + 1 of 
the vote), he or she is directly elected to the parliament. However, if no 
candidate receives this percentage, a second election is held between the 
two candidates with the best showing (O’Neal 1993). A rare variation of 
TRS results in plurality voting, in that more than two candidates compete 
in the second round of elections, and the candidate that simply receives 
the most votes (simple majority as opposed to absolute majority) is elected. 
This system can be applied either to single or multi-member districts and is 
used by countries like Iran, France, Cuba, and Egypt for their parliamentary 
elections (ACE Project 2008).
Although the main advantages of these two majoritarian systems is that 
voters can better present their preferences through rankings or having a 
second chance at voting, which in turn enhances the level of democracy, 
the competitive nature of this system can negatively impact women’s access 
to politics, due to the barriers they continue to face. As mentioned previ-
ously, these include institutional obstacles such as campaign financing and 
cultural obstacles including gender roles. Since majoritarian systems involve 
more competition between individuals than do proportional representation 
systems, women are disproportionately disadvantaged in such systems. 
Overall, while majoritarian/plurality systems are lauded for their simplicity 
and the governability of the specific geographic constituencies they 
engender, whereby elected candidates are accountable to those constituen-
cies, women and minorities do face bigger challenges in gaining access to 
politics under these systems.
Mixed Systems 
The systems described thus far have various advantages and disadvantages in 
terms of women’s access to formal political power, as well as in levels of demo-
cratic representation generally. For these reasons, some jurisdictions combine 
aspects of both proportional representation and majoritarian/plurality 
systems to achieve the benefits of both. In Germany, for instance, half of the 
seats of the Bundestag (the lower house of parliament) are filled through List 
PR, and the rest are filled by plurality, using single-member constituencies. 
Voters make two parallel marks on the ballots, one for the party list, and the 
other for the individual candidate (O’Neal 1993). 
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Parallel System: This is the most common form of mixed systems. As in the 
German case, under the parallel system, two different elections are held in 
parallel but independent to each other; one according to PR system and the 
other according to majoritarian/plurality system. The sole purpose of parallel 
is to combine the benefits of the two dominant systems, and its results 
 usually fall somewhere in between majoritarian/plurality and PR systems 
(ACE Project 2008). Mixed systems tend to enhance women’s access to poli-
tics through the proportionally represented seats, though it can be argued 
that the majoritarian/plurality elections may negatively impact women’s 
representation.
Conclusion
In this chapter we examined several types of electoral systems in order to 
identify how each system hinders or facilitates women’s success in national 
electoral politics. Women’s underrepresentation in politics is the result of 
various institutional and cultural obstacles that disadvantage women relative 
to their male counterparts. Among the most fundamental of these are polit-
ical parties and electoral systems that act as gatekeepers restricting female 
access, rather than as enablers of democratization. In order to identify the 
implicit and explicit ways these institutions disadvantage women’s access 
to formal political power, feminists and women’s rights activists are increas-
ingly analyzing their nature and structure so that they can be reformed to 
enhance women’s overall representation in politics. Research data indicate 
that proportional representation (PR) systems are more woman-friendly than 
majoritarian/plurality or mixed systems because parties are more likely to 
nominate female candidates, who are less likely to be seen as “risky”, for 
reasons elaborated on earlier in the chapter. However, given that complete 
revision of a nation’s electoral system is impractical and unlikely, researchers 
and policy developers concerned with female political representation have 
pushed for electoral reforms that help the shift toward gender balance in 
political institutions. In the following chapter we look at various gender 
quota systems developed to address some of the institutional obstacles 
facing women who wish to access political positions. We will analyze how 
quotas are designed to fit particular electoral systems, as well as their impact 
on women’s levels of representation.
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Political Representation
As stated in chapter one, representative democracy is based on the ideal of 
representing the majority of interests within political decision-making, in 
which at least theoretically all citizens are able to participate in politics with 
the state neither denying nor pandering to any particular group. However, 
as discussed earlier, historically this ideal has been compromised by the 
systematic exclusions of various groups, based on divisions of gender, 
race, class, and property ownership. Struggles to expand democracy 
have resulted in universal suffrage in most modern states, and feminists 
who fought for female suffrage had hoped that the historically masculine 
political arena would increasingly accommodate more women and other 
marginalized groups in political decision-making. However, for the most 
part privileged groups have simply devised more nuanced and sophisti-
cated mechanisms to retain political control. This reality has engendered 
an increasingly refined and profound analysis and critique of the political 
system by many marginalized groups, including women. Such groups are 
demanding enhanced access to politics based on universalist ideals, which 
hold that all members of the society, regardless of gender, race or ethnicity, 
should be treated equally. 
The feminist critique of democracy is therefore focused on the gap 
between what democracy theoretically advocates and the actual absence 
of all groups in the exercise of political control. In other words, femi-
nists point to the fact that women are continuously underrepresented 
in decision-making positions and lack equal rights and opportunities 
to participate in formal politics alongside men. Their demands include 
reform of political systems to ensure women’s representation and end the 
systemic discrimination faced by women attempting to access political 
positions. Feminists argue that the marginalization of women in politics 
actually weakens democracies as the voices of at least half of the popula-
tion go unheard. Through constant activism, research, documentations, 
and writings, feminists have succeeded in popularizing their position to a 
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significant degree, both domestically and internationally. Today, women 
from various countries employ different  strategies to increase women’s 
political representation in key positions, including campaigns and lobbying 
efforts directed to their local communities, their governments, the media 
and the international community.
The demand for gender quotas, either in political parties or as part of state 
electoral systems, has been one of the more prominent of these strategies, 
and gender quotas have been increasingly adopted, particularly following the 
1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, where governments 
agreed to act to increase women’s presence in political decision-making posi-
tions, setting a minimum target of 30 percent (Dahlerup 2006b, p. 5).
The history of electoral gender quotas dates back to the 1930s when India 
under British rule adopted quotas for local-level administrative bodies. The 
Government of India Act of 1935 set aside seats for women in the provincial 
and central legislatures, in addition to other quotas for minority groups from 
different castes. Early gender quota systems, led largely by Asian and African 
countries, generally took the form of reserved seats.  Taiwan adopted reserved 
seats in the 1940s, Pakistan in the 1950s, and Ghana in the 1960s. The global 
trajectory has been as follows: between 1930 and 1980 only ten countries 
established quotas (including Bangladesh, Uganda, and Egypt, though Egypt 
later repealed its quota), followed by an additional 12 countries in the 1980s. 
In the 1990s gender quotas were established in more than 50 countries; since 
2000 approximately 40 more countries have created quotas. Thus, out of the 
more than one hundred countries that have quotas, more than 75 percent 
adopted them during the last fifteen years. Interestingly, the majority of states 
that have adopted gender quotas in the past fifteen years are from devel-
oping or unindustrialized states (see Chart 3.1).
While the idea of political quotas is clearly not new, their recent imple-
mentation in many nations stems from a more sophisticated approach that 
considers their pros and cons and adapts the practice according to the 
particular socio-cultural-political context. As countries adopting gender 
quotas have succeeded in expanding the number of female representatives 
in electoral politics, this approach is increasingly supported by proponents 
of a gender balanced political arena, including women’s movements around 
the world and groups concerned with human rights, development and 
peace processes.
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What are Gender Quotas?
A gender quota is a measure to counter the discrimination, created with the 
intention of recruiting enough women into political positions to ensure that 
they are not merely token actors in the political arena. This measure seeks 
to overcome the obstacles which have led to the underrepresentation of 
women in politics, as well as to increase the currently slow speed by which 
the number of women in politics is rising. While there are different types of 
gender quota systems, the most common ones are political party quotas, 
legislative quotas, and reserved seats (see Table 3.1). A given quota system 
will be more or less successful depending on the extent to which the type 
of gender quota adopted matches the state’s electoral, political and social 
systems. Similar to other “affirmative action”1 strategies, gender quotas 
are generally adopted as a temporary measure, with the ultimate objective 
of equal representation of both sexes in political office, also referred to as 
 1. Measures or policies enacted to benefit an underrepresented group, usually as a means to counter 
the effects of a history of discrimination. In this book we choose to refer to gender quota adoption 
as a “measure to counter discrimination,” since the term “affirmative action” has been (wrongly) 
interpreted by some to mean “positive discrimination” and is thus controversial. The criticism stems 
from the argument that any form of “discrimination” is unjust, even if it is ‘positive discrimination.’ 
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proportional representation2 or 50-50 representation. As an initial step most 
states and institutions adopt a minimum 20 or 30 percent quota for either 
women candidates or politicians. Thirty percent, or roughly one-third of the 
total number of cabinet positions or seats of a legislative body is accepted as 
the “critical mass” of women needed to progress towards fair representation 
and to meaningfully address women’s issues and concerns. 
Gender quotas are meant to correct some of the obstacles that prevent 
women’s equal access to politics, particularly systemic and institutional 
barriers, and to insure that minimum percentage of women and men are 
always present at the major electoral decision-making bodies.3 While quotas 
can be adopted for different institutions across the three different govern-
mental branches, this work however mostly focuses on legislative quotas for 
national assemblies, as these are the arenas where policy and decision-making 
take place that affect all of society and impact women and women’s issues. 
Such quotas are either adopted by governments or political parties, and may 
be voluntary or legally mandated. It is important to keep in mind that whether 
the quota system applies to political parties, the legislature or is in the form 
 2. Proportional representation of women refers to having a total amount of female representatives 
in legislative bodies that is proportional to the total number of women in the society. Hence, since 
women constitute half of the population, a proportional representation entails that about 50 percent 
of total representatives must be women.
 3. While initially feminist demands were specifically for women’s quotas, it is now agreed that a 
minimum percentage of both sexes should be present at decision-making bodies in order to 
ensure a fairer political system. Therefore, in recent years we have witnessed a shift from feminist 
demands for women’s quotas to gender neutral quotas. 
Table 3.1 Types of gender quotas
Political Party Quotas Legislative Quotas Reserved Seats
Party specific measures, 
usually adopted voluntarily,  
to increase the proportion  
of women among party 
candidates or elected 
representatives, mostly 
through setting a percentage, 
proportion, or numeric range 
for party lists.
National binding policies, 
embedded either in the national 
constitution or electoral laws, 
requiring all political parties to 
nominate a certain percentage 
or proportion of women 
among their candidates. Can be 
strengthened by sanctions for 
non-compliance. 
A national policy that sets 
aside a certain number 
of seats in parliament for 
women. If not enough 
women are directly elected 
by the public or chosen 
by the party, they are then 
appointed, generally by  
the executive branch. 
Sources: Constructed from (Larserud and Taphorn 2007a, p. 8)(Krook 2007, p. 367)(Krook 2003, p. 4)
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of reserved seats – the results will vary depending on the extent to which the 
type of gender quota adopted matches the state’s electoral, political and social 
systems. Thus, the same quota system may produce completely different 
results in two different countries or for two different parties, hence, the mere 
adoption of quotas has not resulted in uniform increases in the percentage of 
women in parliaments worldwide; while some countries have seen dramatic 
increases in female representation, some have witnessed only modest changes 
or even setbacks. For instance, while an electoral legislative quota of 30% 
successfully increased women’s parliamentary representation in Argentina 
to an overall 40% in recent times, the same measure resulted in only 9% 
women’s representation in Brazil, and 16.7% in Panama (Krook 2003, p. 4-5). 
These variations suggest that although specific quota provisions seem similar, 
they in fact entail distinct processes of political reform. 
Despite the fact that quotas are generally instrumental in creating a plat-
form for marginalized voices (in this case, women) they nonetheless have been 
controversial. Critics include not only members of conservative male elites, 
but also some feminists. A major argument against the adoption of quota 
systems is that representation should be based on merit. Another key concern 
is that in certain contexts, quotas have had little or no effect. Other criticism 
stems from instances whereby political parties or government leaders decide 
which women are selected as candidates for elections, leaving elected MPs 
more accountable to their political parties and/or leaders and less accountable 
to their female constituents. In this chapter we review the different types of 
quotas currently in use and the major debates for and against gender quotas. 
Clearly the success of gender quotas has much to do with how they fit with 
the structure of the envisaged democracy as expressed in the constitution of a 
particular society, the electoral system in place, the political will to give a voice 
to women, and an informed and vigilant civil society. Subsequent chapters 
examine the various usages of gender quotas in specific country cases. 
Political Party Quotas
Party quotas, the most common of the quota systems in use, were first invoked 
in the 1970s by a number of socialist and social democratic parties in Western 
Europe, followed by some green and even some conservative parties in the 
1980s and 1990s across Europe and to a limited extent in other regions. Unlike 
other quota types, political party quotas are generally voluntarily adopted 
rather than legally mandated. They sometimes exist alongside other quota 
types, and tend to be the least controversial type of quota since they do not 
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involve any governmental or legal oversight. Such quotas commit political 
parties to aim for a certain proportion of women among their candidates, and 
usually apply to party lists presented to the electorate. The party’s commitment 
to utilize a quota for female candidates often forces party elites to recognize 
existing biases and alter practices to enable enhanced female representation. 
Such quotas are often astute strategic moves which recognize that women 
do indeed form a large political constituency to be courted – an awareness 
which in fact is generally due to decades of lobbying by women’s movements 
and women working within party structures. Political party quotas typically 
mandate that women constitute between 25 and 50 percent of the total 
candidates on a party list. Increasingly, women activists and political parties 
phrase their quota requirement as a “gender neutral” provision, in which they 
establish that neither sex can account for more than a stated percentage on 
the party list.4 These measures are most easily implemented in List PR elec-
toral systems, in which voters vote for parties instead of individuals and where 
seats are distributed to the parties in proportion to the overall votes that they 
receive. In countries with majoritarian/plurality systems, whereby voters vote 
for individual candidates rather than party lists, and the candidate with the 
highest votes wins, application of quotas is more complex but not impossible. 
For these systems quotas can be implemented by nominating a proportion 
of women across all single-member districts, or to the districts that the party 
expects to win, such as districts where a party member is retiring. However, 
since competition in the majoritarian system is between individuals rather 
than between party lists incorporating multiple candidates, in majoritarian 
systems parties can be less willing to nominate women candidates if there 
is concern that the prevailing public ethos might hesitate to elect women 
politicians. Examples of a few national parties that use political party quotas 
are Australia’s Labor Party; Canada’s New Democratic and Liberal Parties, and 
Kenya’s Democratic Party. 
Legislative Quotas
Legislative quotas, which also apply to the candidate selection process by 
parties, differ from party quotas in that they are not voluntarily adopted 
but rather are legally mandated quotas that apply to all parties. This is the 
newest form of quota system, and only appeared in the 1990s, in developing 
 4. For instance, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) requires that each sex is represented 
by at least 40% on the candidate party list. 
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countries, particularly in Latin America, post-conflict Africa, the Middle East, 
and across Southeastern Europe. Adoption of these quotas spread rapidly 
in part due to an active transnational women’s movement, which through 
information-sharing enabled local organizations, activists and intellectuals 
to publicize and politicize women’s political underrepresentation. Such 
activities and an international emphasis on women’s political presence led 
many women’s organizations to successfully push for quota adoption in 
their countries. At the same time local organizations, in conjunction with 
the transnational women’s movement, mobilized civil society to pressure 
international and bilateral agencies – such as the UN, the World Bank and 
other development agencies promoting human development – to explic-
itly address women’s discrimination in politics as part of their development 
guidelines and aid packages. 
Legislative quotas are enacted either through reform of electoral law 
or national constitutions. Similar to party quotas, legislative quotas also 
apply to the candidate selection process (often requiring women to consti-
tute between 25 to 50 percent of all candidates), but as mentioned, have 
the force of the law behind them. The strength of a given legislative quota 
depends much on the wording and details of the specific law mandating it. If 
the law does not impose strong sanctions for non-compliance, many parties 
will not abide by its provisions (as was the case with many parties in France, 
detailed in chapter five, which ignored the minimum quota). 
Legislative quotas are implemented in different ways depending on the 
electoral system, sometimes applying to party lists (the simpler way), or to a 
broader group of single-member districts (Krook 2009, p.9). For instance as 
in the case of Argentina, a legislative quota can simply be applied to all party 
lists, requiring all parties to nominate at least 30 percent female candidates. 
Conversely, a more challenging way is to apply the quota to single-member 
districts whereby each party must nominate female candidates in a certain 
percentage of electoral districts, as is done in France. Examples of countries 
that use legislative quotas are Brazil, Indonesia, and France. 
Reserved Seats
Reserved seats quotas differ from the other two types of quotas in that they 
mandate a minimum number or percentage of female legislators. Since this 
type of quota applies to the final result of an election, it tends to be the most 
controversial, and this has meant that reserved seats quotas have only 
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mandated low levels of female representation, usually between 1 to 10 per cent 
of total legislators, although since 2000 a number of countries have legis-
lated as much as 30 percent female elected representatives, as is the case for 
Rwanda. Reserved seats quotas are often established through reforms to 
national constitutions or electoral laws. The quota provision of these legal 
mandates mostly work in one of three ways: parties receive the reserved 
seats in proportion to the votes that they receive in the election (as in 
 Bangladesh and Pakistan), or separate electoral lists are created for women 
(as in  Rwanda), or women who receive the highest votes in the general 
direct elections per district are elected to the parliament to fill the reserved 
seats (as in Afghanistan and Jordan). Reserved seats are the oldest types of 
quotas, first used in the 1930s in India at the time of British rule (John 2000), 
and remained the main quota type adopted through the 1970s. Since 2000 
this quota type has re-gained popularity in a number of countries – primarily 
in Africa – which otherwise have very low levels of female representation. 
The guarantee of advancing women’s representation under this quota 
system has made it an ideal remedy for developing world countries aiming 
to rapidly address the dearth of women in politics. Reserved seats quotas are 
in use chiefly in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, in part because political 
parties in these regions are less established.
Arguments For and Against Quotas
There are a number of arguments made both in support of and against 
gender quotas. The most controversial aspect of gender quotas relates to 
notions of democracy and meritocracy; feminist groups and women’s rights 
activists generally view quotas as a measure to counter discrimination and 
enhance democracy by expanding representation of formerly marginalized 
groups, while opposing groups believes that politicians should be elected 
based solely on merit (qualifications), without taking into consideration 
gender or marginalized constituencies. Ironically, the latter group also invokes 
democracy in defense of its views, arguing that quotas are undemocratic as 
they diminish choice for the electorate. This debate has a long history and 
it is important to note that feminists and proponents of women’s rights are 
found in both camps, although their arguments may differ from those who 
work to uphold the status quo. Below is an outline of the most popular argu-
ments used to support or oppose quota measures, drawn from scholars and 
activists from both camps. 
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Arguments in Support of Quotas:5
• Quotas will ensure that both women and men will be part of political 
 decision-making and will advance democracy by ending the exclusion of 
women. Such measures are necessary to counter the historical exclusion 
of women from the political system across major democracies. Even in 
the oldest democracies, such as the USA and France, it took a century of 
activism and mobilization to obtain formal rights for women and minorities. 
However, these rights did not eradicate systematic exclusionary practices 
by the prevailing male political structure from restricting women’s access 
to formal politics, as even a cursory cross-national examination of national 
elections during the twentieth century makes clear.
• Quotas will force political parties to recruit and include more women 
in their leadership structure. Cross national research has documented 
the tendency of political parties – almost all of which are run by male 
political elites – to favor men based on the assumption that women are 
not electable (due to cultural or religious practices). This perpetuates 
stereotypes of women as apolitical and as unacceptable national repre-
sentatives.6 Party gender quotas will help to correct the patriarchal bias 
of most parties, and to pave the way for a more flourishing democracy.
• Women constitute half of the population – thus it is a democratic right 
for them to hold 50% of parliamentary seats to ensure women’s voices 
are present in the decision-making processes. This argument has been 
advanced against the claim that if we make quotas for women, then we 
have to make quotas for other “social groups”. However, women are 
not a separate social group; 50% of all natural social groups are made 
of women and thus quotas for women can represent all existing social 
categories. The abstract citizen in the prevailing patriarchal model of 
democracy was male; the model posited women as being more than 
adequately represented by their fathers and husbands. However, the 
interest of husbands and fathers do not always coincide with those 
of wives and daughters, as exemplified by discriminatory family laws 
 5. For a more detailed discussion, see (Freidenvall, Dahlerup, and Skjeie 2006, p. 67-68; Dahlerup 
1998; Dahlerup 2006a). 
 6. And conveniently ignoring the question of why, if women are inherently apolitical and inap-
propriate political actors the oldest of democracies took pains to explicitly exclude women from 
political structures, despite intense pressure from women involved in the French and American 
revolutions, as discussed in chapter one. 
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across the globe (Pateman 1988; Scott 1996a). This is similar to the 
commonly accepted argument that employers in the capitalist system 
cannot represent the interests of the workers. This argument is gaining 
strength as feminists emphasize the need for gender balance in politics.
• Quotas, in larger percentage, enable women to enter into political 
structures as a group, ensuring a critical mass and not just a few token 
representatives. Research has shown that when women are not present 
in parliaments in sufficient number, individual female MPs are more 
hesitant to raise women’s issues (Celis and Childs 2008; Phillips 1991). 
This is in part because the culture of most parliamentary institutions 
belittles women’s concerns – such as reforms to make family law more 
democratic or to enhance female employment opportunities – as such 
demands are often perceived to conflict with male interests. And when 
female MPs do raise these items, with only small minorities of women 
MPs, even the support of more liberal male counterparts will not be 
adequate to pass bills. Thus token women MPs feel discouraged from 
putting forward women’s concerns. Clearly a critical mass is necessary 
in the legislature to effectively address issues of concern to at least half 
of any given constituency.
• Women’s qualifications are always undervalued relative to their male 
counterparts. Systemic gender discrimination in political structures and 
institutions favor men over equally qualified women. It is a fallacy that 
there are not enough qualified women; rather women’s qualifications are 
systematically downgraded. Furthermore, since male political elites have 
historically defined what constitutes “appropriate qualifications” the 
valuation of male experiences and qualifications over those of women 
has prevailed, thus emphasizing the key roles of citizens as defend ers 
of the country (soldiering) and as “productive” labor within the formal 
economy. These conceptions ignore the crucial role of women in (re)
producing society and their critical contributions in the daily manage-
ment of households and communities, on which the survival of a 
society depends even more than on national defense and perhaps even 
economic markets. 7 Distorted assumptions that disadvantage women 
 7. These discrepancies in the way citizenship rights were constructed have been extensively discussed 
by political theorists such as Carol Pateman (1988) and Young (2000). Furthermore, even when 
women do enter the formal economy they rarely receive financial compensation equal to that of 
their equally qualified male counterparts in the same job (Narayan 1997).
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have not profoundly changed in many cases. Thus women’s years of 
care-giving and family-raising, community activism or dealing with 
government institutions and bureaucracies are worse than undervalued 
– such long-term experience is often considered to handicap women 
wanting to enter into formal politics. Yet it is precisely these everyday 
grassroots activities and the concerns of ordinary women which must be 
represented in parliament if the majority of citizens are to feel that poli-
tics is relevant to their lives and that they are truly part of a democratic 
society. Further, given that 50% of any nation’s population is women, 
gender in itself must count as a major qualification for political repre-
sentation, since the parliament of a democratic society should reflect 
its population. In these regards, quotas can be, and are, an important 
measure for making the political landscape more democratic. 
• Quotas do not discriminate against men, but rather are an answer to the 
centuries of systemic discrimination against women. In rejection of the 
argument that quotas in practice constitute discrimination against men 
and undemocratically restrict the electorate’s freedom to choose, propo-
nents argue that quotas simply stipulate that neither sex should make up 
more than x percentage (often 40 percent) of a given political configura-
tion (party, candidate list, percentage of seats in parliament, etc.) Quota 
proponents also argue that it is truly undemocratic to systematically 
marginalize women from the political sphere, first through disenfran-
chisement and now through limiting women’s access to formal politics. 
From this perspective quotas are seen as a means to address deep-seated 
and anti-democratic discrimination. Many supporters of this argument 
do not see quotas as temporary measures but rather as a means to ensure 
that a minimum percentage of each gender constitutes the parliament 
of a given democratic society.
• It is good for the image of the party. Some studies have illustrated that 
female candidates can be appealing to the public (Antic´ Gaber 2005). 
Parties that nominate women may thus be favored by the electorate, 
who see such parties as more egalitarian and more justly oriented. Such 
trends have encouraged many parties, particularly in European states 
where party politics has a long history, to adopt quotas and nominate 
women, often as a strategic measure to gain votes. Thus, in some 
contexts the adoption of quotas can up the ante for all political parties, 
including conservative parties who are compelled to follow the lead of 
their more liberal counterparts in order to compete for votes.
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Arguments Opposing Gender Quotas: 
• Unqualified women may displace qualified men since quotas violate the 
merit principle. One of most common criticisms of gender quotas is 
that they deprive citizens of the ability to choose from among the most 
qualified candidates. They argue that candidacy and election in a liberal 
democracy should be based solely on merit. Quota advocates however, 
point out that what constitutes merit is a matter of debate. While polit-
ical parties may consider factors such as high levels of relevant education 
and formal political experience, citizens may support the notion of MPs 
who are familiar with the daily struggles of common people. Research 
from around the world also shows that men in politics do not neces-
sarily have conventional political qualifications and that the ideal of 
meritocracy is invoked selectively to argue against gender quotas and to 
undermine female candidates (Paxton 2007, p.228; Siemienska 2003).8 
In other words, the ideal of a meritocracy has been used as a cover to 
continue the marginalization of and discrimination against women.
• Quotas emphasize the sex of politicians over their qualifications and 
political beliefs. This is a variation on the previous argument and the 
refutations are similar as well. We might well ask proponents of this 
view, if politicians should be elected regardless of sex, why were women 
deprived from the right to vote and to run for office at the conception 
of democracy? According to this “sex-neutral”, merit-based argument, 
the right to vote that women struggled about 100 years to gain should 
have been theirs to start with; however, that was not the case. Sex has 
been a criterion for involvement in political life and in many contexts still 
continues to be. We must now use that same criterion to redress a grave 
distortion, and parliaments must reflect the society by incorporating 
gender balance (Scott 1996a; Scott 2005).
 8. For instance, the few female parliamentarians in Iran have much higher levels of education than 
the majority of the male parliamentarians. In this regard, a female parliamentarian that has 
similar qualifications to the majority of male parliamentarians does not stand a chance of getting 
nominated. Iranian party leaders are infamous for justifying their low levels of women’s nomina-
tions on the absence of “qualified” women. However, in the 1996 general elections, a female 
candidate, Faezeh Hashemi, received the second highest number of votes in her constituency 
after competing with 350 male candidates (Afshar 2002), which illustrates the voters’ willingness 
to vote for female candidates. Similarly, in various European countries, such as Poland, female 
parliamentarians hold more university-level degrees and party or trade union experience than 
their male counterparts (Siemienska 2003). 
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• Quotas are undemocratic. Although this is a common argument 
against quotas, in fact quotas limit electoral choice to a very minor 
degree, since they apply to a limited percentage of candidates or seats 
and the degree to which choice is reduced is insignificant relative 
to the freedom to choose from otherwise marginalized representa-
tives. For instance, in 30% quotas, voters still have complete choice 
for the remaining 70% of candidates, who are almost always men. 
Furthermore, few citizens or even party members are actually involved 
in how parties decide who becomes a candidate in any case, since 
candidate nomination is the prerogative of party leaders. Though this 
criticism is raised by quota opponents in the name of citizen’s choice, 
it is really about the limits quotas place on party leaderships’ preroga-
tive to run candidates who will support them. Citizens’ lack of choice 
is in fact truly compromised by the huge amounts of money special 
interests donate to boost the campaigns of certain candidates. Massive 
advertising buys votes and severely handicaps candidates not funded 
by powerful special interests. However, those who argue that quotas 
are undemocratic do not object to these other practices which truly 
undercut democracy in significant ways.
• Quotas discriminate against men. This is another common argument 
against quotas, which is related to the meritocracy reasoning. However, 
the language of quotas is increasingly gender neutral, with many femi-
nists framing their support for quotas in terms of a minimum level of 
parliamentary representation of each sex (as in no less than 40%). 
Furthermore, how do quota opponents suggest that 100 years of 
explicit exclusion of women from formal political life be addressed? 
Since a reformulation of conceptions of citizenship or a reconstruction of 
electoral systems to reflect the realities of both men and women are not 
viable, well thought-out gender quota systems can be effective, strate-
gies to counter women’s political underrepresentation in an essentially 
male-created system (Pateman 1988; Young 2000). 
• Women do not constitute a single interest group. This argument tries to 
counter the position of gender quota advocates arguing that women 
constitute an interest group with common needs and interests which 
differ from those of men. The counter argument posits that women in 
fact are highly diverse, with differing opinions, thus they do not constitute 
a group and therefore a quota is inappropriate. In fact, having a gender 
24176.indb   54 16/09/11   11:38 AM
55
Chapter.3.–.Gender.Quotas.&.Political.Represention
quota by no means limits representation of the diversity of women 
across classes, religious backgrounds, etc.; it simply acknowledges their 
common handicap in accessing formal politics. Indeed, political parties 
also represent various constituencies, and run candidates who repre-
sent them. Additionally, there has been a shift away from emphasis on 
women’s unique interests (for instance as mothers) by gender quota 
advocates, who focus on the fact that women make up half the popu-
lation and are impacted by policy and legislation differently from the 
male half. This can be due to discriminatory laws which preclude their 
participation in the political structure, to family laws in their respec-
tive societies that restrict them from moving freely outside the home, 
from continuing their educations without their husbands’ permission, 
or from participating in the labor market or traveling. Quota propo-
nents also point out that while women may not be a “special interest 
group” in most democratic societies they are still the ones responsible 
for childrearing and running the household, and in this regard do have 
a shared perspective that is different from the male one.9 
• Quotas may actually act as a maximum threshold for female representa-
tion, instead of a temporary measure to permanently empower women, 
since states may nominate or elect only enough women to meet the quota. 
Some liberal democrats and feminists have expressed concern that quotas 
may ultimately act to limit the numbers of women in parliament. There 
is simply no data to support this concern; failures of gender quotas to 
increase the number of women MPs have been due to weak quota provi-
sions rather than the quota itself. There have been more cases of successful 
quota implementation than not, whereby the number of female MPs rose 
steadily from the time the quota was adopted, as in most Nordic coun-
tries, Argentina, and Rwanda; as opposed to cases in which quotas acted 
as thresholds, such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Jordan. Reserved seats 
quotas, which are usually lower than other quota types, are more likely to 
act as thresholds, particularly if they are to be filled by women appointed 
by male political elites. In these cases, male leaders are very unlikely to 
appoint more women than the quota has mandated (which causes the 
quota to act as a threshold rather than an empowering tool), and the few 
 9. Other impacts of systemic discrimination against women are women’s limited opportunities to 
access educational or professional institutions such as law schools to the same extent as men, 
resulting in those professions being developed with masculine perspectives or even unfriendly to 
women’s presence (Paxton 2007).
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token women are often used as a means for the state to seem modern. 
This is the case for instance in Jordan and Bangladesh in which male elites 
still have much control over quota implementation.
• Quota implementation is too unreliable, depending too heavily on polit-
ical electoral and social factors. While quotas can be difficult to apply, 
and thus require careful design with reference to the specific electoral 
system and political character of a given state their successful applica-
tion outnumbers unsuccessful cases. Fortunately case studies from around 
the world provide us with increasing understanding of factors that lead 
to a successful quota mandate. We thus know that a carefully drafted 
quota provision that is a good fit with the existing political and electoral 
structures and has strong, clear wording are key for its success. We also 
know that gender quotas must be implemented concurrently with efforts 
of the women’s movements and other advocates to mobilize the society, 
including male political elites, and that the quota implementation process 
must be closely monitored and corrected when flaws emerge. If these 
elements are present, a gender quota is almost guaranteed to succeed. 
As the above arguments indicate, the debates around gender quotas 
have been fierce but constructive, and have ultimately brought the opposing 
sides, particularly those who argue from feminist perspectives, closer 
together. The increasingly gender neutral language of discussions around 
gender quotas, emphasizing measures to address the underrepresentation of 
half a nation, has helped diffuse some of the tension.10 And as more research 
and case studies have become available, the dialogue has shifted from the 
highly ideological to the more empirical. More nuanced and sophisticated 
arguments are possible thanks to case studies from around the world that 
highlight very diverse political and historical contexts. The fact is that the 
adoption and implementation of quotas is a complex endeavor and its success 
depends on understanding how a quota may interact with the existing political 
and party systems. The research clearly shows there is no universal or simple 
recipe that applies to all countries. 
Thus, the most important aim of this book is to examine where, how, why 
and under what circumstances the quota system has been successful. This 
 10. The long and fierce public discourses over gender parity in France, as well as the quota debates 
in India, played a key role in developing the discussion on women’s political exclusion to a new 
historical depth, and resulted in a more nuanced, sophisticated and ultimately productive levels 
(Scott 2005; Nanivadekar 2006). 
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includes examining the conditions and political contexts of successful gender 
quota application, and the significant variables political activists should keep 
in mind when lobbying for national or local quotas for their electoral systems. 
Global Gender Quota Trends
Gender quotas are rapidly spreading across the globe, because women 
 refuse to be silenced and societies are looking for ways to address and end 
exclusionary practices that work against at least half of their populations. 
As illustrated in Chart 3.1 above, developing countries are at the forefront 
of recent quota adoptions, and are considered by scholars such as Dahlerup 
(2006) to be taking the fast-track towards gender balance in the parliaments, 
as further elaborated on below. In fact, out of the 26 countries in the world that 
have reached critical mass, or 30% or more women parliamentarians in their 
national legislatures, nine are ranked by the United Nations Development 
Program as having a “low” or “medium” Human Development Index (HDI)11 
(see Table 3.2). Most of these states have adopted either legal electoral or 
constitutional types of quotas; only two have voluntary party quotas, the type 
of quota prevalent in Western contexts (Krook 2006, p. 310). Table 3.2 lists 
the countries with critical mass representation as of November 2010, as 
reported by the international organization Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), 
along with their HDI ranking and the type of gender quota adopted, if any.
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(national level only)
 1 Rwanda 1961 9 2008 56.3% 167 (Low) Constitutional (30% 
reserved) & Legislative 
quotas
 2 Sweden 1921 9 2010 45.0% 7 (High) Party quotas
 3 South Africa 1994 4 2009 44.5% 129 (Medium) Party quotas
 4 Cuba 1934 1 2008 43.2% 51 (High) No quota
 5 Iceland 1915 4 2009 42.9% 3 (High) Party quotas
 11. Human Development Index (HDI) is “a compound indicator of economic development, estab-
lished by the United Nations, which attempts to get away from purely monetary measurements by 
combining per capita GDP with life expectancy and literacy in a weighted average” (A Dictionary 
of Geography 2004).













or Low Human 
Development**
Type of Gender 
Quota*** 
(national level only)
 6 Netherlands 1919 6 2010 40.7% 6 (High) Party quotas
 7 Finland 1906 3 2007 40.0% 12 (High) No quota
 8 Norway 1913 9 2009 39.6% 1 (High) Party quotas
 9 Belgium 1948 6 2010 39.3% 17 (High) Legislative & party 
quotas
 10 Mozambique 1975 10 2009 39.2% 172 (Low) Party quotas
 11 Angola 1975 9 2008 38.6% 143 (Low) Legislative quotas
 `` Costa Rica 1949 2 2010 38.6% 54 (High) Legislative & party quotas
12 Argentina 1947 6 2009 38.5% 49 (High) All three types of quotas
13 Denmark 1915 11 2007 38.0% 16 (High) No quota
14 Spain 1931 3 2008 36.6% 15 (High) Legislative & party quotas
15 Andorra 1970 4 2009 35.7% 28 (High) No quotas
16 New Zealand 1893 11 2008 33.6% 20 (High) No quotas
17 Nepal 1951 4 2008 33.2% 144 (Medium) Constitutional & 
Legislative quotas
18 Germany 1918 9 2009 32.8% 22 (High) Party quotas
19 Macedonia 1946 6 2008 32.5% 72 (High) Legislative Quotas
20 Ecuador 1929 4 2009 32.3% 80 (High) Legislative Quotas
21 Burundi 1961 7 2010 32.1% 174 (Low) Constitutional  
(30% reserved) & 
Legislative quotas
22 Belarus 1919 9 2008 31.8% 68 (High) No quotas
23 Uganda 1962 2 2006 31.5% 157 (Low) Constitutional  
(20% reserved) & 
Legislative quotas
24 Tanzania 1959 12 2005 30.7% 151 (Medium) Constitutional  
(30% reserved) & 
Legislative quotas
25 Guyana 1953 8 2006 30.0% 114 (Medium) Constitutional (33% in 
candidate electoral lists)
26 Total countries with 30 per cent or more female representation
Sources: Adapted from IPU: Inter-Parliamentary Union: Women in National Parliaments as of December 2010 
http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif311210.htm
* IPU: Women’s Suffrage http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm
** UNDP: Human Development Reports: 2009 Human Development Rankings http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/
*** The Global Database of Quotas for Women http://www.quotaproject.org/country_by_region.cfm 
International IDEA, Stockholm University and Inter-Parliamentary Union 2010. 
Notes: The gray shades indicate the countries that are ranked with low or medium human development by 
the UNDP Human Development Reports for 2008. Also the dates of universal suffrage indicate the dates for 
which all restrictions on voting were lifted. 
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The recent dramatic increase in the adoption of gender quotas in non-
industrialized regions has garnered much scholarly interest. In part this 
is because of a long-held assumption that gender equality and women’s 
empowerment are characteristics of Western and industrialized states, 
while the developing world was characterized as culturally, politically, and 
even socially incapable of advancing women’s rights. Cultural standards 
and economic advancement were particularly emphasized as key factors in 
women’s rights development by scholars who posited the Western societies 
as the role model for other regions (Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel 2003; 
Inglehart 2003; Przeworski and Limongi 1997). However, recent data shows 
little or no correlation between a state’s level of economic development and 
women’s political representation. Some of the world’s most industrialized 
democracies, such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, Russia, 
Italy and France, all of whom are members of economically and politically 
powerful Group of Eight countries (G8), have an average of 18.5% women 
in parliaments, while some of the most economically under-developed 
states, such as Rwanda, Mozambique, Uganda, Afghanistan, Tanzania, and 
Burundi, have an average of 31.4% of women representatives. In fact most 
of the countries that adopted gender quotas recently continuously struggle 
with economic and political disasters, ranging from famine to war and 
foreign occupation. 
It appears that achieving a critical mass of women in national legisla-
tures is the result of a more complex constellation of factors than previously 
assumed. Previous studies on women and politics concluded with simplistic 
explanations for increasing the number of women in parliaments, empha-
sizing correlations with industrialization, proportional representation electoral 
systems, high levels of female education and labor force participation, 
Protestantism, and a presence of new left political parties, among other 
variables (Phillips 1991; Inglehart 2003). However, such relatively consistent 
findings might have been the result of limited research that “was largely 
centered on the study of advanced Western democracies in the period after 
1970. More recent studies examining larger samples of countries over longer 
periods of time have exposed limitations in the methods and assumptions 
informing earlier research.” These studies point to a vast array of other 
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factors that influence women’s political participation, such as the diversity of 
political actors, their strategies and the political, historical and social contexts 
of each state (Krook 2003, p. 3).
It is arguable that some of the developing states (most of which are 
also recent democracies) implementing gender quotas are seeking a faster 
route to address women’s underrepresentation. According to Dahlerup 
(2006), it took Norway, Denmark and Sweden (often considered model 
countries in terms of women’s representation) 60 to 70 years from the time 
of women’s enfranchisement to achieve critical mass (see Table 3.2). The 
implicit discourse in early writings on women’s political involvement posited 
a linear progression whereby discrimination against women would gradu-
ally diminish as society developed; developing countries were expected 
to take the same path. However, there has been a growing impatience 
among contemporary feminists who are unwilling to wait and who do not 
subscribe to the linear model of development. There has been increasing 
pressure from national and international groups for “fast track” measures 
pushing for gender parity and more women-friendly political cultures and 
practices. A number of recent democracies are now adopting the fast 
track discourse, applying gender quotas to reach critical mass of women 
in legislatures. As Tables 3.3 and 3.4 indicate, the number of years it takes 
women to achieve critical mass in parliament after acquiring the right to 
vote averages only 38.6 years for developing countries, as opposed to 60 
to 70 years for developed countries. The “incremental discourse” is inter-
twined primarily with the voluntary party quotas (or absence of quotas) of 
developed states; the fast track discourse  requires constitutional or legally 
sanctioned gender quotas – the type of quota more commonly adopted in 
developing states.
The above data as well as the rate of quota adoption in the developing 
world, leads us to ask why these states are at the forefront of quota adop-
tion. What are the forces, actors, and reasons that lead to the adoption 
of gender quotas for national parliaments in countries that have not even 
consolidated their democracies, or are suffering from basic problems such 
as poverty or lack of security? While there are a number of factors, clearly 
a significant cause of this development stems from the relentless work of 
women’s movements that demand recognition of women’s political rights 
as part of inherent democratization process. Thus electoral gender quotas 
have emerged as one of the prominent mechanisms for achieving this 
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Table 3.3 Average number of years for developed states to first reach critical mass 








suffrage to 30%+ 
representation
1 Finland 1906 1983 77
2 Sweden 1921 1985 64
3 Norway 1913 1985 72
4 Denmark 1915 1988 72
5 Netherlands 1919 1990 71
6 New Zealand 1893 1996 103
7 Germany 1918 1998 80
8 Iceland 1915 1999 84
9 Argentina 1947 2001 54
10 Costa Rica 1949 2002 53
11 Belgium 1948 2003 55
12 Cuba 1934 2003 69
13 Spain 1931 2004 73
14 Belarus 1919 2004 85
15 Macedonia 1946 2008 62
16 Andorra 1970 2009 39
17 Ecuador 1929 2009 80
Sources: Constructed from IPU: Women’s Suffrage http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/
suffrage.htm, IPU: Inter-Parliamentary Union: Archived Data http://www.ipu.
org/wmn-e/classif-arc.htm, Freidenvall, Lenita, et al. 2006, p. 58.
Total: 1193
Average: 70.1
Table 3.4 Average number of years for developing states to first reach critical mass 








suffrage to 30%+ 
representation
1 Rwanda 1961 2003 42
2 South Africa 1994 1999 5
3 Angola 1975 2008 33
4 Mozambique 1975 1999 24
5 Nepal 1951 2008 57
6 Uganda 1962 2006 44
7 Burundi 1961 2005 44
8 Tanzania 1959 2005 46
9 Guyana 1953 2006 53
Sources: Constructed from IPU: Women’s Suffrage http://www.ipu.org/
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goal. To further analyze this issue, we will now define what is meant by 
quota adoption and implementation, and outline the key factors involved 
in these processes. 
Gender Quota Adoption
Adoption of a gender quota refers to legislation or state directive, or the 
voluntary action by a political party. We have noted various contemporary 
circumstances which can lead to quota adoption, and the complexities 
entailed. Distilling the multiple factors at play, scholars have arrived at a 
framework for analyzing quota adoption across many studies, while acknowl-
edging that there is no single definitive model (Krook 2007, p. 368-369). 
Quotas are most often adopted when certain actors push for them or various 
forces help create an environment that enables their adoption. This section 
will briefly examine these factors.
The dominant actors generally fall in to one of three categories: civil 
society actors, state actors, and international and transnational actors. 
Civil society actors refer primarily to national women’s movements, which 
research shows are the most common source for gender quota proposals. 
Many scholars argue that gender quotas are rarely adopted without the 
prior mobilization of women’s movements, which generate public discourse 
and lobby relevant political actors and institutions. This is so even when 
male elites are ultimately responsible for formally introducing and legalizing 
gender quotas (Krook 2007, p. 370; Tripp 2004; Baldez 2004). However, 
when state actors are the key force behind a gender quota, in some cases 
this means that political elites, namely political party leaders, adopt gender 
quotas for political expediency, in order to create an image of equality and 
social justice relative to competing parties. In such cases, if the women’s 
movement has not been involved to any meaningful degree, or contributed 
to the substance of the quota details, the quota is often an empty gesture, 
illustrating a commitment to women’s rights to the electorate without neces-
sarily actually altering the pattern of political representation.
The third group of actors that can play a key role in quota adoption 
are from the international community, including transnational women’s 
and human rights activists, international and bilateral organizations such 
as the United Nations (UN), and funding agencies supporting women’s 
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rights and democracy. Over the past decades, various international docu-
ments, namely the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, passed in 1979) and the Beijing 
Platform for Action (PFA, approved in 1995), have emphasized women’s 
equal representation in political decision-making positions. Transnational 
networks, international and non-governmental organizations, continue to 
campaign on these documents and publicize the tactics and strategies for 
successful reform. 
However, quota adoption generally involves the participation of all or 
a mix of groups of actors, in combination with other forces. For instance, 
the gender quotas adopted in post-Taliban Afghanistan were due to the 
efforts of various actors, in conjunction with circumstantial factors. The main 
actor in this case was the Afghan women’s movement, constituted by many 
individuals and organizations already involved in civil society and service 
delivery in the absence of state infrastructure and services through the long 
years of war. Their initial demand was for a 50% women’s quota, arguing 
that women in post war Afghanistan comprise more than 50% of the popu-
lation. They further argued that the particularly bitter experiences suffered 
by women over 30 years of war made them more viable nation-builders 
than the Afghan men, who waged war for decades, particularly the horrible 
divisive civil war which brought more destruction to Afghanistan than did 
the Afghan war against the Soviet Union. The Afghan women’s movement 
enlisted the active support of UNIFEM and of transnational feminists to push 
for the quota. The process of constitution writing in Afghanistan was under 
intense global scrutiny following the dramatic international mobilization 
for the war against the Taliban; notwithstanding the powerful conservative 
and patriarchal forces among Afghan society, great deliberation and discus-
sion among political elites resulted in a reserve of approximately 27 percent 
of parliamentary seats for women under the new national constitution of 
January 2004. 
Other forces are also instrumental in quota adoption. Central among 
them, especially in the recent wave of quota adoption in the developing 
world, is the democratization process itself. Recent political theorists and 
philosophers have noted a trend towards the rhetoric of gender as an impor-
tant feature in the definition of inclusive citizenship and the expansion of 
democracy (Cornwall and Goetz 2005; Held 1987). The vernacularization of 
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these debates by national women’s movements has also helped bring atten-
tion to women’s exclusion from political decision-making in the democratic 
world (Scott 2005; Merry 2006). The international community advocates 
quotas as a way to help establish the legitimacy of a new political system 
during democratic transition or the creation of new democratic institutions 
and contexts, where politicians tend to be relatively responsive to public 
opinion concerning equality, social justice, and the importance of the female 
constituency.12 
Within the international community, donor agencies such as the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and USAID have also influenced 
the adoption of gender quotas, thanks in part to lobbying by the trans-
national women’s movement for conditional funding tied to such political 
reforms. However, in contexts where the particular national women’s 
movement is weak or refuses to work with the state, such conditions can 
lead to quotas that only increase the number of women parliamentarians 
in token amounts, and fail to alter the political structure or to truly expand 
democracy. Tokenism generally amounts to reserving a few parliamentary 
seats (usually not exceeding 10 percent) for females nominated by political 
elites. This also ensures that the women in office are accountable primarily 
to the ruling elites rather than the public. However, as international pres-
sure increases, the percentage or significance of women’s quotas may also 
increase.13 For example, in Bangladesh, national level gender quotas were 
originally introduced in 1972, with 15 reserved seats from a total of 315, 
but the quota lapsed several times as a result of political instability. Various 
civil society groups, in collaboration with grassroots women’s movements, 
mobilized, lobbying directly and through transnational civil society groups 
to convince development agencies to make the re-adoption of gender 
quotas a precondition for development aid upon which the government 
of Bangladesh was dependent. In 2000, a United Nations Development 
Program provided  Bangladesh with funding for a $4 million governance 
 12. However, some states may adopt quotas as a strategy to seem more modern, without allowing 
substantive input from grassroots women’s movements or the consideration of the female constit-
uency’s needs and demands. An example is Jordan, where in 2004 King Abdullah reserved 6 seats 
for women in the 110-member lower house of parliament. This measure occurred without much 
input from the national women’s movement. 
 13. In addition to Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), local NGOs that focus on women’s political 
representation may provide support and training for potential women candidates, funded largely 
by international donor agencies and institutions, instead of depending on the state to formally 
institutionalize gender quotas (Rai 2008, p. 97).
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program to extend its lapsed quota legislation for women in parliament 
and to increase the percentage of required seats for women from 7 
percent to 30 percent (Paxton 2007, p. 184). Currently, Bangladesh has 
45 reserved seats for women out of a total of 300 parliamentary seats, a 
far cry from the advocated 30 percent. However, in March 2009 Prime 
Minister Sheikh Hasina declared her intent to increase women’s reserved 
seats to 100 as proposed by the National Women’s Development Policy of 
her party, though by the time of the publication of this book this promise 
remained unrealized.14
Finally, national crises have also led to the adoption of gender quotas. 
For instance, “of the 12 African countries with the highest rates of female 
representation in parliament (all of which have also adopted quotas in recent 
years), eight (Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Uganda, Rwanda, Eritrea, 
Burundi, and Namibia) have undergone liberation wars or civil conflict in 
recent years” (Tripp, Konate, and Lowe-Morna 2006, p. 119). Many devel-
oping states are still suffering from political, economical, and social turmoil. 
Countries emerging from civil wars or wars of liberation have adopted quotas 
in part because women mobilize under such conditions to save their families 
and communities and to promote peace. Post-conflict states often draft new 
constitutions or re-establish their parliaments from scratch, which enables 
women’s movements to pressure for drastic changes. Also “upheavals of this 
kind shake up existing social and cultural norms, even if only for a short time, 
opening a space for women to play non-traditional roles” (Tripp, Konate, 
and Lowe-Morna 2006, p. 119). For instance, in the aftermath  of the 1994 
Rwandan genocide, women, who by then constituted about 70 percent 
of Rwandan society, were able to break down traditional assumptions 
concerning the role of women and entered the public sphere as rebuilders 
and reconcilers of a torn country. However, the successful adoption of quotas 
in Rwanda would not have been possible if the women’s movement was not 
prepared with specific demands for the new government, namely adoption 
and implementation of quotas. They were also prepared to provide input on 
 14. Thaindian News, “Bangladesh Parliament to Double Reservation for Women,” 2009, available from 
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/politics/bangladesh-parliament-to-double-reservation-for-
women-lead_100164454.html. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s promise to increase the number 
of reserved seats by the next elections, which are expected to take place in 2013, had not been 
materialized by the time this book went to print in early 2011. As quota measures in Bangladesh 
are in the form of constitutional reforms, the parliament is required to debate them, a process that 
thus far does not seem to have begun. 
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the preferred kind of quota and electoral systems. Overall, there is no single 
or conclusive explanation for quota adoption. Factors from below (such as 
the presence of an active women’s movement), and above (the political 
will of elites) and the breakdown of the old social structures in post-conflict 
contexts, can all be cited. It is also common that post-crises situations involve 
the international community in national reconstruction projects, creating 
leverage to either directly or indirectly pressure national elites to abide by 
international norms.
Twists and Turns in Gender Quota Implementation
It is often argued that the adoption of gender quotas is meaningless without 
effective implementation, meaning enforcement such as sanctions for non-
compliance. Many states have adopted gender quotas without a subsequent 
rise in female representation, thus defeating the purpose of quotas alto-
gether. A poorly defined gender quota will fail because it does not adequately 
penalize non-compliance, which is often the case when quotas are adopted 
as token measures without the true intent to politically empower women. 
While scholars agree that it is very difficult to pinpoint why some quotas 
are more successful than others, since the success of quota measures are 
highly dependent on the broader social and political context of a given 
society; nonetheless, it is possible to decipher from various case studies three 
primary characteristics: 1) Quotas must be clearly worded with unequivocal 
language concerning implementation; 2) quotas must fit well with the 
state’s electoral and political structures; and 3) quotas must be advocated 
and adopted by those who are truly committed to addressing women’s 
 underrepresentation. 
First, as alluded to earlier, the success of a quota is highly dependent on 
wording and details. For legislative quotas, sanctions for non-compliance 
appear to be an important variable. It is argued that the more specifically the 
quota measure is stated, and the stronger the sanction for non-compliance, 
the more likely its implementation will succeed. An example of a strong 
penalty for noncompliance that can be stated in quota provisions is that 
party lists that do not comply by nominating the required number of female 
candidates will not be eligible to compete in elections. Concerning voluntary 
party quotas, the commitment of the party should be clearly mandated to its 
members and the electorate. 
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The second factor in the success of a quota is how well it “fits” the 
existing political structures, particularly the state’s electoral system. Thus, 
when formulating quotas, advocates must thoroughly examine existing 
political and institutional structures. For instance, legislative quotas that 
apply to candidate lists might not be the best fit for a majoritarian/plurality 
electoral system with low district magnitude, since individuals rather than 
the parties compete for votes and parties are less likely to risk nominating a 
female candidate to run against male candidate. Similarly attention should 
be paid to party behavior as well as the political culture of a state, since they 
play important roles in the proper implementation of a quota measure.
The third factor deals with the level of commitment of the actors involved 
in quota implementation, since quota measures are ultimately carried out by 
political elites who recruit female candidates and ensure balanced represen-
tation. In this regard, party leaders may implement quotas as a symbolic 
gesture, nominating the minimum quota requirement of women, and thus 
undermining the effectiveness of quotas to politically empower women. 
However, actors such as women’s groups or organizations active inside 
political parties may play instrumental roles in effective quota implementa-
tion. Still other actors, such as courts or state institutions that monitor proper 
implementation are also significant; they may either overlook or penalize 
non-compliance. Therefore, when examining quota adoption, it is critical to 
analyze the key forces and actors involved, on a context-specific basis, since 
a model that may work for one society is not necessarily suitable for another. 
In short, to ensure the successful implementation of a gender quota, propo-
nents must give careful attention to the following three features:
1. Design & language of the quota policy
2. The “fit” between quota and broader political structure and institutions
3. The key actors who support or oppose quotas and the extent of their 
influence, such as the willingness of political elites, women’s organiza-
tions, and courts (international or national). What are the elite’s true 
intentions for wanting to adopt gender quotas?
Conclusion
In sum, gender quotas are considered to be an important tool to address 
women’s political underrepresentation, though quota results are not uniform 
and quota adoption and implementation are complex processes that require 
much activism and research prior to their design, close monitoring of their 
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implementation, and follow-up modification to address shortcomings. Political 
underrepresentation of women is a major arena for intervention by grassroots 
women’s rights advocates, who are often more in touch with the needs and 
interests of more marginalized segments of society. Quota advocates must 
work to promote a system that best matches the existing political structure 
and that has the most potential to support women’s interests as opposed 
to those of political parties and elites. As the previous tables illustrated, 
the developing world seems to be at the forefront of quota adoption and 
reaching critical mass, a minimum standard that has not yet been reached by 
the majority of states in the world. In this regard, developing states are taking 
a fast-track approach towards gender balance in their national parliaments. 
Similar to other empowerment strategies, gender quotas are also expected to 
further develop and improve as countries, institutions, and parties continue 
their implementation and learn from experience. Though some of the recent 
democracies that have adopted quotas may have done so merely to appear 
more modern or democratic to the international community, this may still 
prove effective in the long-run, by encouraging future generations of women 
to participate in formal politics; however, truly effective gender quotas require 
the active involvement of grassroots women’s movements.
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Country Profiles: Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom
Country Profile: Finland
Geographical location: Northern Europe
Population: 5 million (July 2010)
Majority religions: Lutheran Church of Finland 82.5%; unspecified or none 
15.1% 
Major historical developments: Finland was initially a part of Sweden from 
the 12th to the 19th centuries and then an autonomous constitutional 
monarchy within the autocratic Russian Empire. It eventually won its com-
plete independence in 1917 from Russia. Finland is the only country of the 
first wave of democratization that granted suffrage to both men and wom-
en at the same time, as early as 1906. In the 21st century, the key features 
of Finland’s modern welfare state are a high standard of education, equal-
ity promotion, and a national social security system. Since March 2000 
Finland has had a female president, Tarja Halonen, who was initially elected 
by popular vote for a maximum term of six-years, and was then re-elected 
in 2006. Since June 2010, Finland has also had a female Prime Minister, 
Mari Kiviniemi. 
Human Development Index (HDI) ranking: In 2010, Finland ranked #16 out 
of a total of 169 countries measured worldwide. 
Political system: Finland operates as a Republic, and the president serves as 
the chief of state and is elected by popular vote for six-year terms.  Finland 
also has a multi-party system, with numerous parties in which no one 
party often has a chance of gaining power alone, and parties must work 
together to form coalition governments. 
Parliamentary system: Unicameral Parliament or Eduskunta (members are 
elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms). 
Electoral system for parliamentary elections: Finland uses List Proportional 
Representation (List PR) system in which seats in the parliament are distrib-
uted to candidates or parties in proportion to the votes that they receive in 
the multi-member districts.
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Quota type: Finnish parties have rarely adopted gender quotas for parlia-
mentary elections, though Finland did adopt a legislative quota to achieve 
near gender balance by appointing additional women to various munici-
pal and government bodies when not enough have been directly elected. 
In this regard, while gender quotas at the national level were not essential 
as enough women were elected to these positions on their own terms, the 
same was not necessarily true for the local level and appointed positions.
Female suffrage and standing for election: This right was granted as early 
as 1906 to both men and women. The first elections were held in March 
1907, which saw the elections of 19 women to the parliament. 
Voter-turnout for previous parliamentary elections: 65% (2007) 
Voter-turnout by gender: For the 2003 parliamentary elections, 71.6% of eli-
gible female voters turned out to vote in comparison to 67.6% of eligible 
male voters. The total voter turnout was 69.7%. 
Women in parliament (2007 Elections): 80 women from a total of 200 mem-
bers (40% women).
Country Profile: Sweden
Geographical location: Northern Europe
Population: 9 million (July 2010)
Majority religions: Lutheran 87%; other (includes Roman Catholic, Ortho-
dox, Baptist, Muslim, Jewish, and Buddhist) 13%
Major historical developments: While Sweden emerged as an independent 
and unified country during the middle ages, by the 17th century it had 
expanded its territories into the powerful Swedish Empire. However, most 
of the conquered territories were lost during the 18th and 19th centuries to 
Russia. Since the early 19th century, Sweden has adopted strict  neutrality, 
and hence avoided involvement in both World Wars.
Human Development Index (HDI) ranking: In 2010, Sweden ranked #9 out 
of a total of 169 countries measured worldwide.
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Political system: Sweden is a constitutional monarchy, where the monar-
chy is hereditary. The prime minister serves as the head of government. 
 Following legislative elections, the leader of the majority party or the 
 majority coalition is usually appointed prime minister. Sweden has a multi-
party system, with numerous parties in which no one party often has a 
chance of gaining power alone, and parties must work together to form 
coalition governments. 
Parliamentary system: Unicameral Parliament or Riksdag (members are 
elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms).
Electoral system for parliamentary elections: Sweden uses List Proportional 
Representation (List PR) system in which seats in the parliament are distrib-
uted to candidates or parties in proportion to the votes that they receive in 
the multi-member districts. 
Quota type: Voluntary Political Party Quotas adopted various Swedish par-
ties, including the Social Democratic Party which adopted the Zipper sys-
tem (one sex alternates the other on party lists) first in 1993, but had inter-
nal quotas since 1978; the Left Party which has a 50% minimum quota for 
women on party lists since 1993, but even before that had internal quotas 
since 1978 and other party quota rules since 1987; and the Green Party 
currently has a 50% gender quota on party lists, plus minus one person, 
adopted in 1997, but also had internal quotas since 1981 and the first 
party quota rule introduced in 1987.
Female suffrage and standing for election: Swedish women received this 
right in 1921; a decade after men over the age of 25 received it in 1911. 
Voter-turnout for previous parliamentary elections: 82% (2006) 
Voter-turnout by gender: For the 1998 parliamentary elections 82.8% of 
female eligible voters turned out to vote in comparison to 81.5% of male 
eligible voters (total voter turnout 82.1%).
Women in the parliament (2006 Elections): 162 women from a total of 
349 members (46% women)
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Country Profile: United Kingdom 
Geographical location: Western Europe
Population: 62 million (July 2010)
Majority religions: Christian 71.6%; Muslim 2.7%; Hindu 1%; unspecified 
or none 23.1% (2001 census)
Major historical developments: The UK has played a leading role in the 
development of parliamentary democracy, through multiple reforms pro-
tecting the rights of citizens and limiting the power of the Monarch. The 
first was the Magna Carta signed in 1215; followed by the 1628 Petition 
of Rights granting constitutional power to the Parliament over the king; 
the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act granting protection to prisoners kept against 
the wishes of Parliament or the courts; and the 1689 Bill of Rights which 
reduced the Monarch’s right to levy taxes, suspend laws, or keep an army 
during peace times. Internal stability enabled the British Empire to colo-
nize over one-fourth of the earth’s surface by the 19th century, exerting 
significant and long lasting political and economic consequences globally 
even after colonies’ gained independence during the first half of the twen-
tieth century. 
Human Development Index (HDI) ranking: In 2010, the UK ranked #26 out 
of a total of 169 countries measured worldwide.
Political system: United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy. The Prime 
Minister who serves as the head of government is the leader of the major-
ity party or the leader of the majority coalition. The UK has primarily been 
a dual-party system (with Labour and Conservative parties), however after 
the 2010 elections the Liberal Democrats, its third largest party, entered 
into a coalition government with the Conservatives for the first time.
Electoral system for parliamentary elections: The UK uses the First Past the 
Post (FPTP) electoral system, in which the candidate with the most votes 
wins in single-member district elections.
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Quota type: Political Party Quotas in the form of All-Women Shortlists 
(AWS) that required women’s nomination to at least half of the  upcoming 
“inheritor” seats (vacant due to retirement) and in half of “strong chal-
lenger” seats (deemed most winnable), were initially adopted by the 
 Labour Party in 1992. In 2001, Liberal Democrats adopted a 40 percent 
target of women candidates, but rejected All-Women Shortlists.
Female suffrage and standing for election: Universal suffrage with no 
 property restrictions was granted in 1928. Prior, suffrage had been grant-
ed only to propertied men (1432 for the elites, and 1832 for the land-
owners), and propertied women or those who helped in the factories 
during WWI (1918). 
Voter-turnout for parliamentary elections: 61.36% (2005) and 65.1% (2010) 
Voter-turnout by gender: For the 2005 parliamentary elections 61% of 
 eligible female voters turned out in comparison to 62% of eligible male 
voters. Total voter turnout was 61%.
Women in the parliament (2010 Elections): 144 women from a total of 
650 members (22% women); according to the Center for Women and 
Democracy, the breakdown of female parliamentarians by political parties 
is as follows: Labour-82 women from a total of 256 members, Conserva-
tive-49 from a total of 306 members, Liberal Democrat-7 from a total of 
57 members, plus six additional women, each from a different party. 
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Party Quotas: Nordic Countries  
and the United Kingdom
The most widely used type of gender quota is the party quota. Such quotas are 
voluntary measures adopted by political parties, committed by their mandates 
to gender justice and to the increased presence of women in the legislature. 
They were first introduced in the early 1970s by Western European socialist 
parties. They are currently most prevalent in Nordic countries and Western 
Europe; however, they coexist with other quota types, such as legally sanc-
tioned quotas, in many Latin American and African states. International IDEA’s 
Global Database of Quotas for Women (2010) estimates that 101 parties in 
53 countries worldwide use party quotas for national parliamentary electoral 
candidates, and about half of these are in Europe (International IDEA and 
Stockholm University 2010). In this chapter we further discuss the history 
of party quotas, and their successes and limitations, through the analysis of 
some European case studies, beginning with a brief introduction of the nature 
of women’s political participation and representation from the Nordic region, 
which, as shown in the grey shaded area in Table 4.1, has led the world 
in terms of female parliamentarians. Although all Nordic countries, with the 
exception of Finland, adopted party quotas for parliamentary elections, in 
this chapter we will evaluate to what extent these quotas were instrumental 
in increasing the level of women’s parliamentary presence. 
Before we examine the adoption of party quotas in the Nordic context, 
it is first necessary to briefly analyze the historical context of the region 
concerning gender roles and women’s rights activism.
The Historical Context
Rising out of a patriarchal society run by a strong state, the early Nordic 
women’s movements promoted their cause as part of the necessary condi-
tion for the advancement of society as a whole, tactfully pointing out the 
contradiction between social democratic ideals and promises and women’s 
status. In this way they gradually politicized issues of universal suffrage, 
and female education, employment, and parliamentary representation as 
the responsibilities of the state to deliver. The road to success was long 
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and challenging, as the state and conservative political forces considered 
gender inequality a manifestation of natural gender roles. While suffrage 
was achieved in the early 1900s in all the Nordic states, other legislations 
which targeted injustice based on “traditional” gender role ideology were 
not achieved till later. For instance, until 1938 Swedish women in middle-
class professions such as nursing or teaching were likely to be fired either 
upon marriage or pregnancy (Hassim 2008). 
Feminism, understood here as the adherence to equality of men and 
women, has been a particularly strong social force in the Nordic contexts, 
relative to the more intellectual early feminism in other parts of Europe and in 
North America. Questioning the so-called “natural” inequalities maintained 
through systematic discrimination, feminists launched a multi-dimensional 
campaign to rectify several exclusionary laws concerning education and 
employment policies as well as decision-making processes. That their hard 
won successes are now often attributed to the “inherent” egalitarian culture 
of Nordic countries, especially by male researchers, simply attempts to belittle 
women’s ultimately successful resistance and struggle for gender equality. 







% Women as 
of Dec. 2010
Sweden 1921 1980s List PR-Closed Lists with 
limited personal votes
45% (2010)
Iceland 1915 1980s List PR- Open Lists 
(voluntary)
42.9% (2009)
Finland 1906 None* List PR-Open Lists 
(mandatory)
40% (2007)
Norway 1913 1970s List PR-Closed Lists 39.6% (2009)
Denmark 1915 1980s (later 
repealed)





1928 1980s Mixed Member 
Proportion MMP
22% (2010)
Sources: Constructed from IPU: Inter-Parliamentary Union: Women in National Parliaments as of December 
2010 http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm
IPU: Women’s Suffrage http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm
Notes: The gray shaded areas indicate the five Nordic countries.
* In Finland, the Green Party temporarily adopted quotas in the 1970s, but this move came at a time when 
nominating high proportion of women candidates was not unprecedented, as further explained below.
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In the early 1960s, amid widespread public debate on sex roles, 
feminist scholars arguing that gender roles were primarily the outcome 
of socialization formed radical socialist “Women’s Liberation” movements 
that challenged traditional sex-role stereotyping. Mobilizing young women 
by the thousands, along with some young men, in the 1970s and 1980s 
feminists from all five Nordic countries contested the patriarchal political 
institutions, decrying all-male political assemblies as undemocratic and 
unacceptable (Freidenvall, Dahlerup, and Skjeie 2006). The women’s 
movements lobbied around social justice issues, focusing on gaps between 
political party rhetoric and practice, particularly those of left leaning parties 
invoking principles of social justice for all. One of their winning strategies 
was not just lobbying political parties, but actually joining them, making 
alliances and whenever possible placing feminists and women activists in 
party structures and other political bureaucratic positions – working within 
the institutions they hoped to change as well as from outside through 
re-shaping public opinion (Hassim 2008). Gradually, many feminist organi-
zations turned into women’s committees of political parties (mostly leftist 
parties), while some women’s organizations remained independent from 
the party structure, devoting their energy to campaigns for gender equality. 
These various strategies politicized women’s concerns, raising public aware-
ness and support for the idea that women’s exclusion from politics and the 
benefits of democracy was anything but “natural”, and was in fact a result 
of man-made legal systems and an insidious gender ideology perpetuated 
by male-dominated political structures and cultures.
As such activity continued to influence public discourse, Nordic femi-
nists also campaigned to increase female voter turnout, recognizing its key 
importance in both debunking the widespread belief that by nature women 
were uninterested in politics, and increasing political response to women’s 
demands. Gradually the gap between the rates of male and female voter 
turnout began to close in all Nordic states, as well as in most of Western 
Europe. In fact since the 1970s women have generally outvoted men in 
the Nordic region and the U.K.; for the few countries for which data on 
female voter turnout is available, Sweden is notable in that since its 1976 
national elections women have consistently voted in numbers equal to or 
surpassing men (IDEA 2008). In Iceland women have been outvoting men 
since the 1988 elections, and in Finland since the 1987 elections. Even prior 
to this, in both of these countries women and men voted at similar rates 
in the 1960s. In the United Kingdom, discussed in more detail later in the 
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chapter, women have generally voted at similar rates to men since 1974, 
and in some elections have outvoted men (Kittilson 2006). For instance in 
the 1997 UK elections an estimated 17.7 million women voted, compared 
with around 15.8 million men, while the 2005 parliamentary elections had 
61 percent of eligible female voters turnout compared to 62 percent of men 
(IDEA 2008). 
When official statistics on male and female voter turnout are not avail-
able, research institutions turn to surveys carried out by interest groups. 
Although not as reliable as official government statistics, they nonetheless 
give a good indication of voter turnout by sex. Table 4.2 presents election 
data collected by two such institutions – the Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems (CSES), an international election research program, and the 
European Social Surveys (ESS). The table shows that for the years surveyed, 
male and female voter turnout was similar in these 7 countries, with the rate 
of female voter turnout slightly higher in most cases. Only Sweden’s 2005 
elections show slightly more men voting than women.





Sweden 2005 0.98 CSES
Iceland 2002 1.02 ESS
Finland 2004 1.02 CSES
Denmark 2006 1 ESS
Norway 2002 1.02 CSES
France 2003 1.09 CSES
United Kingdom 2002 1.05 CSES
Sources: Based on data from Societal participation, OECD Family database, www.oecd.org/els/social/family/
database. Available from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/20/43200248.pdf
The statistics clearly show there is no credibility to any argument that 
women lack interest in politics, or that low female voter turnout is the cause 
of low levels of women in political office; discriminatory practices have kept 
women out of formal politics and it was in this context that the demand 
for a minimum percentage of women on electoral lists, on committees or 
in government steadily increased in most of these countries (Freidenvall, 
Dahlerup, and Skjeie 2006). 
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Party Quotas in the Nordic Countries
The voluntary quotas eventually adopted by a number of Nordic political 
parties were not implemented until the 1980s, when women already occu-
pied about 20 to 30 percent of parliamentary seats, the highest rate in the 
world at the time. Hence, party gender quotas were adopted to reach “gender 
balance” rather than to meet minimum requirements – their primary function 
in most contexts today (Freidenvall, Dahlerup, and Skjeie 2006). Despite this 
fact, feminists from other regions, such as Latin America, often advocate for 
quotas using the Nordic states as models. This is because for late twentieth 
century feminists aspiring to reach Nordic women’s level of political represen-
tation and empowerment, using women’s quotas, particularly voluntary party 
quotas, is simpler and faster in addressing women’s underrepresentation than 
modifying other major obstacles such as the state’s electoral system or cultural 
attitudes that relegate women to the private sphere.
Interestingly, Scandinavian feminists only lobbied for gender quotas 
in the 1980s and 1990s when their optimism that social progress would 
elimin ate prejudices against women faded away. With promised changes 
failing to materialize, women’s movements began focusing on systematic 
discrimination against women through extensive research and documen-
tation. They brought these debates to the public sphere, and successfully 
politicized the issue of the reproduction of sexual hierarchy through the 
generations, while also pointing to the failure of political processes to include 
women. Galvanizing public opinion, pressure from civil society inspired 
movement within the wider society and party structures to seek solutions 
to the systematic exclusion of women from the public sphere. In other 
words, the women’s movements across Nordic countries tactfully organized 
campaigns “from below” as well as “from above”, which eventually resulted 
in strong “state feminism”, or state support for gender parity within political 
institutions (Lovenduski 2005). For instance, grassroots women’s activism 
in Norway led to the creation of a strong state machinery that eventually 
prioritized women’s equality in decision-making. In this regard Norwegian 
state feminism included the institutionalization of women’s interests by 
establishing consultative bodies overseeing the implementation of equality 
legislation and policy. Beginning in the 1970s, such councils ensured that 
members of both genders are nominated to all governmental committees. 
Prior instances of pressure on political parties included female voters in 
the 1967 municipal elections crossing out the names of candidates on the 
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Socialist People’s Party ballot and instead writing in the names of female 
candidates from other parties. This confrontational, yet legal move not only 
led to the increase in female representatives in that municipality from one to 
fourteen, but also sent a strong message to political parties that it was time 
to let women in (Means 1972, p. 371-373; Means 1976, p. 386).1 When 
male politicians protested, accusing women of using “undemocratic proce-
dures”, the Norwegian women’s organizations joined together to launch 
a campaign urging women to vote for female candidates. The success of 
such coalitions became clear in the 1977 parliamentary elections, in which 
a group of 400 women, consisting of representatives from political parties, 
the private sector, and the feminist movement, united and through their 
efforts increased the number of female representatives from under sixteen 
to twenty-four. One of the major goals of Coalition 400 was to introduce 
quotas within the political parties to end women’s exclusion and to ensure 
their access to politics (Lucas 1990). 
State feminism also became a reality in Finland, as women’s right activists 
pressured the state to establish the Council for Equality whose mandate would 
be to remove exclusionary practices from all political, economic and public 
institutions. Once the Council was established the onus was on women’s 
rights activists to network and develop policies addressing women’s inequality 
at various levels. The Council provided a legitimate and direct channel to the 
state for women activists, through which women managed to pressure state 
institutions to introduce gender quotas at the local level (Raevaara 2005).
Given the close ties between the Nordic countries, feminists and 
women activist leaders networked across borders, learning from each other’s 
experiences. Furthermore, the period from 1985-1995 was the height of 
transnational women’s movement activity, which Nordic feminists vigorously 
joined. They also pressured their countries to make gender equality part of 
their development aid packages. Other factors were also at play in the adop-
tion of gender party quotas in the 1980s and 1990s, the most significant of 
which will be discussed below. Close analysis of these factors demonstrates 
the important role that social and political contexts play in shaping specific 
strategies, as well as the significance of taking advantage of the momentum 
and opportunities that arise, sometimes unexpectedly. 
 1. According to Norway’s Municipal Elections Act of 1925, voters are permitted to delete one or more 
names on a party’s ballot and replace them with other names. For further detailed information 
please see Eugenie Lucas (1990) and Ingunn Nordeval Means (1972, pp. 371-373; 1976, p. 386).
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The Social and Political Context of Nordic Countries
Although many of the Nordic countries’ political parties have adopted gender 
quotas, it is important to note that this only occurred beginning in the 1980s 
after women’s representation had already reached a high level, and only a 
few parties accepted these measures. Therefore we have to examine other 
factors that initially enabled high levels of women’s representation.
The Women’s Movement: Scholars analyzing these cases agree that one of 
the most important factors that assisted women’s political representation in 
Nordic countries was the presence of a sustained, strong, multi-dimensional 
and committed women’s movement that advocated gender equality in all 
spheres of public and private life. The movement carried out research on 
women’s concerns and popularized its results in public discourse, raising 
demands for gender equality in education, employment, child-raising and 
women’s political representation (Giddens 2003). Once they had established 
a base of support within civil society they launched wider strategic campaigns, 
often also working from within the state structure and political parties. Indeed 
what sets these movements apart from women’s movements in most other 
regions is the early cooperation that Nordic feminists sought with the state 
and the country’s political institutions, particularly political parties. While 
they criticized the state, they also treated it as a potential ally, emphasizing 
the responsibility of every democratic state to equally represent women and 
men. Hence, women’s rights activists within the Nordic region used the state 
as a means to advance women’s rights, through continuous pressuring and 
lobbying of state institutions, political elites and parties, while also mobilizing 
the public to support their demands. The long history of such civil society 
involvement with the state has resulted in the evolution of a responsive and 
democratic state structure, which is reflected in each country’s culture and 
constitution. Today, the Nordic model considers various social movements 
as democracy’s primary “actors” and “agents” (Freidenvall, Dahlerup, and 
Skjeie 2006), and values their participation in governance. 
Electoral System: The electoral system of the Nordic states was a key factor 
assisting women’s access to political representation. All five states (See 
Table 4.1) have, since their first democratic elections in the nineteenth century, 
used the proportional representation electoral system in which voters vote 
for parties rather than individuals (List PR). As explained in previous chap-
ters, the PR electoral system is considered to be more “woman friendly” than 
 majoritarian/plurality electoral systems.
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There are two variations of the List PR electoral system: open List PR and 
closed List PR, both of which are used in the Nordic Region. Open List PR 
refers to a proportional representation electoral system in which voters can 
vote for any candidate on the list and the candidates with the most votes 
are elected. In some countries the open list aspect of the electoral system 
may be voluntary, in that voters may choose to vote for the party but are not 
obliged to select specific candidates; open list systems may also be manda-
tory whereby voters are obliged to choose specific candidates from the list 
or their vote is considered invalid. In closed List PR, the party candidate lists 
are pre-ranked by the party leadership. In this system, once the party knows 
how many seats it has won, seats are allocated accordingly based on the list 
ranking, from top to bottom. Generally, Sweden2 and Norway3 use closed List 
PR systems, while Iceland and Denmark leave each party to decide whether 
to present the electorate with either a closed or open party list before the 
elections. Only in Finland, a country with a very high percentage of female 
parliamentarians and no parliamentary quotas, is the usage of open party 
lists legally mandated, whereby the electorate can vote for any candidate 
on the list regardless of their party ranking. Observers consider this aspect of 
the Finnish electoral system as a key factor in women’s high parliamentary 
presence, since the majority female electorate tends to vote for women from 
within the lists. However overall, the success of women’s representation in 
the Nordic region is mostly credited to its PR electoral system, regardless of 
the type of party list system in use, since each variation has advantages and 
disadvantages (as discussed earlier in chapter two) (Freidenvall, Dahlerup, 
and Skjeie 2006). 
A Social Democratic Political Culture: Another important factor is the long 
history of social democracy in the Nordic states. From early on, the political 
culture – or the set of values within which the political system operates 
 (Kavanagh 1972) – of these states emphasized social democratic values, 
which intensified after World War II. Social democracies operate under close 
and integrative alliances between social movements, parties and the state, in 
which formulation and representation of public interest is at the forefront of 
 2. A reform in the electoral system of Sweden enabled limited use of open lists for parliamentary 
elections beginning in 1998 (see section on Sweden below), meaning voters could choose some, 
but not all, of their representatives through personal voting (Krook 2009). 
 3. Norway practices a mixed system with closed lists in parliamentary elections and open lists in local 
elections. 
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state party structure – often dubbed “movement democracy” (Freidenvall, 
Dahlerup, and Skjeie 2006). Also related to the region’s political culture are 
long established secularism and Protestantism, which scholars suggest have 
also influenced gender relations and enabled women’s access to education, 
employment and politics, which in turn democratized the society (Morgan 
2006).4 It is also suggested that the region’s homogeneity and little ethnic 
diversity mean there is relatively little social inequality (Hassim 2008), and 
that furthermore, Nordic countries have democratized along their particular 
trajectory in part because they have never been colonized (though they have 
colonized their own aboriginal populations).
Clearly, a lively civil society including women’s movements, vertically 
diffused from the grassroots to the state structure, helps explain the egalita-
rianism of Nordic political culture, including the prevalence of a comprehensive 
welfare state. Women, as an integral part of larger civil society, were instru-
mental in bringing about such democratic and egalitarian cultures, and are 
not simply beneficiaries, as scholars sometimes imply.
Voluntary Party Quotas: The Swedish Case
The above mentioned factors played a key role in the establishment of volun-
tary gender party quotas in most of the Nordic states, with the exception 
of Finland, where gender quotas are in use only for local elections and are 
mandated by law. Party quotas were primarily adopted by left leaning, social 
democratic, centrist and green parties, but gradually expanded to more 
right leaning parties as well due to party competition in the PR system. As a 
brief case study, we will now examine the adoption and implementation of 
such quotas in Sweden. 
In Sweden women achieved the right to vote in 1921, last among all 
Nordic states. Swedish feminists, a real and growing presence within all 
political parties, particularly in the Social Democratic Party (SDP), began 
to advocate for “gender equality” in various spheres of life (Hassim 2008). 
Campaigns for the adoption and implementation of gender quotas span a 
period of more than thirty years, beginning in the 1960s. While the main 
 4. Through a comparative analysis of four Western countries (France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and 
the United States) Kimberly Morgan argues that there is a direct linkage between religion and 
state feminism. She argues that in states with Protestant legacies, such as France and Sweden, 
women-friendly legislation are in part credited to the governments’ historical tendency to limit 
the patriarchal influence of religion; while the opposite holds true in the Netherlands and the 
United States in both of which a Catholic legacy is much stronger (Morgan 2006). 
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actors in the early campaigns mostly consisted of women’s movement orga-
nizations, later campaigns have engaged a much wider range of actors, 
extending to cross-party networks, the prime minister, party leaders, party 
congresses, civil society movements, and to a lesser extent international and 
transnational influences. As noted earlier the women’s movement had already 
mobilized the mass of female voters to use their franchise, and ensured that 
political parties and leaders took heed of the value of women’s votes. Thus 
party leaders and prime ministers supported the idea of gender quotas, at 
least in part because they feared the electoral consequences and the loss of 
women’s votes if parties refused to take steps to increase women’s representa-
tion (Krook 2009, p. 109). Furthermore, political gender equality advocates 
threatened to establish an all-women political party if existing parties did not 
accommodate their demands; a prospect political parties did not appreciate. 
The women’s organization Fredrika Bremer Association (FBF), took the 
lead in increasing women’s parliamentary presence by encouraging women 
to vote and run for office, as well as pressuring political elites to increase 
women’s representation. In the late 1960s the FBF formed a coalition 
with other women’s organizations within political parties, and demanded 
a 50% increase in women’s representation in every election until women 
had attained equal representation in parliament, followed by a demand for 
legislative quotas in 1980 (Krook 2009, p. 110-111). While initially these 
demands faced considerable resistance from Swedish political parties, which 
declared gender quotas to be an infringement on democracy, many parties 
by the 1970s and 1980s began to adopt recommendations and targets for 
the selection of female candidates. This in turn led to growing differences 
among the parties in terms of the proportion of elected women representing 
them in the parliament (Krook 2009; Hassim 2008).5 
Eventually, the various party efforts to increase women’s representation 
led to the achievement of critical mass (30% +) of women in parliament 
in 1985. In the same year, the government appointed the Commission 
on the Representation of Women to investigate existing nomination prac-
tices and proposed measures to foster gender balance at different levels of 
government. Starting with women’s appointments to local and national 
 5. Although the Swedish parties did not call the various recommendations and targets they adopted 
to increase women’s representation a “quota,” in the common understanding of the concept they 
are in fact considered gender quotas. By the 1980s, the measures that were adopted by the Green 
and Left Parties were titled “quotas” (Freidenvall, Dahlerup, and Skjeie 2006). 
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committees, this Commission recommended that the government pass legis-
lation to address women’s low levels of underrepresentation in these bodies, 
for which a set of quotas were approved by the parliament in 1988. These 
quota discussions moved from the appointed committees to elected bodies 
when for the first time since winning the vote, the proportion of women in 
the Swedish Parliament (the Riksdag) declined from 38 percent in 1988 to 
34 per cent in 1991(Bergqvist and Findlay 1999). This reversal sent shock-
waves across Sweden, where the common belief was that the trend of 
increased female representation was irreversible. Quotas for the Swedish 
Parliament would not in fact have entered public discussion if a decline in 
women’s political presence had not occurred. This decline proved women’s 
demands that political institutions, in this case political parties, must actively 
take measures to increase women’s presence in the parliament; it also politi-
cized the discussion on the public level. 
Thus, in the 1990s a group of women called Support Stockings began to 
secretly meet to discuss the reasons for the fewer numbers of female parliamen-
tarians, and then lobbied using the slogan “a whole salary and half the power” 
– meaning equal pay for equal work and women holding half the political 
power (Bergqvist and Findlay 1999, p. 137). This group threatened the estab-
lished party structure, as many women inside the parties supported the goal 
of varannan damernas (a requirement that parties alternate men and women 
on their candidate lists), and party leaders feared they would defect to form 
a new women’s party. These efforts eventually led to most parties agreeing to 
alternately list men and women in their party lists by the late 1990s, although 
many still refused to refer to this as a “quota”. There were a number of argu-
ments presented by the parties for their refusal of gender quotas. The most 
frequent was that quotas infringed on democracy by interfering with public 
choice. Thus, many party leaders preferred the term varannan damernas as it 
alluded to equal division between men and women, while they feared quotas 
could imply that the women selected might not otherwise be qualified. The 
supporters of this measure tactfully emphasized its equality provision rather 
than the fact that it was essentially a 50 percent quota. This is referred to as 
“framing” the issue in a way as to gain supporters, and can be an important 
strategy for quota advocates, depending on the contexts. 
Currently, the major Swedish parties have adopted different types of 
quotas, ranging from the Social Democratic Party’s 50% quota of varannan 
damernas (also referred to as the Zipper style as it alternates between a man 
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and a woman’s name on party lists), to the Left Party’s 50% minimum quota 
for women on party lists, and the Christian Democratic Party’s 40% gender 
neutral recommendation which means both genders have to be represented 
by the at least 40% on electoral ballots (International IDEA 2006).
The Implementation of Quotas in Sweden: Similar to other Nordic states, the 
implementation of party gender quotas in Sweden varied according to the 
degree of party commitment to adopt the voluntary quota. Those parties 
(majority leftist) that adopted alternated lists (varannan damernas) were able 
to increase the number of women elected to parliament, from 34 percent 
in 1991 to 41 percent in 1994. Among the most important factors that led 
to successful implementation of quotas in Sweden was the commitment of 
quota advocates, namely the women committee members of left leaning 
parties who continuously campaigned for increased female representation. 
In the subsequent 1998 election, the remainder of the major parties (mostly 
right leaning) established various gender thresholds which enabled them to 
elect at least 30 percent women; increasing the overall percentage of women 
parliamentarians to 43 percent. While some parties did not adopt the alter-
nated list system, a slight modification in the electoral system compensated 
for the absence of party quotas by allowing voters to choose women candi-
dates, regardless of their ranking on the candidate list. Thus, through trial 
and error, quota advocates sought a system that was a better “fit” for the 
Swedish electoral system, whereby the closed list system was altered to allow 
“limited personal votes,” though completely open lists were not adopted 
(Ferrara 2003).6 Needless to say, this act alone helped increase women’s 
elections to the Swedish Parliament. Concerning the wording of the quota 
measures, party quotas differ from other types of quotas in that they are 
voluntary and thus lack legal mandates. Their implementation therefore 
depends on the commitment of the particular party to gender equality. In 
Sweden, women were able to politicize “sex” as a central criterion of candi-
date selection, which thus pressured parties to increase the proportion of 
 6. Sweden’s Elections Act of 1997 enabled voters for the first time in Swedish electoral history to 
express a single preference vote for a candidate appearing on the party list, which until then 
was closed. This slight modification in the electoral system allowed “limited personal votes,” by 
presenting voters with the choice to use one of three different ballots to indicate both party and 
candidate preference. The first type of ballot presents pre-ranked party lists on which the voter 
can mark a preference next to one candidate. The second type of ballot only has a party name 
printed on it, but the voter can write in a list of candidates and rank them as they wish. Lastly, a 
blank ballot may be chosen on which voters can write a party name and a list of candidates. In 
the latter type, voters may also write the names of independent candidates (Ferrara 2003).
24176.indb   86 16/09/11   11:38 AM
87
Chapter.4.–.Party.Quotas:.Nordic.Countries.and.the.United.Kingdom
women elected in order to adequately “represent” women as a constituency. 
Party commitments to female representation increased following the decline 
in the number of female parliamentarians elected for the 1991 elections, 
thanks to feminists successfully pressuring party elites to adopt quotas to 
prevent another reversal. Nevertheless, the progress of women’s increased 
representation has been a gradual one, currently at 47 percent, despite the 
long history of women’s and various parties’ efforts. 
Pros and Cons of the Swedish Gender Quotas: As illustrated, gender party 
quotas became a priority for Swedish feminists and women’s activists when 
women’s representation in parliament declined in the 1991 general elections. 
The subsequent adoption of quotas led to a gradual increase in  women’s 
representation; all parties had at least 30% female candidates in the 2002 
general elections; six parties had 40 percent, and two more than 50 percent 
women (Krook 2009, p. 128). The initial commitment to quotas by the left 
leaning parties politicized the issue of a balanced presence of female politi-
cians and engendered widespread public support, forcing right-wing parties 
opposing quotas as undemocratic and anti-meritocratic, to themselves adopt 
gender quotas. Thus, although the quota debates began with leftist activ-
ists, more conservative parties were eventually pressured to accept  quotas in 
order to gain women’s votes. 
Party quotas do however have several limitations. The major concern 
is that since they are voluntary and not legally mandated, a party may 
abandon the quota at any time, potentially resulting in a decline in women’s 
representation. Secondly, since quota implementation is left up to the party, 
a party not truly committed to advancing women’s representation can still 
place women candidates in unwinnable positions or too low on the party 
list. Swedish activists recognized this problem early on, which is why they 
advocated the Zipper style quota. Lastly, gender quotas, similar to other affir-
mative action measures, are considered by some as undemocratic and thus 
less than ideal for addressing women’s underrepresentation. This controver-
sial aspect of gender quotas has led many parties to adopt recommendations 
or targets instead, which may result in weaker implementation. 
High Representation without Gender Quotas: The Case of Finland
Finland is one of the most interesting and key cases for feminist activists 
engaged in promoting electoral gender equality. Finland did not implement 
gender quotas at the national level and yet it was the first country in the 
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world to reach a critical mass of women in national parliament.7 What has 
distinguished Finland is that, unlike most other established democracies, 
women received the right to vote at the same time as men and women’s 
issues have been debated in the Finnish Parliament from the start. Finland’s 
case indicates that where women were not excluded from the initial demo-
cratic political processes when political culture was being formed, their 
 issues and concerns would have been present in parliament, since the dele-
gates would have needed the support of women voters to elect them. As 
a successful case study, Finland is important for gender parity advocates to 
pay close attention to, as it holds valuable lessons for the kinds of argument 
as well as strategies that can be adopted in other contexts. Indeed, Finland’s 
unique experience of granting suffrage to men and women simultaneously 
impacted the legacy of democratization in the country as women were 
 never subject to political exclusion.
However, looking at countries with higher levels of women’s representa-
tion beside Finland, there seems to be a range of strategies that have been 
adopted. As of 2010, six of the 24 countries that have achieved critical 
mass in their national parliaments, namely Cuba, Finland, Denmark,8 New 
Zealand, Andorra, and Belarus, do not currently use gender quotas for their 
national legislatures; though some may have adopted targets or non-formal 
quotas, as is the case in New Zealand.9 Aside from these  various case studies 
point to other strategies that were adopted in hopes to increase women’s 
parliamentary presence, some more successful than  others. For instance, 
some countries, such as Pakistan, India and France, adopted quotas for local 
elections on the assumption that this would eventu ally lead to women’s 
 7. The Finnish Green Party did temporarily adopt a voluntary quota to nominate equal amounts 
of male and female candidates in the 1970s. However, this move did not attract more votes for 
the Finnish Greens (as it did for German Greens), since by that time running a high proportion 
of women candidates was not unprecedented (Kittilson 2006). Hence, women in Finland have 
maintained high levels of parliamentary presence without the help of party quotas, the reasons 
for which are outlined in this section.
 8. Denmark’s leftist and socialist parties had party quotas in the 1980s but all were abandoned in 1996. 
For more information please visit http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?country=63
 9. Since the 1970s the New Zealand Labour Party (NZLP) has been taking steps to nominate more 
women, largely in response to a disastrous electoral defeat in 1975 and subsequent pressuring by 
women on party leaders to seek gender balance. In order to compete with other left-wing parties 
that had nominated and elected many women, the party began to use “soft quotas” – informal 
targets for a minimum number of women party list nominees. Though the NZLP never adopted 
specific or formal quotas, the percentage of women in the New Zealand Parliament reached 
critical mass (32.2%) in 2005 (Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires 2009). 
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increasing success in national elections. However the very successful munic-
ipal quotas in India (Baviskar and Mathew 2009) did not lead to an increase 
of women MPs, and it was only after many attempts and a somewhat bitter 
struggle by women’s rights activists that a gender quota was finally adopted 
by the upper house of the Indian Parliament in March 2010 (International 
IDEA and Stockholm University 2010).
Party or state ideology also seems to contribute to high female represen-
tation without gender quotas. The political culture of communist states, for 
example, tends to enable higher percentages of female representatives – as 
was illustrated by the sudden drop in the worldwide average of women 
parliamentarians, which fell from 14.3 percent in 1988 to 10.3 percent in 
1993, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. It is also argued that 
a strong and sustained women’s movement in the Nordic states has played a 
key role in increasing the number of women in office (Freidenvall, Dahlerup, 
and Skjeie 2006; Dahlerup 2005). Some scholars claim that Nordic societies 
are inherently gender equal, with a cultural openness to women’s presence 
in the public sphere (Inglehart 2003). This argument downplays the very real 
efforts of women and civil society that contributed to making these cultures 
more women-friendly, while at the same time suggesting the exclusion of 
women is based on “culture” as opposed to state institutions that system-
atically discriminate against women. Culture is not fixed, but is continually 
contested and changing. It is necessary to analyze why the political structure 
in a given state can be so resistant to women before proceeding to explore 
which factors can result in higher proportions of female parliamentarians in 
a given context. With reference to this, we discuss the case of Finland.
Finland is a state of many political firsts: in 1906 Finland was the first 
European country to grant universal suffrage to all citizens, regardless of 
gender, above 24 years of age, and in March 1907 held the first elections 
for its unicameral parliament. The significance of these general elections for 
women is illustrated by advertisements that urged Finnish women to ensure 
the election of a sufficient number of women, stating “…women are best at 
interpreting women’s wishes” (Eduskunta 2006). In that election, women 
outvoted men in many districts, and nineteen women were elected to the first 
Finnish Parliament out of a total of two hundred female candidates. Although 
the number of female representatives dropped in the next dozen general 
elections, it gradually rose once again in the 1960s. In 1983, 77 years after 
women were enfranchised (see Table 3.3 in chapter three), Finland became 
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the first nation in the world to achieve critical mass of women in parliament 
(referred to as Eduskunta) (Eduskunta 2006). Currently, among the Nordic 
states, Finland has the third highest percentage of female parliamentarians, 
after Sweden (45%) and Iceland (42.9%) (see Table 3.2 in chapter three).
Overall, the women of Finland have had a remarkable level of participa-
tion in politics, particularly as voters and members of parliament. According 
to a 2006 Parliament of Finland report, since the 1907 parliamentary elec-
tions women have accounted for more than 52 percent of the electorate and 
the turnout of eligible female voters has ranged from 52 to 84 percent. This 
has ensured that Finnish Members of Parliament have remained very atten-
tive to female constituencies. Strong women’s rights advocates in parliament 
have continued to raise women’s issues and tackle gender specific problems, 
helping to promote women’s concerns. For instance, during the very first 
Parliament in 1907, female parliamentarians presented 26 bills, including 
an initiative concerning women’s safety in the streets. In later parliaments 
women legislators across party lines have successfully fought for maternity 
care, women’s property acts, child custody, and more.
Although female MPs have raised the possibility of forming a women’s 
party, the majority of female parliamentarians have concluded that women’s 
issues are best furthered through collaboration with their male colleagues. 
And because an active women’s movement has continued to highlight the 
significance of the female vote, male MPs have tended to support legislation 
promoting women’s equal rights. However, in order to enhance cooperation 
among members of parliament across party lines, in 1991 female MPs set 
up the Network of Women in Finland’s Parliament (Eduskunta 2006). This 
has increased the voice of women MPs and enhanced their ability to gain 
support of male colleagues on gender equality issues. As opposed to creating 
an adversarial or segregationist dynamic that might have resulted from the 
establishment of a women’s party, this approach has increased parity and 
cooperation between male and female legislators. 
Factors that Contributed to the High Levels  
of Female Representation 
As previously mentioned, various factors may have contributed to the high 
levels of female parliamentarians in the Finnish Parliament, the most signifi-
cant of which will be briefly outlined here.
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Finland Set the Trend: Finland was first country where women gained both 
the right to vote and to stand for election. Finland is unique in that suffrage 
was granted to men and women at the same time (in 1906), whereas most 
other European nations first enfranchised men, with women gaining the 
vote at later stages, the exception being some of the countries that won 
independence after World War II. The simultaneous enfranchisement of men 
and women certainly helped shape a culture of gender equality in Finland, 
wherein politics have never been perceived as an exclusively masculine arena 
and women’s interests have always been represented. 
The Women’s Movement: A strong women’s movement, including the estab-
lishment in 1884 of the Finnish Women’s Association – which lobbied for 
voting rights for educated women – has continuously prioritized women’s 
issues (Sulkunen 2007). The movement’s strategy to work from within the 
party structure was significant; women activists saw parties as the true site 
for decision-making power, and thus party politics provided the best oppor-
tunity for the movement’s goals to be translated into reality (Kittilson 2006, 
p. 109). This strengthened ties between women activists and parties, helping 
advance women’s rights, as is further discussed below. The fact that Finnish 
women accounted for a majority of the electorate gave women’s rights activists 
the leverage to successfully pressure parties to adopt women’s issues. Thus, 
from the first parliament bills were passed supporting women’s issues.
The Electoral System: The design of Finland’s electoral system, formed with 
the input of the women’s movement, has greatly contributed to women’s 
political presence. As a result of the historically high female voter turnout 
and support of female candidates, explained earlier, parties have always had 
great incentive to have women on their party lists under the proportional 
representation electoral system. In establishing the electoral system in 1906, 
Finnish women’s movement opposed a closed List PR system wherein party 
officials rank candidates,10 and Finland adopted open party lists, whereby 
voters can select an individual candidate from the party list, allowing any 
candidate to receive individual preference votes. Seats are allocated to 
parties in proportion to the votes received and the candidates with the 
highest number of votes win the available seats. Under this system, women 
have performed remarkably well, evidently elected by a distinct women’s 
constituency (Kittilson 2006).
 10. As mentioned in previous chapters, in “closed party list” PR systems, political elites can and often 
do rank women towards the bottom of the list.
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This has been credited in large part to the women’s movement 
campaign urging women to vote for female candidates. The (majority) 
female electorate, presented with an open party list, has tended to vote for 
female candidates, sending women to parliament, as opposed to in a closed 
list system where parties rank the candidates regardless of the number of 
votes each receives. The open list system, combined with an active female 
constituency, have in the case of Finland rendered gender quotas unnec-
essary. Interestingly, according to research done by Elina Haavio-Mannila 
(1979), since 1906 Finnish women have stood for both parliamentary and 
local elections, but have generally been more successful in getting elected to 
the national parliament. According to her, this is primarily due to the lower 
visibility and campaigning efforts of individual candidates at the local level 
(Haavio-Mannila 1979). This trend may explain the state’s move to adopt a 
legislative measure to achieve near gender balance by appointing additional 
women to various municipal and government bodies when not enough 
have been directly elected, as further explained blow.
Cross-Party Collaboration among Female MPs: Although Finland has a 
multiparty system, female MPs have often cooperated across party lines on 
women’s issues as opposed to rigidly adhering to party platforms. This relative 
independence of female legislators and the alliance of female parliamentar-
ians through the Network of Women in Finland’s Parliament is in part the 
result of the open list electoral system, as women representatives know that 
if they serve their constituencies well, they will likely be re-elected regardless 
of party politics. However, in recent years voting patterns in Finland show 
that both men and women vote for candidates of either sex (Kittilson 2006); 
whereas previously women were more likely to vote for female candidates, 
men are increasingly voting for female candidates as well. However, women’s 
parliamentary presence has been nearly stagnant in Finland since the 1980s 
(Kittilson 2006), and, according to a 2006 Parliament of Finland report, 
there continues to be significantly fewer female than male candidates, which 
impacts women’s proportional representation (Eduskunta 2006). Thus, in 
recent elections women have accounted for slightly less than 40 percent of 
all parliamentary candidates (Hellsten 2007). 
Strong Social and Welfare Policies: From its earliest parliament, Finland has 
adopted strong social welfare policies supporting women’s concerns. These 
include policies concerning education, maternity welfare, healthcare and 
much more. Such legislation reflects the impact of the women’s movement 
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and the high numbers of female parliamentarians. Increasingly, women MPs 
are responsible for social welfare sectors, in which many have the required 
expertise. About 23 percent of current female MPs have worked in the social 
welfare and health sectors, while many others have expertise in the educa-
tional sector (Eduskunta 2006). 
It is notable that though Finnish women have accomplished much in 
terms of access to politics and the ratification of women friendly laws, they 
nonetheless lag behind men in terms of political leadership positions, political 
candidacy, government-appointed positions, as well as in non-political areas 
such as business, unions, academia, media, etc. (Hellsten 2007). To address 
such gender imbalance in these areas, the state of Finland adopted the Act 
of Equality between Women and Men in 1987, which was an important 
response to the demands of the women’s movement for state commitment 
to gender equality.11 This Act, which was amended twice in 1992 and 1995, 
not only banned direct or indirect gender discrimination in educational or 
professional entities, but also established a 40 percent minimum quota for 
both sexes in state committees and local level executive bodies. 
Although this quota does not apply to party lists or candidacy levels 
but rather to appointed positions, it nonetheless illustrates the state’s 
commitment to increase women’s presence across all areas. Thus, although 
Finland has accomplished substantive female representation, with women’s 
rights supported through state legislation and women-friendly laws, it still 
lacks descriptive female representation in that men continue to outnumber 
women in many leadership and managerial positions in both state and non-
state sectors. Thus, even as activists in many nations strive to reach levels 
comparable to Finland’s in terms of female representation, Finnish activists 
continue to push for enhanced female representation, particularly in terms 
of important decision-making positions. 
Party Quotas in the United Kingdom: An Unsuccessful Case
While the United Kingdom (UK) also adopted voluntary party gender quotas, 
it has failed to reach a critical mass of women in parliament or the House 
of Commons. There are similarities and contrasts between the UK and the 
Nordic states in terms of history, socio-economics and politics. For instance, 
similar to women in the Nordic states, British women received the right to 
 11. “Act on Equality between Women and Men” (Finland), (1987). Available from http://www.unhcr.
org/refworld/docid/3ae6b51c0.html (accessed December 30, 2010)
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vote and to run for public office in the early 1900s (specifically in 1918). In 
common with other Western states, the UK has the important characteristics 
of a stable representative democracy in which women’s socio-economic posi-
tion is relatively high. Party competition in the UK has also been conducive 
to enabling the push for gender quotas, and similar to other states, gender 
quotas were first adopted by left oriented parties and subsequently adopted 
by others in order to compete for the female vote. Women’s committees 
of the leftist parties were also influential actors in quota adoption (Kittilson 
2006). Lastly, the level of female voter turnout in UK has been very similar to 
men’s since the 1970s, and at times even higher. 
On the other hand, the democratic institutions and electoral systems 
of the Nordic states differ from those of the UK. While Nordic states 
use proportional representation, the UK currently utilizes the First Past 
the Post (FPTP) system, which is a type of majoritarian/plurality system, 
though that may change in 2011 if the public decides to reform to the 
Alternative Vote system which is a particular form of majoritarian system.12 
Traditionally, UK’s political structure has supported a two-party system, 
wherein mostly two parties – Labour and Conservative – dominate; though 
in 2011 we witnessed a major shift as the Liberal Democratic Party, UK’s 
third party, entered into a coalition with the conservatives. Nonetheless, 
UK’s political culture differs from the Nordic context which functions under 
multi-party systems in multi-member districts. As explained earlier, UK’s 
current “winner takes all” FPTP electoral system negatively impacts women’s 
political representation, as they compete directly with systemically advan-
taged male candidates. The remainder of our discussion in this section will 
 12. The United Kingdom has traditionally used the FPTP electoral system, which depending on the 
number of candidates running it may result in majoritarian or plurality voting outcomes. Hence, 
while previously only the two dominant parties competed for seats, the outcomes were majori-
tarian as one received absolute majority (50%+1) of the total votes; today with the inclusion 
of the Liberal Democratic Party candidates, as the third party, the elections result in plurality 
outcomes, in which simply the candidate with the most votes wins. This system has been increas-
ingly declared unfair by the civil society and supporters of the Liberal Democratic Party, since 
simply electing the candidate with the most votes may mean election of a candidate with only 
36% of the vote (where roughly 60% of the electorate is not represented). A chance to reform 
this electoral system was in May 2011, when UK held a referendum to change the FPTP system 
to Alternative Vote (AV) system as to ensure majoritarian support for the candidate elected by 
allowing preferential voting (or enabling voters to rank the candidates according to their prefer-
ence). However, the AV electoral system was overwhelmingly rejected by the voters. For more 
information please visit BBC News, Q&A: Alternative vote referendum, available from http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11243595, accessed May 21, 2011. 
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analyze the primary reasons why party gender quotas in the UK failed to 
substantially increase women’s representation. Specifically, we examine why 
the same type of quotas that were successful in the Nordic cases, failed in 
the UK.13
In both Sweden and the UK, the campaign for gender party quotas began 
in the 1960s and gained momentum during the 1990s. Prior to the adoption 
of their first quotas, both states had low percentages of women in parliament: 
14 percent in Sweden in 1970 and 9 percent in the British House of Commons 
in 1992 (Krook 2009, p.107). Currently, although both states have used 
quotas for several elections, the percentage of female Swedish parliamentar-
ians has reached 47 percent, while in Britain it is at 22 percent. While the 
difference can in part be attributed to the number of years the quota has been 
in place, British women have also faced more obstacles: the FPTP electoral 
system, which has not been revised since the 19th century despite significant 
social and demographic change; and the relative absence of an organized 
campaign by women’s rights activists directed at political representation; in 
combination with a competitive dual party structure. The central reasons for 
the shortcomings in the British case can be summarized as follows:
The Electoral System and Legal Barriers: Much of the comparative research 
concerning party quotas in the UK blames their failure on Britain’s First 
Past the Post system (which may result in either majoritarian or plurality 
outcomes depending on number of candidates running) and its related 
institutions. Under this system voters vote for individual candidates rather 
than party lists, so voluntary party quotas cannot apply to party lists. The UK 
women’s movement thus advocated another strategy, pushing for an “All 
Women Shortlist” (AWS), which was adopted by the Labour Party in 1993-
94, mandating that in 50% of upcoming “inheritor” seats (seats vacant due 
to retirement) and in 50% of “strong challenger” seats (seats deemed most 
winnable), the party would put forward a short list of only women candi-
dates, to ensure an increase in the election of women.14 However, though 
 13. For a useful and more detailed analysis and comparison of party quota adoption and implementa-
tion between Sweden and United Kingdom, see chapter five of Mona Lena Krook (2009). 
 14. Short-listed candidates are drawn up by Labour Party leaders at the local level and then presented 
for approval to the national level (by the National Executive of the Labour Party). The members 
of these organizations then choose one of the candidates, often after much consultation, as their 
final nominee for the party to enter the race with other parties’ candidates. Hence the local Labour 
organizations choose one female candidate amongst many on the All Women Shortlists that were 
endorsed by the National Labour Party (Lovenduski and Norris 1989).
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the AWS applied to only half of specific types of seats (about 40 districts 
or ridings), many male politicians within the Labour Party saw the AWS 
as an infringement and took the party to court. Eventually, in 1996, the 
measure was declared illegal, in violation of the 1975 Sex Discrimination 
Act, on the grounds that it discriminated against men (Kittilson 2006). The 
UK’s First-Past-the-Post electoral system was blamed in part for the vehe-
ment challenge by male Labour politicians to the AWS; since each party can 
nominate only one candidate for each single-member district, male politi-
cian’s saw their dominance and sphere of influence would be limited by the 
requirement to appoint women. Interestingly, despite the legal defeat of the 
AWS, the Labour Party was able to garner enough support from its members 
to partially apply the quota in about half of its “winnable seats” in the 1997 
elections. Even with this marginal application, the AWS helped double the 
percentage of women in the national parliament, from 9.5 to 18.2 percent. 
Sixty-four percent of female representatives elected to parliament that year 
were from the Labour Party. 
Furthermore, the legal defeat of the AWS fuelled the women in the 
 Labour Party and women’s movement to come up with innovative strategies 
to ensure women’s election to the newly devolved assemblies in Scotland 
and Wales. The first strategy was to mobilize support for the establishment of 
parliaments in Scotland and Wales, with emphasis on adoption of a women-
friendlier electoral system than the one used in the UK. The result was the 
adoption of a mixed electoral system for both assemblies, in which a portion 
of the seats are filled through the FPTP plurality system and the remainder 
through List Proportional Representation. Also thanks to continued mobi-
lization the advocates of gender equality were able to make alliances with 
the Scottish and Wales nationalist movements and gain a commitment to 
equal representation in the new assemblies from political elites, and ensure 
provisions for women to be included to achieve this goal. Consequently, for 
the first elections for Scottish Parliament and the Welsh National Assembly 
in 1999, the Labour Party used a candidate selection system for the seats to 
be filled by the plurality system by “twinning” neighboring seats, whereby 
electoral districts were paired according to geography and “winnability”, 
with a woman selected to run in one of the paired districts and a man in the 
other. Therefore, this strategy which was used for the plurality seats coupled 
with a list proportional representation electoral system for the remainder of 
the devolved assemblies’ seats, resulted in significantly high percentages of 
women’s representation. Also the “twinning” strategy was more difficult to 
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denounce than the All Women Shortlist system, since it could not be claimed 
to discriminate against men. This led to the election of 38% women to the 
Scottish Parliament and 43% women to the Welsh National Assembly, which 
sent a powerful message to the political elites that the public was willing 
to vote for female candidates over males. Interestingly, women performed 
better in terms of election to the plurality seats than in the proportional 
representation seats since parties tended to nominate women low on party 
lists whereas “twinning” was a firmer commitment to nominate women 
for the single-member districts (Squires 2004, p. 12-13). The Labour Party 
election inspired other parties in Scotland and Wales to slightly adjust their 
candidate selection procedures in 2003, which led to a jump in women’s 
representation to 43% in Scotland’s parliament and 50% in the National 
Assembly in Wales. 
Back in England, women in Labour focused on legal rather than institu-
tional strategies to increase women’s representation, emphasizing revision 
of the Sex Discrimination Act as a means to avoid future legal contestation 
of measures to counteract discrimination. This strategy was deemed more 
realistic than demanding institutional modifications, such as attempting 
to lobby for a switch to proportional representation. Their primary thrust 
included lobbying for legal recourse to address the importance of increasing 
abysmally low minority representation along with addressing political 
gender imbalance. Since European Union law allowed provisions to counter 
historical discrimination in various arenas, including political candidacy, this 
provided the Labour women with ammunition to demand change of the 
Discrimination Act. Eventually, efforts paid off when, after the 2001 general 
elections (in which women’s representation dropped), parliament passed 
an amendment to the Sex Discrimination Act, which allowed (but did not 
require) political parties to adopt measures to boost women’s election. This 
reform enabled Labour to reintroduce All Women Shortlists for the 2005 
elections, but only in 30 “winnable” constituencies; however, the party did 
not win all of these (Krook 2009, p. 215). Thus, women are still under-
represented in the House of Commons.
Political Party Structure: Related to the UK’s majoritarian electoral system 
is the state’s political party structure whereby in practice it is only the 
two main parties that compete for representation of single-member districts. 
The emer ging third party, the Liberal Democratic Party, has yet to assume a real 
 presence in the House of Commons, although it entered into a coalition with 
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Conservatives after the 2010 parliamentary elections. From the 143 women 
(out of 650 total MPs) that were elected to parliament in 2010, only seven 
were from the Liberal Democratic Party. Concerning gender quotas, the 
Liberal Democrats initiated the debate as well as the use of the All Women 
Shortlists, but the party’s small size and lack of influential actors meant that 
no formal quotas were ever adopted. The Conservative Party has always 
resisted any form of quota, using the argument of merit based nomina-
tions. However, this shifted significantly in February 2010, when for the first 
time a Conservative leader, David Cameron, acknowledged the importance 
of All Women Shortlists to address the abysmally slow increase in female 
MPs. This is credited to the fact that Conservatives can no longer ignore 
the female voting bloc pressuring for increased women’s presence, and are 
likely to be forced to pay at least lip-service to demands for a quota of some 
sort. The Conservatives won the May 2010 general elections which saw the 
election of 143 (22%) female parliamentarians, of whom an unprecedented 
48 are Conservative. However, the majority of the women in the House of 
Commons are from the Labour Party, which currently has more than 80 
female MPs. A two or three party, single-member district system, where one 
party dominates during a given mandate, is in general less vulnerable to 
pressures to increase women’s representation. 
Overall, the British voluntary gender quota case faced many obstacles 
that the Nordic cases did not. These ranged from a majoritarian/plurality 
electoral system, to legal and institutional barriers, as well as limited strat-
egizing from key actors. Considering that quota adoption, implementation, 
and impact on increasing women’s representation are multi-faceted, 
experts and activists advocate harmonized reforms to ensure that quota 
systems match the political and structural institutions. In the case of the UK, 
quota initiatives should have been matched with institutional and practical 
reforms, such as altering the electoral system, as occurred for the elections 
to the National Assemblies of Scotland and Wales; or alternatively adopting 
a quota measure that is more gender neutral (hence less controversial) such 
as Scotland and Wales’ “twining strategy,” which nominated a man and a 
women to each of the twinned neighboring seats according to geography 
and “winnability”. As mentioned above, UK is currently in the process of 
reforming its electoral system to one in which minority or third parties have 
better chances of gaining votes. Hence, this is opportune times for the British 
women’s movements to push for further structural or institutional reforms 
that also address women’s political underrepresentation. 




The Nordic states, comprised of Sweden, Iceland, Finland, Denmark 
and Norway, have traditionally ranked the highest in the world in terms 
of women’s parliamentary representation, and were considered models 
for other regions to follow. Not only were these states among the first to 
enfranchise women, their progressive social policies, namely in the areas 
of education, healthcare, employment and maternity, greatly enhance and 
benefit women’s status in society. Today the Nordic states are widely lauded 
for their “democratic stability, secularism, egalitarianism, large public sector 
and an extended welfare state, as well as high standards of living and a long 
tradition of popular participation” (Freidenvall, Dahlerup, and Skjeie 2006, 
p. 55-53). 
Not only is gender equality part of the official ideology of the Nordic 
countries, it has also been successfully enshrined in various formal institu-
tions. Nordic countries have continued to demonstrate their commitment 
to gender equality through the passage of various measures that have 
removed discrimination against women, ratifying international women’s 
rights documents, and supporting “feminist” political parties. Not surpris-
ingly, proponents of women’s political representation and gender quotas 
in other nations have paid close attention to the Nordic states in their own 
efforts to implement successful strategies. As discussed earlier, some scholars 
have pointed to the “egalitarian culture” of the region, and downplayed the 
 integral efforts of women’s rights activists that helped to bring about such a 
“culture”. However, it is commonly recognized that culture is continuously 
contested and changing, and certainly the dedication of women’s move-
ments, activists and an active democratic civil society in the Nordic countries 
have been highly instrumental in achieving women’s political empowerment 
in the region. Activists have organized collectively to develop and experiment 
with various strategies, to bring about not only women’s political representa-
tion but a society that truly promotes gender justice. Close analysis of the 
achievements of women in the Nordic countries shows the role that activism 
has played in establishing gender justice as a norm and in shaping and incul-
cating state institutions with an egalitarian culture and ideology. 
Though Nordic women were among the first to receive their political 
rights, it took them about 70 years to achieve critical mass from the time 
of enfranchisement. According to Drude Dahlerup (2006b), this time gap 
illustrates the incremental path towards gender equality, which recent 
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democracies will not necessarily want to emulate, as this would mean waiting 
decades to achieve women’s critical mass in their parliaments. Another 
lesson and concern for proponents of gender justice is that despite current 
high levels of female parliamentarians in Nordic states, there is not yet a 
corresponding presence in other areas outside the political arena. However, 
women in Nordic states are gaining status in all areas, mostly due to the 
efforts of the women’s movements, as opposed to reliance on the state’s 
good will. As noted for example, women’s high levels of representation are 
not wholly the result of quotas; in fact women had already reached excep-
tionally high levels of parliamentary presence before quotas were adopted 
by some parties in the 1980s and 1990s. And Finland, a state at the forefront 
of female enfranchisement and political participation, has hardly deemed it 
necessary to use quotas because historically women were part of the political 
sphere at the same time as men and because of their strong involvement 
in modern Finnish politics. While women in other countries can learn from 
the Nordic cases, they have to be mindful that these strategies cannot be 
adopted wholly as models to follow. Rather they have to be adapted to a 
particular country context.
Contemporary women’s rights activist and feminists cannot wait decades 
to achieve gender equality in their emerging “democratic” states. They are 
opting for “fast track” strategies utilizing gender quotas to reach critical mass 
of women in legislatures. Indeed, a number of recent democracies (mostly 
from the global south) have been able to reach critical mass with an average 
of only 38.6 years from the time of women’s enfranchisement (see Table 3.4 
in chapter three). While there are certainly lessons to be learned from the 
Nordic countries, more recently democratizing countries, such as Rwanda 
(discussed in chapter six), with a most notable achievement of 56.3% female 
representation, may provide a more appropriate strategic model.
In sum, the effects of gender party quotas vary from state to state, and 
similar to other quota provisions, their success depends on a number of 
factors, such as electoral systems, the presence and strategies of an active 
women’s movement, and the role of political elites or party competition, to 
name some of the most significant. In contrast to Sweden, which has been 
able to maintain an almost gender equal presence in parliament due to some 
parties’ voluntary quota adoptions, the UK has yet to come close to critical 
mass of women in the House of Commons due to institutional, legal, and 
strategic barriers. Though some UK parties have adopted measures to change 
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this, and there is an active movement demanding women’s representation, 
most of the problems lie in the implementation process. Some scholars argue 
that voluntary party quotas are somewhat easier to adopt than other types 
of gender quotas, but their implementation tends to be more challenging as 
it may require institutional changes as well. Such complexities all highlight 
that any type of quota adoption requires close examination of many institu-
tional and political factors such as political traditions, historical trajectories 
and levels of civil society engagement may combine to play a key role in 
increasing the level of women’s representation beside using gender quotas.
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Country Profiles: Argentina, France, and Indonesia
Country Profile: Argentina
Geographical location: South America
Population: 41 million (July 2010)
Majority religions: Roman Catholic 92% (less than 20% practicing)
Major historical developments: In 1816, Argentina declared its indepen-
dence from Spain but until World War II it was dominated by periods of in-
ternal political conflict, particularly between civilian and military factions. 
After World War II, an era of Peronist populism championed social justice 
(including female suffrage), Argentinean nationalism, and independence 
from foreign influence. This era came to end in 1976, when a military jun-
ta supported by the CIA took power in a coup. The years that followed saw 
intense repression during a “dirty war” in which thousands of dissidents 
“disappeared”. Democracy returned in 1983 after the military regime was 
widely discredited due to unprecedented corruption, the public’s revulsion 
over the dirty war, and their defeat by the British in Falklands War, all of 
which eventually led to free elections. In 2007, Argentina elected its first 
female president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.
Human Development Index (HDI) ranking: In 2010, Argentina ranked #46 
out of a total of 169 countries measured worldwide. 
Political system: Argentina operates as a Republic, and the president serves 
as the chief of state and is elected by popular vote for four-year terms. 
Argentina also has a multi-party system, with numerous parties in which 
no one party often has a chance of gaining power alone, and parties must 
work together to form coalition governments. 
Parliamentary system: Bicameral National Congress: Senate (upper house) 
and Chamber of Deputies (lower house). Members of both houses are 
elected by popular vote. 
Electoral system for parliamentary elections: Argentina uses List Propor-
tional Representation (List PR) system in which seats in the parliament are
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distributed to candidates or parties in proportion to the votes that they 
receive in the multi-member districts. 
Quota type: Legislative Candidate Quotas: Ley de Cupos adopted in 1991 
but later revised in 2000, reformed the country’s electoral law to mandate 
that all party lists must have a minimum of at least 30 percent women 
among their candidates for all parliamentary elections. To ensure women’s 
election, the law specified that the regulation of nominating 30 percent 
women applies to the number of seats that the party is trying to renew. 
The law also has rank order rules in that it requires at least one woman 
for every two men nominated on the party candidate lists (Semi-Zipper 
style all the way down the list); in case the party has only one or two seats 
to renew, at least one woman must be nominated as one of the top two 
candidates. In case the party lists do not comply with the electoral law, 
they will either not be approved or are subject to revision by a judge, who 
moves women candidates’ names to higher positions on the list prior to 
the election. 
Female suffrage and standing for election: Argentinean women received 
this right in 1947, while their Argentinean men had received it in 1912. 
Voter-turnout for previous parliamentary elections: 73.13% (2007); infor-
mation for voter-turnout by gender is not readily available. 
Women in the parliament (2009 Elections): 99 women from a total of 
257 members (39% women) 




Geographical location: Western Europe
Population: 64 million (July 2010)
Majority religions: Roman Catholic 83-88%; Muslim 5-10%
Major historical political developments: The French Revolution of 1789 wit-
nessed the adoption of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 
by the National Assembly, which extended citizenship rights solely to European, 
property owning men, despite women’s active participation in the revolution. 
Nonetheless, this document was among the first citizen rights documents 
in the world, though it did not expand citizenship rights to women. France 
became an imperial power colonizing parts of the African continent and 
the Middle East, but suffered extensive losses in its empire, wealth, and 
rank after the two World Wars. France has revised its constitution and electoral 
system several times, the last of which (the Fifth Republic) was in 1958, 
which made France’s political system a hybrid presidential-parliamentary 
governing system.
Human Development Index (HDI) ranking: In 2010, France ranked #14 from 
a total of 169 countries measured worldwide.
Political system: France operates as a Republic, and the president serves as 
the chief of state and is elected by popular vote for five-year terms. France 
also has a multi-party system, with numerous parties in which no one 
party often has a chance of gaining power alone, and parties often work 
together to form coalition governments. In France, the dominant parties 
are the Union for a Popular Movement, which is a rightist party led by 
Nicolas Sarkozy (elected in 2007), and the left leaning Socialist Party and 
the Green Party. 
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Parliamentary system: Bicameral Parliament: Senate (upper house) and 
National Assembly (lower house). For the Senate seats, an electoral college 
elects some of its members while the rest are filled according to a List Pro-
portional Representation system, to which the parity law applies. Members 
of the National Assembly are elected by popular vote under a Two-Round 
System (TRS), as defined below, for single-member districts to serve five-
year terms. The parity law requires parties to nominate equal percentages 
of women and men in the country’s single-member constituencies.
Electoral system for parliamentary elections: France uses the Two-Round 
System (TRS) only for their parliamentary elections in the lower house. TRS 
is a majoritarian system in that once voters have cast their first ballot for 
their single-member district, choosing one candidate or party among sev-
eral, a runoff is held between the two candidates or parties with the best 
showing (the second election is avoided if in the first round a candidate or 
party receives absolute majority of the votes).
Quota type: Legislative Candidate Quotas: Parity Law or Parité which 
was adopted in 2000 constitutionally mandated that each party nomi-
nate 50 percent candidates of both sexes overall, but with no conditions 
 regarding which districts female candidates should run for, nor strong 
sanctions for noncompliance
Female suffrage and standing for election: French women were among the 
last countries in Europe to receive the right to vote in 1944. Male suffrage 
in France was granted as early as 1792 in theory, since the turmoil of 
the revolutionary period made this ineffective, but in practice French men 
have voted continuously since 1848. 
Voter-turnout for previous parliamentary elections: 60.44% (2007); infor-
mation for voter-turnout by gender is not readily available. 
Women in the parliament (2007 Elections): 109 women from a total of 
577 members (19% women)




Geographical location: Southeastern Asia
Population: 242 million (July 2010)
Majority religions: Muslim 86.1%; Protestant 5.7%; Roman Catholic 3%; 
Hindu 1.8%
Ethnic Groups: Javanese 40.6%; Sundanese 15%; Madurese 3.3%; 
Minangkabau 2.7%; Betawi 2.4%; Bugis 2.4%; other or unspecified 29.9%
Major historical developments: A former Dutch colony since the early 17th 
century (and briefly occupied by Japan in the 1940s), Indonesia eventu-
ally declared its independence in 1945; but it took four more years until 
 Netherlands agreed to transfer sovereignty in 1949. A major blow to the stabi-
lity and democratization of post-independence Indonesia was the brutal 
massacre of some half a million of its population in the 1960s, mostly in-
tellectuals and nationalist elites, trade unionists, feminists and other social 
activists with the support of the CIA and military leaders under the pretext 
of preventing the creation of a communist state. They helped to set up one 
of the most corrupt dictatorships in Indonesia which was ousted only in 
1998. Consequently although universal suffrage was established in 1945, 
it was not until 1999, after decades of political turmoil and repressive rule 
that Indonesia held its first free parliamentary election. Despite such tur-
moil, Indonesia is now the world’s third most populous democracy, and 
home to the world’s largest Muslim population. Also in 2001, Indonesia 
elected a female president, Megawati Sukarnoputri. In fact, although 
Indonesian women have been largely kept out of formal politics, they 
have always been present in the nation’s political struggles, beginning 
with the nationalist movements of the 1950s. 
Human Development Index (HDI) ranking: In 2010, Indonesia ranked #108 
out of a total of 169 countries measured worldwide. 
Political system: Indonesia operates as a Republic, and the president is 
elected by popular vote for five-year terms. Indonesia also has a multi-
party system, with numerous parties in which no one party often has a 
chance of gaining power alone, parties must reach the minimum 2.5% 
threshold of the popular vote to gain seats in the parliament.
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Parliamentary system: Indonesia’s legislative branch consists of three bod-
ies: one upper house, one lower house and one house for the regional level 
(this latter house is also integrated into the national level bodies to ensure 
their involvement in national level decision-making). Therefore, People’s 
Consultative Assembly or Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) is the 
upper house and consists of members of the House of Representatives as 
well as the House of Regional Representatives. The role of the MPR is to 
inaugurate and impeach the president and in amending the constitution, 
but does not formulate national policy. On the other hand, the House of 
Representatives or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) is the primary legisla-
tive body in the country as it formulates and passes legislation at the na-
tional level; this body consists of 560 members who are popularly elected 
to serve five year terms. 
Electoral system for parliamentary elections: Indonesia uses List Propor-
tional Representation (List PR) system in which seats in the parliament are 
distributed to candidates or parties in proportion to the votes that they 
receive in the multi-member districts.
Quota type: In 2003 Indonesia adopted legislative quotas, or legally man-
dated measures embedded in the country’s electoral laws that required 
all parties to nominate at least one woman among every three candidates 
on party lists. Despite this powerful rank order rule, Indonesia’s quotas 
have been rendered less effective when the constitutional court in 2010 
declared that parliamentary seat allocation cannot be based on how can-
didates were pre-ranked on party lists, rather the voters are to select the 
individual candidates from party lists as in an open list system which re-
duced the chance of women being elected. 
Female suffrage and standing for election: Indonesian women and men re-
ceived the right to vote in 1945, upon independence from colonial rule. 
Voter-turnout for previous parliamentary elections: 84.09% (2004); infor-
mation for voter-turnout by gender is not readily available. 
Women in the parliament (2009 Elections): 101 women from a total of 
560 members (18% women)
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In the four years from 1991 to 1995, the percentage of female parliamentar-
ians in Argentina rose from 6 percent to 22 percent. This significant increase 
would not have occurred without continuous pressure from key political and 
civil actors lobbying the government to remove both the subtle and overt 
exclusionary practices sustaining women’s underrepresentation. Their efforts 
eventually led to the adoption of legislative quotas in November 1991. 
Today, Argentina is considered a role model for the process of gender quota 
implementation via legislative reforms within a proportional representation 
electoral system. Thus Argentina took the “fast-track to equal representa-
tion of women”, whereby legislative gender quotas notably raised women’s 
parliamentary presence (Dahlerup 2006b).
Legislative quotas, or quotas that are legally mandated by national 
or constitutional law, are the newest type of gender quota, appearing only 
in the 1990s as the issue of women’s representation increasingly gained 
prominence within the international community. The 1995 Beijing World 
Conference on Women, the transnational women’s movement, and feminist 
research and writing, all contributed to the growing emphasis on chal-
lenges facing women in formal politics. Legislative quotas are adopted by 
national parliaments either through constitutional or electoral law reform, 
and require all political parties to nominate a certain proportion of female 
candidates. Similar to party quotas, legislative quotas target the candidate 
selection process, but differ in that they are legally mandated for all parties. 
Legislative quotas apply only to the proportion of candidates, not to the 
ultimate proportion of women elected to parliament. Since these provisions 
are mandatory, they essentially require that national parliaments recognize 
“gender” as a political category, in effect altering the basic notions of equality 
and representation to allow for gender equality in the citizenship and democ-
ratization process (Krook 2009; Scott 2005). In other words, the state’s legal 
guarantee of women’s representation is in fact official acknowledgement 
that women’s underrepresentation in parliament is “undemocratic”. Various 
scholars see the adoption of legislative gender quotas by developing states 
as part of efforts to consolidate their democratization process (Araujo and 
Garcia 2006). 
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Legislative quotas have been adopted mostly by Latin American states 
and post-conflict nations in Africa, the Middle East and South Eastern Europe. 
They often call for women to form 25 to 50 percent of total candidates 
on party lists, but vary greatly in their implementation depending on the 
wording of the legal provision and the sanctions for noncompliance. While 
some legislative quotas are “weak”, only vaguely outlining nomination 
mechanisms and with few or no penalties for non-abidance, others are more 
robust and rigorous concerning the selection and placement of female candi-
dates, sanctions and oversight by external bodies. These elements greatly 
impact the success rate of quota legislations. In order to better analyze the 
key factors enabling successful implementation of legislative quotas, this 
chapter compares several cases. 
The legislative quota experiences of Argentina and France provide a 
compelling comparison for several reasons. Firstly, although France adopted 
a more radical gender quota requiring 50 percent female candidacy, 
 Argentina’s more moderate 30 percent quota led to significant increases 
in female  representation, while France’s did not. As well, women’s move-
ments in both countries began their campaigns for legislative quotas in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s and, prior to quota adoption, both countries 
had almost identical proportions of women in parliament: 6 percent in the 
 Argentine Chamber of Deputies and about 7 percent in the French National 
Assembly. However by 2008, after several post-quota electoral cycles, women 
made up 40 percent of Argentina’s parliamentarians, but only 18 percent in 
France (Krook 2009, p. 161-162). The success of Argentina’s quota system and 
the failure of France’s deserve further analysis, since they clearly illustrate that 
adoption of high proportional quotas are not enough to sufficiently increase 
women’s parliamentary presence. By examining the historical context, adop-
tion, and implementation of legislative quotas in these two states, we will shed 
light on some of the main factors that impacted their quota experiences. 
We begin with a brief examination and comparison of Argentina and 
France, and then look closely at very recently introduced quota provisions 
in Indonesia. These three states differ significantly in terms of political and 
institutional structures, and have had varying degrees of success with the 
use of gender quotas. Thus they are valuable cases for examining the various 
processes for implementing gender quotas and the different factors that 
impact their implementation. 




Gender Quota Debates in Argentina: Argentinean women obtained the right 
to vote in 1947 after decades of organizing (Feijoo 1994). While Argentinean 
politics have been primarily male dominated, for a brief period during the 
1950s the governing Peronist Party, under the influence of First Lady Eva Peron, 
voluntarily adopted a 30 percent female quota for party organs and elective 
positions.1 This quota increased the proportion of female representatives to 
22 percent, and placed Argentina fourth in the world in terms of women 
in parliament. However the coup d’état of 1955 which overthrew Peron’s 
government also put an end to the short-lived party quota, and women’s 
parliamentary presence fell drastically to a mere 2.2 percent. Following 
the series of military dictatorships that ruled over Argentina for decades, 
the early 1990s saw efforts to rebuild democratic institutions. Such reforms 
further enhanced and democratized the already existing Argentinean closed 
List PR electoral system.
Women’s groups and organizations played a central role in the demo-
cratic transition in Argentina, but their continued marginalization from 
politics revealed that democracy alone was not enough to bring about 
substantive changes in women’s representation. Argentinean women’s 
groups thus worked to forge links within the country as well as with the 
transnational and international feminist movements, and participated in 
several transnational conferences concerning women’s political underrep-
resentation; the Argentinean women’s movement determined that gender 
quotas offered a potential solution and began research and activism to that 
end.2 Women’s increased activism also influenced the left-leaning political 
parties, whose women’s committees included advocates for increased 
 1. Argentinean women’s political rights are often credited to Eva Peron’s lobbying efforts. Madame 
Peron was a moving force in the campaign for women’s right to vote and for the adoption of 
party quotas. She founded various women’s organizations and introduced the idea of wages for 
housework (Htun and Jones 2002). Thus Argentina has a history of women’s involvement in poli-
tics and is considered among the first instances of mobilization for “women” as an underserved 
political constituency. In this regard, women’s gender specific demands were emphasized and 
politicized from early on, which supported the consideration of women as an interest group when 
the demand for quotas was raised. 
 2. The Argentinean women’s movement and the quota debates were influenced and supported by 
several international conferences and declarations that emphasized women’s access to political 
decision-making, as well as quota developments in other states, such as Costa Rica’s Bill for Real 
Equality for Women, and quota mandates of parties in Spain, Germany, and Italy (Krook 2009, 
p. 166-167; Bonder and Nari 1995). 
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women’s representation. These women introduced the discourse on quota to 
their parties. Eventually a cross-party women’s network was organized, which 
pressed for the passage of a national quota law (Araujo and Garcia 2006). 
Argentina’s democratization process engendered the emergence of a 
lively civil society and cultivated interest in social justice. Combined with 
the international community’s emphasis on women’s political presence, 
these elements provided the Argentinean women’s movement with the 
opportunity to push for legal reform to address the low level of female 
parliamentarians. These efforts finally resulted in the proposal of a few bills 
presented by female legislators from several parties in 1990. These bills, 
which were introduced to both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies 
(discussed below), not only called for a 30 percent quota of women on 
all candidate lists, but also required that female candidates be placed in 
electable positions; for example, placing a woman in every third position on 
party lists to ensure her election. When these bills came up for discussion in 
parliament, women legislators lobbied their colleagues, while the women’s 
movement mobilized to raise media and public awareness concerning the 
new bills and the status of women in parliament generally. The senate voted 
in favor of the bill, primarily out of expediency; the majority of senators 
did not expect the bill to pass, and assumed that in any case it would be 
rejected by the Chamber of Deputies. None of the parties had developed 
positions regarding the quota, though the bill did face some opposition in 
the Chamber. However, the situation shifted dramatically when President 
Menem made a last minute phone call urging Deputies, particularly members 
of his ruling party, to vote in favor of the bill. This intervention was at least 
in part due to the women’s movement lobby and the President’s realization 
that his party needed the support of female voters. The bill passed almost 
unanimously in November 1991 (Krook 2009, p. 169-170).
However, the 1991 legislative quota provision (known as Ley de Cupos), 
was a watered down version of the bill originally introduced by female legis-
lators. This law “amended Article 60 of the Electoral Code to stipulate that 
lists of candidates must include 30 percent women, in proportion which 
would make their election possible, and that lists that do not comply with 
this requirement would not be approved” (Krook 2009, p. 170). Unlike 
the original draft, the law did not specify where female candidates should 
be placed on the closed lists. This was rectified by a Presidential decree 
stating that the 30 percent quota applied to the number of seats that parties 
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expected to win (to ensure women’s electability), and that non-compliance 
would result in the rejection of party lists by the electoral court. Despite this, 
for the 1993 elections several parties violated the provision, applying the 
quota to their entire list and not to the portion that was likely to be elected. 
The election thus failed to increase women’s parliamentary presence to the 
anticipated level, due in part to poor enforcement mechanisms (women’s 
movement and activists had to take the offending parties to court), and 
to the fact that only half of the Chamber’s 257 seats were up for election 
(Araujo and Garcia 2006, p. 94). 
In preparation for the 1995 elections, women’s groups worked to ensure 
further clarifications of the quota law, and to outline enhanced enforcement 
mechanisms. A major legal clarification defined the “seats parties expected 
to win” as the “seats that a party had up for re-election.” The court also 
established that the law in no way violated the constitutional principle of 
equality before the law, since the constitution guarantees equality of oppor-
tunity between men and women regarding access to political office through 
measures to eradicate discrimination against women. The election courts 
were required to ensure that all party lists were in compliance with the 
law; with more party lists complying this time around the election resulted 
in 22 percent female representation. The Ley de Cupos underwent further 
reform following the 1999 elections after women’s representation decreased 
slightly when several parties which expected to win only two or three seats 
continued to ignore the quota. An executive decree in 2000 resolved this 
issue by requiring parties to place women at least second on their lists in 
districts where they expected to win only two seats, or to include at least 
one woman for every two men all the way down the list when expecting to 
win more than two seats. Parties found to be in non-compliance with this 
ranking order had forty-eight hours to revise their lists, after which time a 
judge would move women candidates to higher positions on the lists. The 
2001-4 elections saw full application of the quota, following which women 
comprised more than 33.5 percent of elected Deputies and 44 percent of 
the Senate (Araujo and Garcia 2006, p. 99, 101). The percentage of women 
parlia mentarians in Argentina has remained above 30 percent ever since, 
rising to 40 percent in 2007, and falling slightly in the 2009 elections to 
38.5 percent.3
 3. The 257 members of the Argentinean parliament are elected for four year terms, with half of the 
seats renewed every two years in all districts. 
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Adoption of Gender Quotas in France: France’s historical context had a unique 
and significant impact on its quota debates. It is important to recognize the 
historical link between women’s political representation in France and the 
French Revolution of 1789 with its Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen. This celebrated document engendered legal reforms that did 
not recognize women as full citizens and did not extend rights to women. 
Subsequently, women marched in opposition, presenting a petition to the 
National Constituent Assembly condemning the male monopoly on political 
decision-making. Olympe de Gouges, a feminist intellectual and political 
activist who had devoted much of her life to the revolution on the premise 
that it supported women’s political inclusion, published the Declaration of 
the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen in 1791, in which she challenged 
the practice of male authority and the notion of male-female inequality. 
Ultimately, her opposition to the massive number of executions in the name 
of revolution and her uncompromising fight for equality between men 
and women cost her her life; in 1793 at the age of 45 she was guillotined 
for the crime of wanting to be a “statesman” and causing hysteria (Bauer 
and International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development 
1996). Her insights on women’s issues and her conviction that the revolution 
will only take effect when women are given all their legal and social rights 
continue to resonate in France today, as French women are still seeking 
political equality and gender justice.
Despite the fate of Olympe de Gouges, French women continued orga-
nizing, publishing works and setting up various organizations, including 
arts and popular theater groups, advocating for democracy and full citizen-
ship rights for women. French women played a key role in the Revolution 
and in the creation of the Second French Republic in 1848, which led to 
further reforms and recognition of public rights. However, even at this stage 
in France, despite the French motto of Liberté, égalité, fraternité (Liberty, 
equality, fraternity), women remained without the right to vote (Scott 2005). 
This impacted the rest of the European states, which were also undergoing 
revolutionary turmoil; while revolutionary ideas of equality and democracy 
spread from France, so did the French model of excluding women. 
The exclusion of women was justified through the notion of the “abstract 
individual”, in which universalism was emphasized over differences such as 
gender, class, or ethnicity. At the time of the revolution, this abstract indi-
vidual was understood to refer to every human with the capacity to reason 
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and make moral judgments, characteristics that male intellectuals insisted 
belonged only to men. Though the male revolutionary leaders were only too 
happy to have women’s active participation during the revolution, with the 
establishment of the Republic they argued that women were not endowed 
with the powers of logic and reason, and belonged in the domestic sphere. 
Some male intellectuals, including Rousseau (1762) did not deny women’s 
intellectual capacity, but claimed that women had “passive” imaginations 
and thus were not qualified to hold political power (Scott 1996a; Rousseau 
1979). Thus, the abstract individual citizen was, by definition, a man. 
French women rejected their political exclusion and continued to 
struggle for their political rights. This battle has been one of the longest and 
hardest fought struggles of women’s movements anywhere. Their demands, 
which were fully articulated as early as 1791 in de Gouges’ Declaration of 
the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen, are yet to be realized. Even the 
right to vote was not achieved until after World War II, in 1944 – nine years 
after Turkish women obtained this right and some fifty years after women in 
New Zealand. Even then French women’s right to vote was framed in terms 
of the recognition of their contribution to the French Resistance against 
the German occupation and not as a means to addressing and rectifying a 
political wrong after over one hundred and fifty years (Opello 2006). 
Women’s right to vote did not have as profound an effect as might 
be imagined, due to the deeply entrenched patriarchal political culture and 
structure of France. The debate on women’s equality surfaced again during 
the 1960s in the context of the so-called second French Revolution of 1968, 
which demanded civil rights and equality for all citizens, regardless of gender. 
This crisis resulted in a general strike which temporarily destabilized the 
Charles de Gaulle government; it also opened up avenues for the discussion 
of liberal ideals of equality, sexual liberation and human rights. Nonetheless, 
despite research and surveys indicating public support for gender balance in 
political offices, women’s political representation was clearly not supported 
by the system, never exceeding 6 percent and remaining one of the lowest 
in Europe. Until the early 1990s, attempts by the women’s movement to 
address this were stone-walled in one way or another by the male political 
elite (Scott 2005).
The most common argument against legislation to increase women’s 
access to political office was that the essence of the Republic was the notion 
of the individual citizen, regardless of race, ethnicity, religion or gender. This 
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argument held that any legal accommodation to address gender inequality 
would be too divisive, and would weaken the unity of the French nation. 
Discouraged in attempts at a legislative solution, women began to pres-
sure individual parties from inside to adopt gender quotas. The women’s 
committee of the Socialist Party lobbied the party to adopt a voluntary quota 
system. This resulted in the first ever women’s quota, adopted by the Socialist 
Party in the 1970s. However, other political parties did not take the issue up, 
and quotas in the Socialist Party, which ranged from 10 to 30 percent of 
their candidates, never resulted in significant changes in the proportion of 
Socialist Party female members elected to office. The failure of the Socialist 
Party quotas is blamed on weak provisions which were rarely implemented 
to their fullest extent. Following this experience, quota advocates realized 
the importance of enforcement mechanisms and legally mandated quotas 
(rather than voluntary ones), as well as women’s placement in winnable 
 positions to accomplish proper implementation (Krook 2009, p. 183-4).
The first attempt at legal quotas occurred in 1982, when a modest quota 
bill, lacking any rank-order rules, was passed by the National Assembly. 
However, this law was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional 
Council on the grounds that any sort of division of candidates into catego-
ries, and indeed any bill that recognized and addressed sexual difference, 
undermined the principle of equality before the law guaranteed by the 
constitution. This decision, justified once again by the notion of the universal 
abstract individual, forced quota advocates to try and develop a more funda-
mental critique of the French principle of equality.
It was within this context that in 1992 French women’s rights activists 
launched what is referred to as the Parité movement, using the motto liberté, 
égalité, parité to advance new arguments and strategies, and calling for a 
fifty-fifty balance between men and women in all elected assemblies (Scott 
2005; Lépinard 2007). This call for parity-democracy was aligned with other 
parity movements in Europe and with the Council of Europe (COE), which 
in the 1980s called for an increase in women’s political presence (Krook 
2009, p. 186). French feminists’ new strategies for increasing women’s 
representation did not include “gender quotas” for women; they focused 
instead on the idea of the equal presence of males and females in political 
office. Feminists advanced their argument by presenting the French notions 
of equality and the abstract individual as the root cause of women’s under-
representation, since the original definition of universalism had ignored 
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the female half of humanity. By sexing this abstract individual, in essence 
broadening and refining the definition to include the recognition that indi-
viduals are humans of both sexes, these feminists proposed reforming the 
constitution to explicitly distinguish the two sexes of the universal citizen 
(Scott 2005). Thus, while quotas implied special representation rights, parity 
simply called for the equitable sharing of power between both sexes, i.e. the 
constituent parts of the citizenry of individuals, as was originally intended by 
the spirit of French republicanism. 
The low levels of female representation in France, in comparison to 
other European countries at the time, did bring attention to the systematic 
discrimination keeping women from political office in France. The French 
women’s movement, well connected to the transnational women’s move-
ment particularly since the 1990s, capitalized on this awareness, keeping the 
issue in the French public’s eye and enlisting support from many inter-Euro-
pean women’s organizations. Thus, addressing this shortcoming became a 
matter of saving face for French politicians, particularly for the more successful 
socialist parties, which were presumed to stand for social justice. After the 
involvement of a number of political elites, particularly President Jacques 
Chirac (1995-2007) and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin (1997-2002), on June 
6th 2000, the French Parity Law was eventually passed, though in a milder 
form than originally proposed by feminists. “To the disappointment of many 
parity advocates the law focused on the nomination of female candidates, 
rather than on the proportion of women elected, and made weak provisions 
for the elections to the National Assembly (Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires 
2006, p. 211).” The particular provisions of this law led to unexpected 
implementations, as discussed in the implementation section below.
Comparing Quota Adoption in France and Argentina: The quota debates in 
both France and Argentina emerged from the women’s movements, led by 
key women’s rights activists and legislators. Their efforts were a response to 
low levels of female representation that persisted despite democratic change. 
In both cases women were marginalized from the public sphere in the after-
math of their participation in mass democratic movements and revolutions, 
as male political elites continued to dominate a discourse framing politics 
as a male domain. The struggle for political equality has been much more 
complex in France, as a patriarchal perspective is deeply entrenched in the 
foundation of the French Revolution and its philosophy of “universalism”. 
Ironically, while the French revolution has represented a turning point in the 
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equality of citizens and the promotion of democracy and social justice across 
Europe, French women have had the hardest time of all European women in 
obtaining equality, particularly in the political domain.
The introduction of gender quotas in both France and Argentina was 
presented as a practical solution to end women’s exclusion, and in both 
cases was influenced by the experiences of other nations and supported by 
conferences and efforts of regional and international organizations. While 
Argentinean women were able to benefit from quotas for a brief period in 
the 1950s, French women had no parallel experience, as gender quotas have 
historically been opposed as contrary to French Republicanism and the ideal 
of universalism. However, both democracies felt it vital to address women’s 
underrepresentation, though each took a different approach. The adoption of 
legislative quotas in France faced a unique obstacle in that France’s constitu-
tional provision of universalism ignored sexual (or any other type of) difference; 
in contrast, the Argentinean legal framework enabled the passage of measures 
such as quotas to advance the rights of a specific section of society. Thus, 
“political equality” had different connotations in each state: in France refer-
ring to an abstract ideal that in practice engendered unequal opportunity; in 
Argentina to a practical measure to support fair if not equal opportunity for 
women and men. 
Ultimately, legislation mandating quotas was adopted in both cases 
due in large part to the efforts of a variety of actors – local, national and 
international women’s movements, female legislators, and political elites. 
French and Argentinean party leaders played important roles in these legis-
lative changes, primarily as a means of gaining popularity at a time when 
the  majority of the populations supported the idea of state action to increase 
women’s representation. Thus, both Menem of Argentina and Chirac in 
France were instrumental in the initial passage of a quota bill, though in 
neither case was the bill the same one originally proposed by the women’s 
movements. However, as we discuss in the following section, both legal 
provisions were further reformed through trial-and-error and continuous 
pressure from women’s groups. 
The Implementation of Quotas in Argentina and France
Contrary to expectation, France’s strong legislation supporting gender parity 
failed to result in any significant increases in the percentage of female parlia-
mentarians, while Argentina’s 30 percent quota ultimately exceeded its goal. 
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The first Argentinean parliamentary elections after quota adoption, in 1993 
increased female representation by almost 8% from 5.8 to 14.4 percent; in 
France female representation went up only 1.2%, from 11 percent in 1997 
to 12.2 percent in 2002. The problem in France seems due primarily to poor 
implementation of the French Parity Law. Several factors are at play here, one 
of the most significant being the wording of the Parity Law, which is some-
what weak in terms of implementation; as well, the type of legislative quota 
adopted does not fit well with the French parliamentary electoral system. 
Both of these factors deserve further investigation, as they provide important 
lessons for activists working to implement gender quotas in other contexts. 
Among the major obstacles that hindered the successful implementa-
tion of the Parity Law is the France’s dual electoral system. Unlike Argentina’s 
universal List PR electoral system, France uses the Two-Round System (TRS) 
for its presidential and parliamentary elections, and a List PR System for local 
elections and a portion of senate seats (Haase-Dubosc 1999). Hence, France 
uses two types of electoral systems for different elections. For the Senate 
seats, an electoral college elects some of its members while the rest are filled 
according to a List PR system. The Parity Law applies to the lists of both local 
and senate elections, in which parties are required to alternately list male 
and female candidates, also known as Zipper style. Below, we elaborate on 
the differences between Parity Law implementation at the local and national 
levels in France to illustrate how the fit between the electoral system and the 
Parity Law impacts its execution.
For France’s parliamentary elections, under the TRS system, as discussed 
in chapter two, to win an election a candidate must accrue a predetermined 
percentage of total votes, for example 30 or 40%. This often means that 
candidates go through a second round of voting, if none reach the required 
quota in the first round. In France, the threshold is set at absolute majority 
–  any candidate that receives more than half (50%+1) of the total number 
of votes in her/his single-member district is directly elected to parliament 
and no run off is necessary. If this condition is not met in the first round of 
voting, a run-off election is held among candidates that received at least 
12.5 per cent of the total casted votes in the first round. In the second round, 
the candidate that receives the highest votes is then elected to parliament, 
regardless of whether they receive an absolute majority. Thus, in French 
parliamentary elections, votes are cast in single-member districts for an 
individual candidate from candidate lists presented to the electorate by 
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the various parties, which already presents a disadvantage for women, as 
discussed in chapter two.
The Parity Law requires that for parliamentary elections, each party 
present 50 percent candidates of both sexes overall, but with no condi-
tions regarding which districts female candidates should run for. This lack 
of specificity has resulted in party lists that typically nominate women for 
unwinnable districts, so that despite record numbers of female candidates 
(39 percent of the total candidates nominated by all parties in 2002, still less 
than the expected 50%), women’s representation in the National Assembly 
increased only 1.2% from the previous election (Krook 2009, p. 198).
In addition to problems with the wording of the French Parity Law, it 
also lacked adequate sanctions for non-compliance, particularly for larger 
and more powerful parties. The law originally stated that parties that do not 
nominate at least 50 percent female candidates are subject to a negligible 
financial penalty, whereby the party only loses a small percentage of state 
funding that it receives. In 2007, after much lobbying and public aware-
ness campaigning, the penalty amount for non-compliance was increased. 
However, this sanction still lacks real force as the larger parties do not depend 
on government financial support to the same extent as smaller parties 
(which more often abide by the parity requirement). Parties in France receive 
private as well as government funding and though larger parties get larger 
sums of government money (Jouan 2008), they are often both unwilling to 
sacrifice male incumbents in single-member districts, and have the financial 
resources to absorb losses in state funding. Thus, in the 2002 elections the 
two main rightist parties nominated fewer than 20 percent women, and 
compliance with gender thresholds varied drastically among parties, with 
the smaller parties generally respecting the law. Smaller parties did not have 
many incumbents to unseat, while also hoping to maximize the amount 
of state subsidy they could claim (Krook 2009, p. 197-198); the financial 
penalty proved a deterrent only for the smaller parties.
In the 2007 elections, the percentage of women in parliament rose 
from 12 to 18 percent for a number of reasons, including high pre- election 
involvement of women and a high female voter-turnout, which led to 
greater party interest in and responsiveness to the female constituency. 
During the campaign women pressured the political parties, mobilized in 
women’s caucuses, and effectively shamed leftist parties spouting gender 
equality and social justice rhetoric to live up to their slogans. This resulted in 
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the voluntary commitments of mostly smaller parties to increase the female 
percentage of their elected members. In particular the smaller Green and 
PCF (French Communist Party) parties pledged to field 50 percent women 
candidates, while the large PS (Socialist Party) adopted a target of placing at 
least 30 percent women in winnable positions (defined as seats the party had 
won at some point in the last four elections) (Krook 2009, p. 200).
To further illustrate the shortcomings of implementing the Parity Law 
in parliamentary elections, we must compare parliamentary with local and 
senate elections. While the French two-round parliamentary electoral system 
faced a number of problems, local and senate elections, which use the List 
PR electoral system, produced opposite results. Under the Parity Law, for 
these elections parties are required to produce closed candidate lists with 
equal numbers of women and men, along with placement restrictions. The 
placement restrictions require either alternating between men and women 
on the party list (Zipper style), or nominating in any order three women and 
three men per group of six candidates. Voters vote for the party list rather 
than for individual candidates and seats are allocated in proportion to the 
votes each party receives, starting from the top of the candidate list and 
moving down. In case of noncompliance the party list is rejected. Strict regu-
lation, in conjunction with the woman-friendly close List PR system, resulted 
in a 40% increase of women on local councils following the first elections 
after the passage of the Parity Law in 2000 (French Embassy 2007). 
Following the 2010 local elections, women constituted 48 percent of 
local representatives nationwide. This unquestionably demonstrates how, 
barring legal and structural impediments, women can and will be elected to 
office, and proves that the languages of laws, along with sanctions for non-
compliance, are crucial to the success of legislative quotas (Lejeune 2010).
In sum, legislative quotas, which carry the weight of law, are becoming 
more popular in recent decades in part because political elites are becoming, 
of necessity, more responsive to the demands of women’s movements which 
have successfully popularized the requirement of gender equality for democ-
ratization. Women voters keep reminding politicians that it is time to close 
the gender gap or be voted out of office. Argentina was among the first 
countries in the world to adopt a legislative quota, and due to its quick 
successes became a role model for many other countries. After adopting 
legislative quotas in November 1991, Argentina achieved critical mass of 
women (30.7 percent) in parliament only a decade later. In France, however, 
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a series of factors, ranging from a historical legacy of patriarchal universalism, 
to the national level electoral system and weak legal regulations, made the 
implementation of its Parity Law at the National Assembly unsuccessful, 
though at the local level under a different electoral system women’s repre-
sentation increased significantly. Clearly, legislative quotas, the newest types 
of quota being used, are still in the trial-and-error phase, and, as illustrated 
above, must be subject to reform as their shortcomings are realized.
Indonesia
Indonesia adopted legislative gender quotas in 2003. In contrast with  Argentina 
and France, Indonesia’s current political structure is still in the making. The 
country is undergoing major political and institutional reform to consoli-
date its democracy, since the protracted political upheaval which led to the 
resignation of President Suharto in 1998 and ended decades of dictatorship. 
In fact the first free parliamentary elections in Indonesia only took place in 
1999, and its electoral system is still under evaluation and continual reform. 
Indonesia’s gender quotas have also been subject to ongoing modi fication 
as the country’s electoral system has also been changing. Nevertheless, 
Indonesia offers a good case study for analysis precisely because major insti-
tutional shifts provide valuable opportunities for quota advocates, particularly 
since many countries of the global south are also in the process of further 
democratization and reformulating state mechanisms. However, to under-
stand the current quota situation in Indonesia, it is first necessary to analyze 
Indonesia’s historical and political contexts in order to comprehend the 
trajectory of reform. This section will briefly introduce Indonesia’s history, its 
political shifts, as well as the role of quota advocates in institutional reforms.
Indonesia, with a population of 242 million, is the world’s most popu-
lous Muslim country and, similar to most states in the region the nation’s 
history includes “Islamization”, colonization, periods of authoritarianism, 
and recent democratization. Among Islamic societies, Indonesia is known for 
its moderate and liberal Muslim traditions, due in part to the spread of Islam 
through trade as opposed to occupation or force. Thus many Indonesians 
voluntarily converted to Islam, mixing and matching it with pre-existing 
cultural norms and practices. In this sense religion has been an aspect of 
Indonesian culture rather than a tool for domination by political conquerors. 
Aside from its liberal culture, another significant feature of modern 
Indonesia is that the country had a woman president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, 
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from July 2001 to October 2004. Of course, Indonesia is not unique in this; 
contrary to common Western constructions of Islamic societies women have 
reached the highest political elected offices in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and 
Turkey.4 However, despite having elected a female president, overall female 
political representation in Indonesia and some other Muslim nations has 
remained low. Currently, the women’s movements, civil society organiza-
tions, and the transnational women’s movement are working to address the 
low levels of female parliamentarians in these states, with varying rates of 
success. In Indonesia, the women’s movement has lobbied political parties 
and the state to adopt gender quotas for parliamentary elections since the 
1990s. Muslim women’s organizations, as will be discussed below, have also 
been at the forefront of quota advocacy, contrary to Western notions that 
Muslim culture is necessarily incompatible with gender equality and female 
authority. The following section introduces Indonesia’s political structure and 
electoral system, and examines the process of quota adoption and imple-
mentation and the pros and cons of the current gender quota system. 
The Historical Context 
Indonesia gained full independence from Dutch and Japanese colonial rule 
in 1949. Although universal suffrage was established in 1945, it was not until 
1999, after decades of political turmoil and repressive rule that Indonesia 
held its first free parliamentary election (Vickers 2005). A major blow to the 
stability and democratization of post-independence Indonesia was the brutal 
massacre of some half a million of its population, mostly intellectuals and 
nationalist elites, trade unionists, feminists and other social activists (Slater 
2004). This massacre, which drastically hindered Indonesia’s democratization 
and institutionalization process, occurred with support from the U.S. and the 
tacit agreement of other Western powers, who branded the victims as commu-
nist enemies of the state.5 Of course these events negatively impacted the 
development of social justice discourse, including women’s representation. 
 4. Some of the largest Muslim societies have elected female presidents or prime ministers. These 
include: Pakistan’s Benazir Bhutto, Bangladesh’s Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, Indonesia’s 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, and Turkey’s Tansu Çiller (Hoogensen and Solheim 2006).
 5. Following the Chinese and Cuban revolutions, the CIA with an alliance of small elite who were control-
ling the economy, international trade, and powerful military leaders, brought about a coup against 
many nationalist governments from Latin America to Asia and launched brutal attacks on nationalist 
forces in the name of anti-communism. These policies left hundreds of thousands killed and interrupted 
social and political developments by continuing to support dictatorial regimes which would up-hold 
the interest of the US and other Western states (Vickers 2005, p. 163; Slater 2004; Cribb 2002). 
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The world was thus taken by surprise when, despite the dearth of women in 
formal politics, Indonesia elected a female president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, 
in 2001. In fact, although Indonesian women have been largely kept out 
of formal politics, they have always been present in the nation’s political 
struggles, beginning with the nationalist movements of the 1950s ( Parawansa 
2005).6 The paragraphs that follow will shed light on some of the shifts 
 concerning women’s political representation, the mobilization of women 
and the strategies that eventually led to the adoption of gender quotas. 
In terms of the public sphere, Indonesian women have always had a pres-
ence in the politics of their communities, in part due to residual “matriarchal” 
traditions among many of its ethnic groups which persist despite Indonesia’s 
conversion to Islam and centuries of colonization. After independence women 
were given a (limited) role in the public sphere; their presence in state structures 
such as the judiciary, police corps and other ministries deemed consistent with 
the modernist perspective of the 1950 constitution. Indonesian women took 
full advantage of their limited civil positions, pushing for women’s increased 
public participation. Though their presence in parliament was minimal, 
Indonesian women mobilized to increase the numbers of potential female 
politicians. One of the women’s movement’s main strategies during the early 
days of the republic in the 1950s was to train potential female candidates 
about the state’s political structure. During Indonesia’s first general elections 
in 1955, along with grooming female candidates for office, women’s organi-
zations also formed alliances with various political parties, based on parties’ 
agreements to include women’s demands, such as the reform of marriage 
law, onto party platforms. However, despite efforts by feminist organizations 
and a high female voter turn-out, the 1955 elections resulted in only seven 
percent female parliamentarians. Although this outcome actually compared at 
the time favorably with many other states that had longer histories of demo-
cratic elections, it was disappointing for women activists, especially given that 
women voters made up more than 60 percent of the electorate.7 Explanations 
 6. Political rights, electoral politics, and constitutional debates emerged as key political concerns in 
Indonesia in the 1950s as the new nation-state was being created. Women’s involvement emerged 
through the equation of women’s political rights with duty, and the nationalist concept of commu-
nitarianism which includes the full participation of women (Martyn 2004). 
 7. According to Elizabeth Martyn (2004, p. 115) “it is unclear how many women candidates stood 
in the 1955 elections but the regional experience of elections in Minahasa (14 June 1951) and 
Yogyakarta (27 August 1951) indicated there were relatively few. In Minahasa there were 34 women 
candidates out of a total of 577 (Wanita 1953, p. 301) and only 15 on the party lists in the 
Yogyakarta election (Susanto 1951, p. 408).” 
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for the low percentage of elected women included the placement of female 
candidates at the bottom of party lists by political parties, combined with the 
fact that most voters were illiterate at the time and simply selected the party 
of their choice by choosing the party symbol on the ballot (Martyn 2004, 
p.114). The conjunction of these two factors made the election of women 
candidates less likely. Literate voters (the minority) could however vote for 
individual candidates under Indonesia’s open List PR system. 
While the issue of women’s political representation remained on the 
agenda of many women’s rights activists in Indonesia, the women’s  movement 
began to prioritize other concerns, including rights in marriage, education, 
and inheritance. This was in part because pushing for female representation 
seemed somewhat pointless under Suharto’s dictatorship,8 and a focus on 
legal and social change to benefit women and build their social capacities 
seemed more strategic. During Suharto’s “New Order” era, which lasted from 
the 1970s to 1998, his party dominated in all general elections, and a seat 
in parliament could be obtained by making a payment to party leaders or 
government officials (Sherlock 2009). Women’s representation was deter-
mined by the party’s national-level elites, which in turn made their presence in 
parliament fluctuate throughout Suharto’s rule, peaking at only 13 percent in 
1987 (still higher than either France or the U.S. at the time) (Parawansa 2005). 
Ironically, while women parliamentarians were relatively few and inef-
fective during Suharto’s dictatorial rule, shortly after his fall in 1998, a 
woman replaced him and led the country in its transition towards democ-
racy. Megawati Sukarnoputri came to power in July 2001. The daughter of 
former President Sukarno, who led Indonesia to post-colonial independence, 
 Megawati joined the opposition Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle in 
1987. She soon became a symbol of popular resistance and thus a major 
threat to Suharto, who in 1996 used violence to try to remove her as leader 
of the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle; this incident provoked demon-
strations in the capital in her support, and transformed Megawati into a 
national hero. Subsequently, in the country’s first free parliamentary elections 
in 1999, her party won the most votes. While the election proved that the 
public supported Megawati and clearly mandated her leadership, the party 
elite remained unconvinced that a woman should hold presidency; they 
 8. Suharto became the second president of Indonesia after the country’s founding president Sukarno 
was removed from office in 1967. Suharto ruled for 32 years, and ‘resigned’ from power in 1998 
due to mass public protest. 
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hesitated to appoint her President, and instead chose Abdurrahman Wahid, 
with Megawati as Vice President. However, Wahid was dismissed for incom-
petence and corruption in 2001 and Megawati assumed the Presidency, an 
unambiguous illustration of the reality that, contrary to the common claim 
of male political elites, the public is generally more willing to accept women 
leaders than are male elites themselves. 
Megawati led the country towards democratization during the “Reformasi” 
Era, holding legitimate elections for the first time since Indonesian indepen-
dence.9 The emerging democratic environment encouraged the Indonesian 
women’s movement to turn some attention back to the issue of low female 
representation. Those activists and politicians that emphasized the gender 
aspect of democratic discourse advocated for gender parity in politics and 
argued that though male politicians can certainly support women’s causes, 
women’s interests cannot be adequately represented without sufficient female 
policy and decision-makers. Women’s organizations, such as Partai Wanita 
Rakjat (Women’s People’s Party), framing democracy in terms of equal rights 
and opportunities in all spheres – political, economic, social and cultural – 
called for women’s access to parliament and state institutions. Although 
the Indonesian women’s movement faced many obstacles, including ever 
changing cabinets and religious and ideological divisions among feminist 
leaders, they continued to lobby on the basis of the equal citizenship provision 
of the Indonesian constitution. Addressing the reality that rights in law do not 
necessarily translate to rights in practice, the women’s movement focused on 
the implementation of equality laws (Martyn 2004), and began pushing for 
legally mandated gender quotas.10 
Adoption of Quotas in Indonesia 
The successful adoption of quotas in Indonesia is credited to the country’s 
ongoing democratic consolidation, which has resulted in a strong civil 
society dominated by Muslim democrats, the values of democratization and 
inclusiveness, and a respect for cultural pluralism (Hefner 2000). Within this 
 9. The first general elections of the reform era, held in 1999, saw the election of 8.8 percent women 
in parliament, rising to 11.3 percent in 2004 (Parawansa 2005). General elections in Indonesia are 
held every five years.
 10. President Megawati, aware of the male political elites’ resistance, made a statement that fighting 
for gender quotas would rock the boat and adversely affect women’s gains (Mar'iyah 2003). This 
rhetoric was however ineffective in dampening mass mobilization by the women’s movement, 
and, as we discuss below, legislative quotas were eventually adopted in 2003. 
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vibrant civil society context, the Indonesian women’s movement advocated 
for parliamentary quota adoption, securing the support of many political 
elites and other Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) which played important 
roles in the formation of the new political structure. Having tackled a myriad 
of gender issues such as polygamy, female education, and family law reform 
over decades of activity, starting in 1998, the Indonesian women’s move-
ment increasingly prioritized women’s political presence. The increasingly 
democratic environment enabled open public discussion on issues of citizen-
ship and democracy, and on gender equality, and the women’s movement 
successfully politicized women’s political presence as a “basic human right” 
(Mar’iyah 2003). Never-the-less, efforts to increase the percentage of female 
parliamentarians have encountered many obstacles, particularly a shortage 
of women wanting to enter politics, and women’s low societal status due to 
limited access to socio-economic resources that support political aspirations.
As a key actor in Indonesian civil society and the democratization process, 
the Indonesian women’s movement(s) was well prepared for the opportuni-
ties that the democratic transition presented. Through collaboration among 
women’s organizations, intense government lobbying, and the forming of 
coalitions with political parties and their women’s sections, the women’s 
movement achieved many of its goals in the early years of the reform era. 
For instance, not only did Indonesia sign the United Nations Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 
2000, it also began debates on electoral system reform and gender quota 
adoption. Other key actors in gender quota advocacy included civil society 
(women’s) organizations, journalists, academics, political parties, and parlia-
mentarians. The women’s organizations included both Muslim and secular 
organizations.11 Indonesian quota supporters thus united across religious 
as well as party lines, though not across gender lines (at least within the 
political sphere); while almost all women activists and politicians joined 
forces to promote quotas, only a few male members reluctantly gave their 
support while the majority were in opposition. The central argument of the 
quota opponents was meritocratic – that qualifications should always take 
precedence over sex in candidate selection. It was also argued that there 
were simply not enough qualified women to run (Bylesjoe and Seda 2006).
 11. According to Cecilia Bylesjoe and Francisia Seda, major Muslim women’s organizations such as the 
Muslimat, Fatayat, and Aisyiah were deeply involved in the work to adopt quotas. In this regard, it 
can be argued that Islamic feminists considered women’s access to politics compatible with Islam. 
The only oppositional forces were the small and more hard-line Muslim political parties and the 
military faction of the national parliament (2006, p. 260).
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The movement for gender quotas strengthened as the General Election 
Law was being reformulated by the new parliament between 1999 and 2003. 
There were disagreements among quota supporters, mostly over technical 
specifications, including over the quota percentage (20 to 30 percent), the 
timing of quota introduction, and the electoral and list systems. But as the 
passing of the General Election Law drew closer the women’s movement 
became more cohesive, ultimately united in its demand for a legislative 
quota of 30 percent women candidates on political party lists to be intro-
duced for the 2004 election, using open lists under a PR electoral system 
(Bylesjoe and Seda 2006). Their efforts succeeded when the new General 
Election Law 12/2003 including Article 65(1) was passed in February 2003, 
which included a “soft quota” or a non-binding gender quota. This new 
provision recommended that parties “bear in their hearts” the desirability 
of nominating at least 30 percent women to their candidate lists in each 
electoral district at all levels (national, provincial, and district), but had 
no enforcement provisions (Parawansa 2005). Districts in Indonesia are 
multi-member, and parties get elected in proportion to the votes that they 
receive in each district; hence, multiple parties compete for seats in each 
electoral district. Thus the parties were recommended (and later required) 
to nominate at least 30 percent female candidates in each district, rather 
than their overall nomination of female candidates across all districts. 
The Shift from Closed to Open List Electoral System: Other important reforms 
adopted for the 2004 general elections – Indonesia’s second legislative elec-
tions since the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime – included changes to the 
state’s election laws. These included a key move from a closed list system to 
an open list system, allowing voters to select a preferred candidate, but only in 
conjunction with a vote for the party (their vote was invalid if they only chose a 
candidate). In other words, voters first voted for their party of choice and then, 
and if they wished, one candidate from that party (Sherlock and Fealy 2009).12 
The change from a closed to an open list system came about due to 
widespread criticism of the closed list system used in the 1999 election, where 
party leaders determined which candidates received seats in parliament 
 12. For a preferred candidate to win a seat, he/she needed to reach a predetermined quota, which 
was calculated dividing the total number of valid votes cast in a district by the district magni-
tude (the number of seats per district), or simply: [total district vote/district magnitude]. Since 
the highest number of seats in a given district for the 2004 election was 12, and many parties 
competed in one district, reaching the quota by an individual was very difficult. For instance, if 
the total valid votes cast in a 10 seat district was 20,000, then an individual candidate needed at 
least 2000 votes to be directly elected into parliament [20,000/10 = 2000]. 
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(according to the placement of candidates on party lists). In a closed list 
system, elected MPs tend to prioritize allegiance to their party over their 
constituencies, as the party leadership played a key role in helping them 
be elected. The women’s movement welcomed the change to an open list 
system, which improved female candidates’ chances for election, regardless 
of where they were placed on the list. However, activists were not hopeful 
that open lists would sufficiently address women’s underrepresentation, 
given the high level of illiteracy among the electorate and the complex nature 
of the provision. The 2003 electoral laws also created a National Election 
Commission (KPU), responsible for organizing and monitoring elections and 
ensuring abidance by the new provisions (Sherlock and Fealy 2009).
Article 65(1) was Indonesia’s first attempt at a gender quota. Although 
the quota provision was weak, it was nonetheless considered a great accom-
plishment by the women’s movement, and proof that the movement’s hard 
work, extended networking and collaboration with different groups had 
paid off. It also provided hope that continuing efforts would ultimately result 
in a stronger, viable legislative quota (Bylesjoe and Seda 2006). Indeed this 
proved true; in 2008 Indonesia adopted a legislative gender quota, though 
it did not go unchallenged, as discussed in the next section.
Implementation of Quotas in Indonesia: From a Soft to the Real Quota: After 
the passage of law 12/2003, nation-wide capacity building and training 
programs were launched by major civil society organizations (CSOs) 
working in co-operation with a number of political parties. Much effort was 
made to produce qualified female candidates for the 2004 elections. To 
cover as much of the country as possible in the one year remaining before 
elections, organizations coordinated their activities according to theme 
and geography. Workshops were organized on a massive scale to train 
potential female candidates, educate the populace about the Indonesian 
political/electoral system, prepare women to perform as elected MPs, and to 
educate the public on the importance of quotas and female representation. 
The organizations involved also started working with international organiza-
tions, further enhancing the resources and strategies of the movement.13 
Simultaneous to the mass education and trainings, the women’s movement 
politicized the parties’ responsibility to nominate women and continuously 
lobbied the parties to implement the quota (Bylesjoe and Seda 2006). 
 13. The assistance of the international organizations to the civil society organizations (CSOs) in training 
potential female candidates was questioned by quota opponents, “who criticized the local movement 
for bringing ‘foreign’ ideas to the Indonesian political agenda” (Bylesjoe and Seda 2006, p. 262). 
24176.indb   130 16/09/11   11:38 AM
131
Chapter.5.–.Legislative.Quotas:.Argentina,.France,.and.Indonesia
However, the first general elections following the adoption of the 2003 
soft-quota did not see a major increase in the percentage of female MPs. 
The 2004 election resulted in only 11 percent female legislators in the House 
of Representatives (DPR), up slightly from 8.2 percent in the 1999 elec-
tions. Examining the implementation of the 2003 voluntary gender quota 
reveals a number of interesting factors. To most observers’ astonishment, 
a majority of the political parties did nominate at least 30 percent female 
candidates in the 2004 elections, though not in every district list as the provi-
sion had recommended. Of 7,756 total candidates competing for 550 seats 
in the House of Representatives, 32.3 percent were female. Of 24 parties 
competing in 69 districts in an open list electoral system, only 8 did not fulfill 
the voluntary 30% quota for female candidates, and even these came close. 
Yet despite the overwhelming compliance with the quota and the massive 
training and education program spearheaded by the women’s movement, 
the 2003 quota failed for three main reasons. 
First, since the quota did not impose any ranking requirements, female 
candidates were generally positioned towards the bottom of the lists. 
Despite the fact that party lists were now “open” and voters could select 
any candidate, this still worked against women candidates, given the illit-
eracy of the electorate. Only 9.7 percent of all party lists ranked women in 
the first position and 16.8 percent ranked them second. (It is argued that 
parties merely nominated women to appeal to women voters rather than 
to sincerely increase women’s representation). Secondly, the low ranking of 
women by the two largest parties, which received the most votes, particu-
larly impacted the situation. The Golkar party, which won 43 percent of the 
seats in parliament, placed women either first or second on its lists in only 
20.1 percent of districts. Third, since the quota was only a recommendation, 
it lacked sanctions for non-compliance; at the same time its wording was 
unclear and hence misinterpreted by a majority of the parties. Although the 
provision recommended 30% female candidates on all party lists for each 
district, for the most part parties interpreted it to mean nominating 30% 
female candidates in total, across all districts, and this further weakened the 
impact of the quota (Bylesjoe and Seda 2006).
The failure of the 2004 elections to produce a satisfactory percentage 
of female representatives spurred the women’s movement to demand 
a stronger gender quota with a binding rank order provision. In prepara-
tion for the 2009 elections, a coalition of women’s activists and politicians 
lobbied for further legal provisions for party nominations, as parties are often 
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the main gatekeepers barring women from political access. Thus, the coali-
tion demanded a legislative quota based on the principles of democracy and 
equality contained in the original 1945 Indonesian constitution. 
In 2008, parliament adopted Law 10/2008 requiring all political parties 
to nominate 30 percent women candidates on all party lists. To further 
strengthen the implementation of the quota, Article 55 of Law 10/2008 
included a rank order rule, the so-called Zipper system (in practice Semi-
Zipper),14 whereby parties were required to include at least one woman 
among every three candidates throughout the party list (Suryakusuma 2009). 
Additionally, Article 214 10/2008 allowed for semi-closed candidate lists, 
to assist with the implementation of the Semi-Zipper system and to guar-
antee the election of one-third female representatives (International IDEA 
and Stockholm University 2010). The law did this by addressing how votes 
should be translated into seats, stating that “the allocation of legislative seats 
for a political party is based on the number of votes won in electoral districts, 
with the priority given to candidates who win 30 percent of the minimum 
votes required to secure a legislative seat” (Article 214 10/2008). According 
to this Article, party lists are both open and closed: open in the sense that 
voters select individual candidates as well as the party, with candidates who 
meet the 30%+ quota directly elected into parliament, and closed in the 
sense that the remaining seats won by each party are allocated according to 
ranking of candidates on party lists, where every third candidate is female. 
Law 10/2008, which transformed a voluntary recommendation into the first 
real legislative quota with a rank order rule, was considered a great victory 
by the women’s movement. However, the lack of sanctions for non-compli-
ance did compromise its implementation; the National Election Commission 
was simply required to publish informing the public of the percentage of 
women nominated on each party list, and the KPU published no information 
concerning parties’ compliance with the ranking rule (Sherlock 2009).
The Constitutional Court Challenges: Unfortunately the victory was short-
lived; in December of 2008, only a few months after the quota law passed, 
the Constitutional Court declared Article 214 of Law No. 10/2008 allocating 
remaining seats according to party ranking, unconstitutional in response to a 
petition filed by two male candidates and four political parties opposed to the 
 14. Zipper system generally refers to alternating male and female candidates on a list, however in the 
case of Indonesia, the required placement of a woman for every third place along the list is also at 
times referred to as a zipper system, though calling it a semi-zipper style is more accurate. 
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gender quota. The petition argued that any seat allocation by a party rather 
than by the electorate was unconstitutional and undemocratic ( Suryakusuma 
2009), and that “instead of a candidate’s position on the list (which, in most 
cases, is the result of intra-party political bargaining), the actual number 
of votes should be the single determinant on who the representatives of 
the people should be (Ardani and Kanadi 2009).” Similar to France, male 
politicians objected to a provision of the electoral system that had raised no 
opposition until the introduction of the gender quota. Male members of the 
Indonesian political elite who had little objection to the party list prior to the 
gender quota suddenly declared the closed list undemocratic. The court’s 
ruling abolished the candidate ranking rule, rendering the Semi-Zipper style 
listing a female as every third candidate ineffective, since seats were now all 
allocated according the number of votes a candidate received.
The ruling to annul Article 214 was actually applauded by many 
observers both within and outside the country as a significant step towards 
further democratization of Indonesia electoral politics; the direct election 
of representatives by voters is understood to increase parliamentarians’ 
accountability to constituents, a matter of widespread concern in Indonesian 
politics. The ruling meant increased competition among candidates within 
a party and encouraged them to campaign on their own behalf, rather than 
depending on the party and its platform. However, the Indonesian women’s 
movement considered the ruling undemocratic as it removed a law which 
sought to create a level playing field in politics for Indonesian women, who 
saw their opportunities to serve as MPs diminished (Ardani and Kanadi 2009).
Of the nine Constitutional Court judges, the sole female, Judge Maria 
Farida Indrati, dissented, arguing that women’s equality is a constitutional 
right and reiterating the importance of a parliamentary gender quota to help 
achieve this constitutional requirement in the political arena (Suryakusuma 
2009).15 In her dissenting statement, Judge Indrati pointed to a very impor-
tant contradiction in the Court’s decision. The petitioners had questioned the 
constitutionality of both Articles 55 (which said that one in three candidates 
should be women) and 214 (which allowed partial seat allocation according 
to party rankings). The petitioners argued that the 30% quota undermined 
 15. Judge Maria Farida Indrati defended gender quotas based on the four widely-known arguments: 
women are half of the population (the justice argument); women have different experiences 
to men (the experience argument); women’s interests cannot be represented by men due to 
some inherent conflicts of interest (the interest group argument); and women politicians provide 
important role models for other women (Suryakusuma 2009). 
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the electorate’s freedom of choice by privileging women to the disadvantage 
of potentially more qualified male candidates. While the court declared the 
affirmative action measures codified in Article 55 were in accordance with 
the 1945 Constitution (which advocated gender equality), as well as with 
Indonesia’s commitment to assist women in the political process as party 
to both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
CEDAW, it ruled that Article 214 was unconstitutional, undermining indi-
vidual sovereignty, universal equal rights, and freedom of expression and 
association (Sri Adhiati 2009). According to Judge Indrati, her colleagues 
were gravely misguided in keeping one provision while striking the other, 
since the affirmative action measure of Law 10/2008 is only effective with 
both provisions (Suryakusuma 2009).
The Result of the 2009 Parliamentary Elections: Indonesia’s path towards 
democracy has included several significant and sometimes controversial 
modifications and revisions to the electoral system, particularly with regards 
to the rules adopted for the 2009 elections. The result is a complex system 
that has caused much confusion among the electorate. This, in conjunc-
tion with high illiteracy and the partial reversal of the quota provision, 
negatively impacted the election of female candidates on April 9th 2009. 
Indonesia’s electoral system is considered by political scientists to be among 
the most complex in the world; the fine points are still in the process of 
being hammered out, through the courts and through reforms advocated by 
activists and politicians. For the 2009 elections significant changes included: 
raising the number of seats in parliament from 550 to 560; increasing the 
number of parties competing from 24 to 38 (and establishing a minimum 
threshold of 2.5% of the national vote for a party to win a seat); and 
increasing the number of electoral districts to 77 from 69 (thus shrinking the 
district  magnitude). 
These reforms resulted in a more competitive parliamentary race mostly 
because the rise in the number of districts and the simultaneous shrinkage 
of each district size meant that each party needed a higher amount of votes 
to win seats in a district. In other words, due to the Constitutional Court 
ruling that parties cannot rank women on their lists, only known parties 
and candidates have a good chance of receiving votes, while women who 
rarely have sufficient funds to campaign on behalf of themselves are greatly 
disadvantaged. Additionally, increasing the number of parties from 24 to 38 
and allowing parties with as little as 2.5% threshold of votes to win a seat, 
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Table 5.1 The Indonesian electoral system post Suharto
Election 
Year % 
Electoral System and List type Quota Provision
1999 8.8% PR Closed List System: Voters chose between 
parties; parties allocated seats in proportion to 
votes received in each district. Little account-




Electoral System and List type Quota Provision
2004 11.3% PR Open List System: Voters voted for a party 
and, if they chose, for a candidate as well. 
Votes were invalid if a party was not selected 
along with an individual candidate. Candi-
dates had to reach quota (total district 
vote/district magnitude) to win a seat through 
preference votes.
Very few individual candidates reached the 
threshold required for directly winning a seat, 
since few voters marked their ballots for indi-
vidual candidates, thus preference voting did 
not disrupt most party lists. 
General Election Law 
12/2003-Voluntary 30% 
female quota for party lists, 
but without rank order rules.
2009 18.0% PR “Half-Open” List System (Initially): Based on 
legislation passed in 2008 in preparation for 
the 2009 election, voters were to vote for a 
party or an individual candidate. Candidates 
meeting the minimum threshold (see 2004 
above) were directly elected to parliament; 
remaining seats were allocated according  
to party list ranking, which was to include  
a Semi-Zipper (at least one woman among 
every three candidates) style quota. 
However, the Constitutional Court annulled 
the regulation pertaining to allocation of seats 
according to (the Zipper style) party ranking, 
deeming seats must be allocated solely on  
the basis of numbers of votes. 
PR Open List Systems (as of end of 2010): 
Accordingly, voters select individual candidates 
from party lists. The candidates with the most 
votes win seats. Voters are still allowed to  
only vote for a party, but these votes count 
towards the total number of seats for the 
party. Thus, the party-only votes determine 
the number of seats a party receives, and  
have no bearing on how seats are allocated. 
General Election Law 10/2008: 
Article 55: Mandatory 
30% quota of women  
candidates on party lists, 
ranked according to a  
Semi-Zipper style.
Sanctions for non-compliance: 
According to Articles 53  
and 66 of Law 10/2008,  
the National Election  
Commission (KPU) must 
verify whether party lists 
comply with the 30% quota 
of female candidates.
However, apart from pub-
lishing all party lists to be 
scrutinized by the electorate, 
no sanctions result for parties 
not meeting the quota or  
the initial Semi-Zipper style  
ranking rule (1 in 3 candi-
dates a female).
Sources: Constructed from data in (Parawansa 2005; Sherlock 2009).
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drastically amplifies party competition, as none are willing to “risk” women’s 
nominations. Trying to safeguard and increase votes, many parties nomi-
nated well-known, high-profile politicians or celebrities, making it almost 
impossible for little-known female candidates to compete. The number of 
celebrities (performing artists, athletes, relatives of high-profile politicians, 
and the like) on party lists quadrupled for the 2009 elections; though most 
of the celebrity candidates were politically inexperienced they drew many 
votes (Soeriaatmadja 2009). This phenomenon actually did support the elec-
tion of some female representatives in 2009, a few of whom actually won 
seats from male incumbents (Adjusuf 2009). For instance, Ratu Hemas, a 
sultan’s wife, won in the district where her husband is governor.16 Although 
this is not unlike some developments in the United States, usage of celebrity 
candidates has made Indonesia’s political scene even more complex and 
raises new issues for the women’s movement.
Similar to the 2004 elections, 30 percent of candidates in 2009 were 
women. In all, 18% of the seats in the legislature were won by women, 
increasing from 11.3% in 2004. As in the previous elections, most parties 
disregarded the requirement of 30% female candidates per list in each 
district, and simply nominated 30 percent women candidates in total across 
the nation. Thus, it is possible that women candidates were placed on lists 
in districts their parties considered unwinnable, therefore rendering the 
quota ineffective. The lack of real sanctions for non-compliance with the 
30% quota also weakened the provision, and in fact the National Election 
Commission (KPU) chose not to publish the lists highlighting which parties 
had not complied, deciding that the law was too vague on this matter 
(Sherlock 2009). 
Overall, Indonesia’s legislative quota has positive and negative aspects. 
The implementation of the quota has not increased the percentage of female 
parliamentarians to the extent that was expected (an increase from 11.3% 
in 2004 to only 18% in 2009). The success of gender quotas is a function of 
three primary factors: how well the quota provision fits with existing institu-
tional frameworks, such as electoral systems; the precision, clarity and detail 
of the quota provision; and lastly, whether key actors and political elites 
 16. The Jakarta Post. “Record Number of Female Legislators Elected into the House,” May 27 2009: sec 
National, available from http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/05/27/record-number-female-
legislators-elected-house.html. And The Jakarta Post. “Sultan's Wife Wins Most Votes, Secures DPD 
Seat,” April 23 2009: sec National, available from http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/04/23/
sultan039s-wife-wins-most-votes-secures-dpd-seat.html
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are supportive of or oppositional to the gender quota (Matland 2006). In 
the Indonesian case, the quotas legislated in Election Laws 10/2008 were 
originally designed to fit the state’s electoral system. Having learned from 
previous mistakes that parties tend to nominate women in unwinnable posi-
tions/districts, quota advocates lobbied for and won a Semi-Zipper style 
ranking rule to ensure that at least 1/3 of the 30% women candidates in all 
districts were in relatively winnable positions. This provision fit the List PR 
electoral system, however, it required support from at least a partially closed 
list, which quota advocates recommended. This was a highly sensitive issue 
due to a history of corruption concerning candidate rankings (for instance, 
individuals buying positions on the list from party leaders). However, when 
the Constitutional Court declared it illegal for political parties to have any 
candidate ranking power (as in ranking women in every third position on the 
lists), it weakened the potential of increasing the number of female parlia-
mentarians. Hence, the new ruling undermined the intent of the wording 
of the Semi-Zipper style ranking rule; despite the listing of a woman every 
third candidate, seat allocation had no relation to list ranking. In addition 
to this huge shortcoming, the wording of the original quota lacked the 
degree of detail necessary to avoid misinterpretation. Not only were sanc-
tions for non-compliance weak to non-existent, the requirement that the 
quota apply to every list in every district was overlooked or misinterpreted 
by most parties and the National Election Commission (KPU), which instead 
applied the provision to the total number of candidates per party across the 
nation. Lastly, most political parties had little commitment to, or support 
for the implementation of the quota, and neither did the majority of the 
judges of the Constitutional Court, the political elites, and institutions such 
as the National Election Commission (KPU). This increased the burden on 
the women’s movement/quota advocates, who had to simultaneously train 
potential candidates, fight court battles and try to elicit support from both 
voters and political elites. The situation illustrates the extent of patriarchal 
domination in Indonesian politics. 
Conclusion
Though fairly new, legislative party quotas are increasingly used, especially 
in emerging democracies. Many such countries are still in the process of 
fine-tuning the details in terms of the best implementable gender quota. 
Argentina, one of the first countries in the world to adopt a legislative 
gender quota, has undergone various electoral reforms related to the quota 
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and has achieved great success in electing women to parliament. In the 
current context of global diffusion, quota advocates are increasingly able to 
look to processes such as Argentina’s in their own quests to improve female 
representation in their states. In France and Indonesia women activists are 
still in the midst of figuring out the best strategies for achieving a successful 
quota system. In every effective implementation effort, quota advocates and 
political elites must pay attention to three essential elements. 
It is the responsibility of quota advocates to lobby for a legislative 
quota system that matches existing state structures, while avoiding undue 
complexity. France’s legislative quotas were not a good match with the 
majoritarian Two Round System, where women were seen by parties as 
“risk” candidates. In Indonesia, while the quota provision was designed as 
a perfect fit with the existing List PR system, key elements were ultimately 
struck down, as male political elites used the constitutional court to argue 
that a closed or semi-closed list violated an essential philosophy of the 
constitution. The court ruling made direct election the main option for 
Indonesia’s electoral system and eliminated the control of political parties 
over any seat allocation, rendering the gender quota as it was designed 
ineffective. This is a clear reminder to gender quota advocates that besides 
being well versed concerning political and historical context, and political 
party structure and ideology, they must also have clear understanding of the 
constitution and its founding philosophy, around which their discourse must 
be built. This was also the case for French feminists, who used constitutional 
ideals supporting gender parity and citizenship to promote women’s formal 
political participation. 
The wording of the actual quota provision, including clear, strong sanc-
tions for non-compliance, is also key. Legislative quotas lacking these are, 
for all intents and purposes, ineffective. Without strong, legally binding 
language the commitment of the state and political elites to gender equality 
or women’s political empowerment, often emerges as superficial and without 
substance. As discussed, both France and Indonesia lacked effective sanctions 
for non-compliance; French law imposing a very minor financial penalty and 
Indonesia’s simply “shaming” parties through public disclosure. Conversely, 
Argentina simply bars non-compliant parties from running for election. 
Finally, quota advocates must carefully asses the role and impact of key 
political actors during the process of quota adoption and implementation, 
and form alliances with key actors who are able to impact policy. While in 
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both France and Argentina there has been strong co-operation between the 
women’s movement and political parties (or their women’s sections), this 
is not really the case in Indonesia, despite the considerable efforts of the 
Indonesian women’s movement. It can be argued that Indonesian political 
parties might have been more responsive to gender quotas if the women’s 
movement had been more successful in its campaigns to bring political 
parties and other key actors on board in terms of recognizing the importance 
of female politicians to democratization and social justice. Such collabora-
tion could have prevented the court ruling that resulted from opposition 
by politicians, which rendered the quota ineffective. As a result, successful 
legislative quota adoption as well as implementation requires careful atten-
tion to various details, similar to other forms of quotas. 
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Country Profiles: Bangladesh and Rwanda
Country Profile: Bangladesh
Geographical location: Southern Asia
Population: 156 million (July 2010)
Majority religions: Muslim 89.5%; Hindu 9.6%
Major historical developments: In 1947 West  Pakistan and East Bengal (both 
primarily Muslim) separated from British India and jointly became the new 
country of Pakistan in 1955 although they were separated by 1,600 km. 
This awkward arrangement did not work and after the bloody Liberation 
War in 1971 East Pakistan became independent and was renamed Ban-
gladesh. The 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War came at great human cost, 
with Bengali women especially victimized by devastating war crimes in-
cluding systematic rape and murder perpetuated as a military tactic by 
the Pakistani Army. Needless to say, these atrocities negatively impacted 
the initial foundations of the Bangladeshi state and the emergence of its 
civil society. Since 1971 Bangladesh has experienced ongoing political in-
stability, ranging from military takeovers to one-party rules and multiple 
suspensions of its parliament. Although women have the right to vote, the 
presence of women in significant state decision-making positions has been 
limited. Ironically, since 1991 two women, Khaleda Zia of the Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (1991-1996 & 2001-2006) and Sheikh Hasina of Awami 
League (1996-2001 & 2008 to present) have held the elected position of 
Prime Minister.
Human Development Index (HDI) ranking: In 2010, Bangladesh ranked 
#129 out of a total of 169 countries measured worldwide.
Political system: Bangladesh operates as a parliamentary democracy, and 
has a multi-party system, though the two parties of Awami League and 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party tend to dominate elections, while the re-
maining parties receive very little votes.
Parliamentary system: Unicameral National Parliament or Jatiya Sangsad; 
members are elected by popular vote from single territorial constituencies
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to serve five-year terms. From 345 total seats, 45 are reserved for women 
(13%) to be filled by parties in proportion to their overall share of the vote. 
Electoral system for parliamentary elections: Bangladesh uses the First 
Past the Post (FPTP) system in which the candidate with the most 
votes wins in the single-member districts. This is the simplest form of 
majoritarian/plurality system.
Quota type: Reserved Seats adopted in 1972 (at the time the Bangladeshi 
Constitution was first drafted), in which 45 of 345 (13%) parliamentary 
seats are reserved for women, to be allocated to parties in proportion to 
their overall share of the votes. 
Female suffrage and standing for election: In 1947, when Pakistan (both 
West and East) split from British India, women and men received the right 
to vote. Subsequently when East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) gained its 
independence, suffrage for both genders was confirmed in the 1972 con-
stitution.
Voter-turnout for previous parliamentary elections: 85.26% (2008); infor-
mation for voter-turnout by gender is not readily available. 
Women in the parliament (2008 Elections): 64 women from a total of 
345 members (18.5% women); these 64 women include the 45 women 
who were selected by political parties to fill the reserved seats in propor-
tion to their overall share of the votes, as well as 19 women who were 
directly elected into the general seats on their own terms. The 2008 par-
liamentary elections saw an increase of more than 50% in the number of 
female parliamentarians more than any previous election.




Geographical location: Central Africa
Population: 11 million (July 2010)
Ethnic groups: Hutu 84%; Tutsi 15% 
Majority religions: Roman Catholic 56.5%; Protestant 26%; Adventist 
11.1%; Muslim 4.6%
Major historical developments: In 1959, three years before independence 
from Belgium in 1962, the majority ethnic group, the Hutus, overthrew the 
ruling Tutsi king. Over the next several years, thousands of Tutsis were killed, 
and some 150,000 driven into exile in neighboring countries. The children 
of these exiles later formed a rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), 
and began a civil war in 1990. The war, along with several political and eco-
nomic upheavals, exacerbated ethnic tensions, culminating in April 1994 
in the genocide of roughly 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The Tutsi 
rebels defeated the Hutu regime and ended the killing in July 1994, but ap-
proximately 2 million Hutu refugees – many fearing Tutsi retribution – fled 
to neighboring countries. Since then, most of the refugees have returned 
to Rwanda, but several thousand remained in the neighboring Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC). Rwanda’s post-conflict reconstruction efforts 
brought about women’s active and continued involvement in society and 
politics. Women insured that the transitional government adopts strategies 
that guarantee women’s long-term presence in political decision-making. 
Rwanda held its first local elections in 1999 and its first post-genocide presi-
dential and legislative elections in 2003. 
Human Development Index (HDI) ranking: In 2010, Rwanda ranked #152 
out of a total of 169 countries measured worldwide. 
Political system: Rwanda operates as a Republic, and the president serves 
as the chief of state and is elected by popular vote for seven-year terms. 
Rwanda is also technically a multi-party system, in which numerous par-
ties are to compete in the elections, however, since 2003, the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) has been securing majority of the parliamentary votes;
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parties must reach the minimum 5% threshold of the popular vote to gain 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies. 
Parliamentary system: Bicameral parliament consists of Senate (upper 
house) and Chamber of Deputies (lower house). The Senate members 
are mostly appointed by other political elites to serve eight-year terms. 
Within the Chamber of Deputies, 53 members are elected by popular vote, 
24 women are elected by local bodies, and 3 are selected by youth and 
disability organizations; all members are to serve five-year terms.
Electoral system for parliamentary elections: Rwanda uses List Proportional 
Representation (List PR) system in which seats in the parliament are distrib-
uted to candidates or parties in proportion to the votes that they receive in 
the multi-member districts. 
Quota type: Reserved Seats adopted in 2003. The 2003 Rwandan constitu-
tion reserves 24 from 80 total parliamentary seats for women. These re-
served seats are filled by Rwanda women’s councils, who elect two women 
from each province and from the city of Kigali from women only ballots. 
Female suffrage and standing for election: Rwandan women and men were 
franchised in 1961, upon independence from colonial rule. 
Voter-turnout for previous parliamentary elections: 98.5% (2008); informa-
tion for voter-turnout by gender is not readily available. 
Women in the parliament (2008 Elections): 45 women from a total of 80 mem-
bers (56.3% women, first country in the world with female majority 
 parliamentary representation). 24 women were elected by women’s coun-
cils to fill the reserved seats, while 21 women were directly elected into the 
general seats on their own terms.
24176.indb   145 16/09/11   11:38 AM
Reserved Seats Quotas:  
Bangladesh and Rwanda
“Our president knew that if Rwanda was going to succeed (from its civil 
war and genocide), the women were going to be the anchor, and the force 
behind the national processes of this country.”
Aloisea Inyumba
These are the words of Aloisea Inyumba, a senator in Rwanda’s Parliament 
often referred to as the “mother of the country” for her efforts to rebuild 
post-genocide Rwanda (Hinojosa 2008). In 1994, in the aftermath of the 
Rwandan genocide, Senator Inyumba commissioned Rwanda’s Unity and 
Reconciliation Commission to promote reconciliation between Hutus and 
Tutsis.1 She also became the first Minister of Family, Gender, and Social Affairs, 
during which time she, with support from other Rwandan women, oversaw 
the burial of the dead, the resettlement of refugees, and a national adoption 
campaign which placed almost all of the half million genocide orphans in 
Rwanda with adoptive families (Institute for Inclusive Security 2009). Senator 
Inyumba’s story is echoed around the globe, in other regions facing recon-
struction in the aftermath of extreme despair and crisis. Similarly, women in 
Bangladesh played a key role in post-conflict reconstruction of their newly 
founded state after its brutal separation from Pakistan in December 1971. 
After the Pakistani army went on a rampage, killing thousands of civilians and 
raping tens of thousands of women in Bangladesh, perhaps more, in order 
to intimidate the nationalists and their supporters, it was women who rose to 
the challenge of reconstructing post-separation Bangladesh, attending to the 
victims and addressing poverty and underdevelopment (Bose 2005).
In the aftermath of conflict or natural disaster, we often witness the 
remarkable presence of women in the public sphere working to rebuild lives 
and societies, to empower women to access arenas previously denied them, 
 1. For more details on hostilities between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda see (Mamdani 2001; Mamdani 
1996; Gourevitch 1998; Magnarella 2001).
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and to change cultural and societal assumptions concerning women’s roles 
(Paxton 2007; Ballington and Dahlerup 2006). Yet, such female public pres-
ence is often temporary, and eventually reverses once the acute phase of 
post-crisis nation-building passes. This is similar to what happened post 
World War II, when women were again relegated to the private sphere, 
after working in factories and industries during the war. To counter this 
erasure of women in the public sphere, a strategy of feminists and women’s 
rights activists is the adoption of various forms of gender quotas for state 
decision-making positions, in order to achieve a critical mass of women in 
key public positions. 
Today, women’s movements, the international community, and even 
political elites are pressing for measures to encourage and maintain women’s 
public presence, particularly in legislative and decision-making positions. 
Some argue that women “bring something unique to the table”. Those 
adhering to this argument believe that these “unique” qualities include 
women’s more nurturing character, their lesser susceptibility to corruption, 
and their proclivity to maintain peace. However most feminists argue that 
such qualities and skills are a result of gender socialization, not any inherent 
female nature (Sapiro 1998; Bourque and Grossholtz 1998). Regardless, 
whether culture or nature, few deny that women, particularly in less indus-
trialized nations, often do possess such key qualities and that these do 
support post-crisis societal rebuilding. Thus, activists from non-industrialized 
or war-torn regions tend to emphasize this notion of women’s uniqueness 
in politics, while activists from the industrialized world demand women’s 
increased presence in politics based on values of democracy and justice.2
This chapter presents the central arguments around the adoption of 
parliamentary reserved seats quotas for women; meaning the setting aside a 
number or percentage of parliamentary seats specifically for women, which 
has become more prevalent in recent decades. As outlined in chapter three, 
 2. Global regions differ in their emphasis on a justification for enhancement of women’s political 
representation. For instance, the quota discourse from the unindustrialized and developing world, 
particularly in Africa, demands women’s representation through emphasis on women’s unique 
features, while in the Western world this is rarely emphasized. In the West demands for equal 
representation are predicated on democratic ideals and accepted notions of gender equality. 
This is perhaps due to the fact that in recent democracies, where notions of gender equality 
and liberalism are weak, the women’s movement seeks other strategies to address women’s 
underrepresentation, one that is derived from women’s gender roles and hence considered more 
acceptable given such contexts.
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this particular type of quota mostly occurs in less-developed and emerging 
democracies,3 the majority of which are in Africa and many of which have 
faced recent national crises. However, reserved seats quotas have a longer 
history than any other type of parliamentary quota, appearing as early as 
the 1930s in India as part of a British Mandate and emerging again over the 
past decade after a general decline in their use. Reserved seats are legally 
mandated, either in the national constitution or a county’s election laws, but 
differ from legislative quotas in that they are meant to guarantee a minimum 
female presence in legislatures (though in rare cases they fail to fill women’s 
reserved seats). Though such quotas guarantee women’s presence in the 
legislature, the proportion of women that they stipulate is generally much 
lower than other types of quotas – usually around or below 10 percent, 
though in some cases as high as 30 percent. Such low percentages are often 
considered tokenism which does little to insure woman-friendly legislation. 
Due to the legally mandated strength of reserved seats quotas, they are often 
adopted by states with very low levels of female parliamentary representa-
tion. There are various reasons for the sudden popularity of reserved seats 
in such states, ranging from democratizing influences, international and 
transnational factors, post-conflict factors, women’s movement pressures, 
and others, noting that along with addressing women’s underrepresenta-
tion, reserved seats are also used as a strategy to tackle other pressing needs 
in contexts where women’s presence in politics is associated with peace, 
hope, cooperation, and even democratization. Many such states, particu-
larly those that have recently suffered national crises, have made historical 
advancements in women’s political participation. Among the most signifi-
cant advancements are:
 • As of November 2010, nine developing states (most of them African), 
have achieved critical mass (30%+) female parliamentary  representation. 
They represent an astonishing 35 percent of the total number of states 
that have reached critical mass (see Table 3.2 in chapter three).
 • Within the past decade gender quota adoption in the developing 
world is quadruple that of the developed world (see Chart 3.1 in 
chapter three). African states are currently at the forefront of quota 
 3. For instance, constitutional gender quotas, which also include reserved seats, are currently 
employed in 16 countries, 14 of which (with the exclusion of France and Argentina) are ranked 
Low or Medium Human Development according to the 2008 UNDP Human Development Report 
(International IDEA and Stockholm University 2009).
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adoption, and  Rwanda is the first country in the world to reach gender 
parity in its parliament. This illustrates successful quota implementa-
tion following adoption. 
 • The rapid spread of quotas reflects the commitment, preparation, and 
innovative strategizing of gender quota advocates, including national 
and transnational activists, scholars, political elites, and the interna-
tional community.
Overall however, while a few states in the developing world have made 
great strides regarding women’s political representation, such success does 
not extend widely to the less industrialized world. The issue of women’s 
 underrepresentation remains a reality across the globe, regardless of levels 
of industrialization.
This chapter examines the cases of two developing states; Bangladesh 
and Rwanda. Both introduced quotas following major social and political 
crises. While Rwanda is considered a success story in its reserved seats quota 
adoption and implementation, Bangladesh, which has debated quota 
adoption for much longer, still lags far behind in levels of female political 
representation, despite a recent history of female political leaders, including 
 presidents, since the early1980s. Below we discuss some of the factors that 
led to the achievements of the Rwandan quota process and the factors 
hindering success in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh
Reserved seats quotas originated in the 1930s from colonial India, which was 
later partitioned into India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Despite this history, 
none of these South Asian states have achieved parliamentary gender 
balance. Similar to other cases, this is a result of various factors, not merely 
due to the shortcomings of the quota system. Reasons include but are not 
limited to the region’s colonial past, under-development, civil war, elitist 
women’s movements, and electoral systems that do not support the candi-
dacy of women. Many of these factors are characteristic of less-industrialized 
states generally. Here, we explore the situation of Bangladesh, a country 
with low levels of industrialization and institutional infrastructure which, 
nonetheless, adopted reserved seats quotas to improve women’s political 
representation. This case study will allow us to look at additional factors 
associated with quotas in the developing world, and the role quotas have 
played in encouraging or hindering women’s parliamentary representation, 
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particularly in contexts impacted by the legacies of colonialism. As one of the 
earliest nations to adopt legislative quotas, advocates for women’s political 
representation can learn a great deal by studying the quota process that has 
unfolded in Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh is a highly impoverished and populated4 state that, despite 
early adoption of reserved seats, has yet to achieve critical mass of women 
parliamentarians. The multi-faceted nature of the problems faced by 
Bangladesh result from its shared colonial history with India, the  unworkable 
1947 partition from India as East Pakistan, and finally a bloody, devastating 
civil war in 1971, which led to the establishment of Bangladesh as an indepen-
dent nation (Ayoob and Subrahmanyam 1972). Even with independence, 
however, Bangladesh continues to suffer from political instability and contin-
uous natural disasters. Under these circumstances, although Bangladesh 
boasts scores of women activists and women’s organizations focused on 
development and poverty reduction, the state has not been successful in 
improving women’s representation in its national assembly. The Parliament 
of Bangladesh (Jatiyo Shangshad) has faced numerous political crises where 
parliament was suspended in order to hold new elections; however, the 
extreme opposition between the two dominant parties (the Awami League 
and Bangladesh Nationalist Party) has often resulted in one or the other party 
boycotting the elections. Furthermore, the political parties rarely nominated 
female candidates for the general seats, viewing them as “risky” or incapable; 
which is ironic, given that since 1991 two women, Khaleda Zia (1991-1996 
& 2001-2006)5 and Sheikh Hasina (1996-2001 & 2008 to present)6 have 
held the elected position of prime minister. A brief discussion of the historical 
background of gender quotas in the South Asian region (including India, 
 4. Bangladesh is currently the 7th most populated country in the world, with a population of just 
over 150 million. 
 5. Khaleda Zia entered politics after her husband was assassinated in 1981 and gradually became 
the chairperson of her political party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). While in power she 
made alliances with 7 other political parties and despite being harassed by the military regime, 
which she decried as illegal, she continued her struggle and was elected to parliament two times, 
and later held the post of Prime Minister for a total of 10 years. Although some try to minimize 
her achievement by relating it to her husband’s assassination, her election 10 years after his death 
proved her political intelligence and ability to unite the public.
 6. Sheikh Hasina has been the president of the People’s Party (Awami League) since 1981. Her father, 
along with almost her entire family, was assassinated in a military coup while she was outside the 
country. She was not allowed to return home until 1981, after which she became the leader of the 
party and was elected first to parliament and then to the post of Prime Minister on two occasions.
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Pakistan and Bangladesh), as well as an analysis of key actors and institutions 
involved in quota debates and processes will shed light onto the various 
obstacles faced in quota adoption and implementation in Bangladesh. 
The Historical Context
Discussions of quotas in the developing world always require historical 
contextualization. Bangladesh, like many other developing nations, has a 
significant legacy of colonialism and foreign influence which has engen-
dered long-term economic, political, and social turmoil. Because of the stain 
of colonialism, policies have sometimes been rejected not for lack of merit 
but because of their association with colonial influences and a resistance to 
anything smelling slightly of the oppressor. Heated debates around reserved 
seats for women and disadvantaged religious groups and castes arose when 
the British introduced the idea in India as early as the 1920s; regional gender 
quota developments that followed must be understood within this histor-
ical conjuncture. The Government of India Act of 1935 introduced further 
quotas for a range of minorities, including 41 reserved seats for women in 
provincial legislatures and limited reservations in central legislatures (John 
2000, p. 3828; Rai 2008, p. 92; Hasan, Sridharan, and Sudarshan 2005, 
p. 407). The quotas were viewed by many Indian nationalists and intellectuals, 
including Gandhi, leader of India’s independence movement, as an attempt 
to break the unity of India as a nation and weaken resistance to the British 
colonial power (Raman 2003, p. 22).7 While few denied the need to include 
marginal and disadvantaged social groups within the nation’s political struc-
tures, various British policies sowed the seeds of religious conflict resulting 
in the wrenching partition of India and Pakistan on the eve of independence 
in 1947. In this context, anti-colonial leaders frequently pointed out that 
few Indians actually controlled their own destinies under British rule, thus 
providing political representation for the underrepresented and “disadvan-
taged” would be quite meaningless. 
Because the Indian women’s movement at the time regarded itself as an 
integrated part of the nationalist, anti-colonial movement, it also opposed 
gender quotas, arguing that such preferential policy would undermine the 
goals of equality among all Indians. As the organization purporting to speak 
 7. An example of British quotas for minority groups is the British Communal Award of 1932 which 
sought to provide separate electorates and reserved seats based on religion and caste (Rai 2008, 
p. 92; Hasan, Sridharan, and Sudarshan 2005, p. 407). 
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on behalf of all Indian women, the All India Women’s Congress (AIWC), 
established in 1926, demanded universal adult suffrage irrespective of any 
property or literacy qualification, and the right to be elected to legislatures, 
but with “equity and no privileges” (Hasan, Sridharan, and Sudarshan 2005, 
p. 406; Raman 2003, p. 22). 
A closer examination reveals the extent of the contradictions and 
tensions faced by the early twentieth century Indian women’s movements 
concerning gender quotas, due to their imperial origin. Today’s Indian 
gender quota debates (as well as the quota issues in Bangladesh) cannot 
be truly understood without considering the history of quota discourse 
in the region over the last century (John 2000). Various Indian women’s 
organizations of the pre-independence era, such as the Women’s Indian 
Association (WIA), initially favored reserved seats for women, but withdrew 
their support when Gandhi began a fast to protest “untouchability” and the 
British mandate to create separate electorates and seats for minorities (and 
women) – which Gandhi believed reinforced the notion of caste distinc-
tions. In this instance, women sacrificed their political empowerment to 
prove their devotion to Gandhi and the nationalist agenda. However, after 
the 1935 Government of India Act provided women with 41 reserved seats, 
the All India Women’s Congress, which was in the vanguard of opposition 
to gender quotas, nevertheless used the legislation to great advantage, and 
in the 1937 elections, 56 women were elected to the legislature. Thus, “the 
reserved seats laid the groundwork for women’s participation in politics 
and provided them with a very important foothold in legislatures” (Hasan, 
Sridharan, and Sudarshan 2005, p. 407). The women’s movement also 
compromised with the British concerning women’s suffrage. Although the 
women’s movement called for “universal adult suffrage”, they accepted the 
British restriction of women’s franchise to urban areas, and as cited by Mary 
John, they argued that they attached “equal importance to the quality as 
well as the quantity of women’s vote”, (emphasis ours) which suggested 
that urban women were somehow more likely to vote “properly” (John 
2000, p. 3825). At the same time the movement continued to oppose 
quotas, reiterating that “merit and merit alone” should be the only criterion 
for elections.
The colonial, non-grassroots origin of quotas and reserved seats 
hindered their adoption in post-colonial India. The women’s movement 
at the time had to prioritize independence from Britain over women’s 
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political participation. However, following Independence and Partition in 
1947, quota debates differed from India to Pakistan, with each country 
taking opposite approaches to the issue of reserved seats. Pakistan, which 
at the time included present-day Bangladesh, introduced reserved seats for 
women in the early 1950s, while India rejected the idea until the late 1980s. 
Pakistan, however, reserved only two seats of the Constituent Assembly (less 
than 3 percent) for women. Women’s reserved seats were also expanded to 
local level government, with Pakistani political elites arguing that women’s 
political participation and rights were essential not only for women’s prog-
ress, but for the development of the country (Mumtaz 1998). The Pakistani 
women’s movements were eventually able to achieve 60 reserved seats for 
women out of 342 (17.5%) (International IDEA and Stockholm University 
2010); but this happened in only 2002 after years of campaigning by various 
women and civil society organizations.8
Initially designated the province of East Pakistan by the British Partition 
of India on the eve of Independence in 1947, Bangladesh only became 
an independent nation in 1971, when the ethnic Bengalis rose in revolt 
against the Pakistani military. The 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War came 
at great human cost, with Bengali women especially victimized by devas-
tating war crimes including systematic rape and murder perpetuated as a 
military tactic by the Pakistani Army (Bose 2005). Needless to say, these 
atrocities negatively impacted the initial foundations of the Bangladeshi 
state and the emergence of its civil society. Since 1971 Bangladesh has 
experienced ongoing political instability, ranging from military takeovers 
to one-party rules and multiple suspensions of its parliament. Although 
women have the right to vote, the presence of women in significant state 
decision-making positions has been limited. On the other hand, addressing 
the extreme poverty of the majority of the population has absorbed many 
women activists into charity and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
which in effect run the development policies of Bangladesh. Concurrently, 
the instability of the state and its inability to implement its laws and policies 
have meant that feminists and others trying to implement social change 
do not focus on state political institutions; thus, until quite recently, few 
activists or organizations paid much attention to how reserved seats quota 
was designed and implemented. Consequently, despite the long history 
 8. For more information on Pakistan’s gender quota debates see chapter four of Krook (2009) and 
Hanif (2009). 
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of reserved seats in the region, Bangladesh has been rather unsuccessful 
in increasing the number of female parliamentarians. The following 
sections will analyze the adoption and implementation of reserved seats 
in Bangladesh, highlighting various factors which have contributed to low 
rates of women’s representation. 
Quota Adoption in Bangladesh: “Token” Female Representation
Gender quotas or “reservations” – terms used interchangeably in the case 
of Bangladesh – refer to reserving a designated number of seats in the 
legisla tive/local body exclusively for women. The term “reservation” has 
colonial roots that allude to safeguarding the participation of vulnerable 
groups. In this sense, women formed a group that deserved governmental 
protection rather than needing deliberate measures that would empower 
them ( Chowdhury 2003). This perspective impacted the political behavior 
concerning women’s election to reserved seats, marginalizing women 
parliamentarians. Initially gender quotas in Bangladesh were conceived of 
as temporary measures to be implemented with the new Constitution. It 
was hoped that their use for 10 to 15 years would allow for true political 
empowerment of women such that quotas would eventually no longer be 
needed. However, women’s representation in Bangladesh has never reached 
critical mass (see Table 6.1). As the table below outlines, the number of 
women elected to general seats has remained minimal, and whenever the 
quotas expired, women’s overall parliamentary presence also declined. It 
was only the most recent elections of December 2008 that saw any real 
increase in the number of women elected –19 women won seats, an increase 
of more than 50% from any previous election. Reserved seats have remained 
the primary gateway for women’s entrance into the Bangladeshi Parliament. 
Many scholars argue that the low percentage of women parliamentarians 
illustrates the tokenism of the quota system,9 and that Bangladesh’s political 
elites have not institutionalized genuine reform to sufficiently address 
women’s underrepresentation (Chowdhury 2003; Panday 2008). In this 
section we will address the key shortcomings of Bangladesh’s quota adop-
tion process: namely the role of political elites and Bangladeshi women’s 
movements.
 9. In this study, “tokenism” concerns the limited number of reserved seats for women (usually not 
exceeding 10 percent) designated by political elites. This also ensures that the women in office 
remain accountable to the interests of the ruling elites than to the public.
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Table 6.1 Women in the Parliament of Bangladesh
Parliament No.  in 
general seats
No. & %  in 
reserved seats
Total 
1st: 1973-75 None 15/315 (4.8%) 15 (4.8%) 
2nd: 1979-82 2 30/330 (9.1%) 32 (9.7% )
3rd: 1986-87-parliament dissolved 5 30/330 (9.1%) 35 (10.6%)
4th: 1988-90 4 None* 4 (1.3%)
5th: 1991-95 4 30/330 (9.1%) 34 (10.3%)
6th: 1996-96-parliament dissolved 3 30/330 (9.1%) 33 (10%)
7th: 1996-01 8 30/330 (9.1%) 38 (11.5%) 
8th: 2001-06-caretaker govt. assumed power 
from 2006-08




9th: Dec. 2008-present 19 45/345 (13%) 64 (18.5%)
* In 1987, the women’s seat reservations in force since Bangladesh’s founding expired; there were  
no reservations for the 1988 elections.
** There were no gender quotas for the October 2001 general elections – the provision reserving seats for 
women had expired in April 2001. However, in 2004 parliament passed a bill increasing the number of 
women’s reserved seats from 30 to 45, and created a total of 345 parliamentary seats. This measure was 
extremely controversial, but the reserved seats were allocated within 45 days after the passage of the bill, in 
proportion to the seats won by each party back in October 2001 (OneWorld.net, “Bangladesh: Parliament 
Passes Controversial Bill For 45 Reserved Seats For Women,” accessed July 29, 2009. Available from  
http://uk.oneworld.net/article/view/98756)
Sources: Constructed from (Panday 2008) 
IPU: Inter-Parliamentary Union http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif300609.htm
Bangladesh Parliament Legislative Information Center http://www.parliamentofbangladesh.org/general-2.html
Reserved Seats in the Name of Women and at the Service of Political Elites: 
Adoption of gender quotas in Bangladesh began as a top-down effort, 
carried out by those who framed the Constitution. These male political 
elites simply continued the practice of Pakistan, granting women a few 
parliamentary seats. They justified this decision by arguing that women 
were too politically weak to contest male candidates for general seats, 
not by articulating a commitment to gender justice or democratization 
(Chowdhury 2003). The 1972 Constitution established a 300 seat parlia-
ment with an additional 15 seats (4.8%) reserved for women to be elected 
indirectly by political elites, while the 300 general seats were up for direct 
election in single-member districts. Although women were legally allowed 
to compete for the general seats, the ruling parties showed little commitment 
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to addressing women’s underrepresentation,10 rarely nominating female 
candidates in the First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system.11 This lack of 
support basically excluded women from running for general seats, which 
were treated as “men’s seats”. The reserved seats became an additional 
“vote bank” for the dominant parties, since the party that received the 
majority of the votes in the general election had its own women members 
elected to the reserved seats ( Chowdhury 1994). Thus, all of the 15 reserved 
seats went to one party, instead of being divided among parties in propor-
tion to the popular votes each received, though this was later modified in 
2004, as explained below. 
The proportion of women’s reserved seats has varied over time either 
because of constitutional amendments or the dissolution of parliament 
due to political crises. For instance, the 1978 presidential proclamation 
increased the number of reserved seats from 15 to 30 (9.9% of the total), 
but this provision lapsed in 1987 due to parliament’s dissolution, only to 
be re-incorporated in 1990 by a constitutional amendment. The provision 
lapsed again in 2001, and was replaced in 2004 by the fourteenth consti-
tutional amendment which raised the reserved seats to 45, out of a total of 
345 seats (13%). These reserved seats are allocated to parties in proportion 
to the votes each receives. Thus, if a party received 30% of the total vote, 
its leaders could elect women party members to 30% of the reserved seats 
in the 90 days following the gene ral election. This mechanism was a major 
improvement from the  previous system. Multiple parties could now elect 
women, whereas previously only the ruling party could, and this encour-
aged parties to nominate more women candidates (Panday 2008). Women 
elected into reserved seats do not represent a single-member constitu-
ency from the total of 300 districts as their directly elected colleagues do. 
Instead, the entire country is divided into 45 reserved seats constituencies; 
thus women holding reserved seats re present constituencies that are almost 
 10. As explained below, one of the major obstacles for increasing the number of female representatives 
in Bangladesh is its First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system, since parties consider women to be 
risk candidates if running against men. The Bangladeshi political elites did not make much effort to 
address this obstacle, which has been effectively addressed by a few other states that use the FPTP 
system, such as Nepal, which tackled it by requiring at least 33 percent female candidates for the 
seats that are filled by the FPTP system (International IDEA and Stockholm University 2010).
 11. The four major political parties of Bangladesh have nominated very few women to contest general 
seats. For instance, in the 1986 parliamentary elections women made up only 1.3 percent of the 
total candidates for general elections and only 1.5 percent in the 1991 elections (Basu 2009, p.101). 
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six times larger than those of directly elected Members of Parliament. Such 
huge electoral zones not only distance reserved seats holders from their 
constituents, they also tend to keep them more accountable to the male 
party leaders that have elected them than to their constituents (Chowdhury 
2003; Panday 2008). 
The current quota system in Bangladesh is one that is initiated and main-
tained by political elites. While the government of Bangladesh has failed 
to effectively empower women to political office through gender quotas 
at the national level, it has however been more effective at the local level. 
This was achieved by adopting the Local Government Second Amendment 
Act in 1997 which introduced direct election for women’s quota seats at 
the local level (Panday 2008). At the national level, although two women 
head the dominant political parties in Bangladesh (and almost all polit-
ical parties in Bangladesh have some sort of gender branch or women’s 
committee), none of the parties have committed themselves to reform the 
proportion of reserved seats for women in the national parliament or the allo-
cation system which tends to only elect “token” women. The various legal 
reforms concerning reserved seats have been passed in spite of immense 
opposition from women’s organizations and groups, as discussed below.
The Women’s Movements: South Asian women’s movements played a small 
role in the initial quota discourse that unfolded in British India, and later in 
Pakistan and Bangladesh. Since quotas were implemented in a top-down 
manner, the true needs and demands of women were rarely considered. 
However, once the debate began, the women’s movements did not remain 
silent. In Bangladesh, when the first gender quotas were adopted by the 1972 
Constitution, the most dominant women’s organizations, such as the Mahila 
Parishad (Women’s Council) founded in 1970, advocated in general terms 
for gender equality and the removal of all forms of gender discrimination. 
However, women’s organizations were not invited to be involved in the formu-
lation of the women’s reserved seats provision, which were eventually designed 
and passed by the male elites, in the absence of women’s inputs. From the 
1970s through the early 1990s, Bangladeshi women’s organizations focused 
primarily on welfare or development related issues. As mentioned earlier, this 
is explained in part by the fact that governance and political institutions were 
extremely unstable and weak, and thus, not viable channels for addressing 
women’s or other issues, including the poverty affecting large segments of the 
population – and it is widely accepted that burdens of impoverishment weigh 
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most heavily on females of the most disadvantaged social groups (Lord 1993; 
Nordquist 1987).12 Ironically, the constant political crises and instability of the 
state actually stimulated a very strong grassroots women’s movement, with a 
large number of organizations and NGOs functioning to address various social 
welfare issues, many facing impoverished rural women. 
More recently, a large number of Bangladeshi women’s organizations 
have, with the support of the transnational feminist movement – in particular 
women’s organizations working in Muslim contexts – unified their objectives 
to advance women’s status. One goal of these transnational activist networks 
is enhancing women’s political participation. However, most of their work has 
so far focused on training programs for potential female candidates, rather 
than on a demand for gender quotas ( Panday 2008). Training is indeed a 
crucial element of the strategy to increase female representation, since few 
women in Bangladesh have formal political  experience; however, various 
research surveys show that for women who are elected, the level of education 
and knowledge of the political structure is higher for female parliamentar-
ians than for their male counterparts (Jahan 1987). Such findings illustrate 
the entrenchment of male dominance in poli tics – a lack of qualifications on 
the part of male politicians is not necessarily an impediment to accessing 
political office, though the same is not true for women. Although the train-
ings launched by women’s organizations have succeeded in empowering 
women to run for office, they have not resulted in significant increases in the 
proportion of female candidates. This is primarily because women generally 
do not have the access to funding and patronage that is crucial to a successful 
electoral campaign in Bangladesh, where financial resources or kinship with 
political elites remain important factors for political success. 
The women’s movement in Bangladesh did bring the issue of quotas 
into public discourse as the failure to increase the number of female parlia-
mentarians became apparent. They criticized the quota system in place and 
lobbied for a quota system to fundamentally change the token nature of the 
constitutional provision. In the aftermath of the 1987 dissolution of parlia-
ment, the Bangladesh women’s movement put forward clear objectives of 
increasing reserved seats to at least 100 (30 percent of the total seats), and 
filling those seats through direct elections in order to bring women into 
the political mainstream. Some women’s organizations also encouraged 
 12. Based on interviews with Salma Sobhan, a leading feminist, human rights lawyer and writer on 
the political status of women in Bangladesh in Montreal in Fall 2000 and Sultana Kamal in London 
on March 2007. See also (Guhathakurta 2003).
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political parties to nominate a percentage of women to contest the general 
seats. However, the ruling elites ignored these demands and in 1991 simply 
re-adopted the previous reserved seats provision with minor changes. 
Following this defeat, the women’s movement worked to rally public 
opinion to pressure the government for an effective quota system. By 2001, 
about 20 women’s groups and NGOs were mobilized by the Mahila Parishad 
(Women’s Council) to lobby government, political parties, and parliamentar-
ians through mass protests and awareness-raising campaigns, linking with the 
transnational women’s movement for support.13 Such transnational  support 
ranged from UN-sponsored gatherings and conferences surrounding the 
enhancement of women’s political rights throughout the 1990s, to regional 
influences from women’s movements in neighboring Pakistan and India as 
well as the strong networking that existed between many South Asian femi-
nist groups (Basu 2009, p. 17-18). Although hopeful that the ruling Awami 
League would stand by an earlier promise to meet the movement’s demands 
for real reform to the reserved seats provision, to their great disappointment 
in 2004 a similarly tokenistic provision was passed. The constitutional amend-
ment simply increased the number of reserved seats from 30 to 45, out of a 
total 345 parliamentary seats (to 13 percent). The amendment was strongly 
condemned by women’s rights activists, who declared that it would “under-
mine women’s political role” and was “insulting” (Shehabuddin 2008, p. 162). 
The women’s movement continues to pressure the government for 
meaningful reforms to the reserved seats provision. In March 2009 Prime 
Minister Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League announced that she will 
increase women’s reserved seats to 100, a policy measure adopted by her 
party in its 2008 National Women Development Policy,14 to comply with 
the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) towards women’s develop-
ment (and thus be eligible for significant development funding). Among 
the policy’s progressive features are to set aside one-third of parliamentary 
seats for women, to be filled through direct elections. However, this policy 
has faced fierce opposition from Islamist groups, such as the fundamentalist 
 13. This support was mostly in terms of sharing experiences, looking at the successful strategies, and 
becoming aware of the arguments in favor of quotas to effectively counter quota adversaries. 
Furthermore, they helped to develop strategies for mobilizing and the lobbying of influential 
bilateral and international donor agencies such as the World Bank and American aid agencies to 
give more weight to women’s political representation.
 14. Thaindian News, “Bangladesh Parliament to Double Reservation for Women,” 2009, available from 
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/politics/bangladesh-parliament-to-double-reservation-for-
women-lead_100164454.html.
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political party Jama’at Islami, who declare it “contrary to Allah’s law” and 
continue to demand its immediate withdrawal. According to Women and 
Children’s Affairs adviser Rasheda Choudhury, most of the policy’s provisions 
have been willfully misinterpreted by Islamists.15
In sum, gender quotas in Bangladesh were initially championed by 
political elites, with little regard for women’s true interests. However, more 
recently the Bangladeshi women’s movement has played a much more active 
role around gender quota issues and policies. They have also enlisted the 
support of the transnational women’s movement and international organiza-
tions. The transnational women’s movement has played a key role, lobbying 
international aid agencies to support measures to increase women’s political 
representation by making this a condition for obtaining development aid.16 
It has been argued however, such pressures, without proper mechanisms to 
ensure that grassroots women’s movements involvement in the design of the 
quota system, can often lead to the adoption of gender quotas as part of an 
attempt to appear progressive and “modern”; to gain support from the West 
and to access larger, Western oriented markets without actually drastically 
altering the political structure (Abou-Zeid 2006, p. 172). Thus, for example, 
in 2000 a United Nations Development Program provided Bangladesh with 
$4 million for a governance program to extend its lapsed quota legislation 
and to increase the percentage of women in parliament (Paxton 2007, p. 184). 
Bangladesh subsequently formulated and adopted the 2004 constitutional 
amendment without any input from the women’s movements and other 
civil society organizations, increasing reserved seats to 45. Women’s groups 
opposed the amendment for its weak and non-empowering provisions. 
Implementation of Quotas in Bangladesh:  
Many Shortcomings, Few Accomplishments
According to Najma Chowdhury (2003) and Pranab Kumar Panday (2008)
quotas in Bangladesh have served more as a “glass ceiling” for women rather 
 15. The Daily Star, “Don’t Criticize Women Policy without Reading: Adviser Rasheda asks People,” 2008, 
available from http://www.thedailystar.net/pf_story.php?nid=27511
 16. Currently, in response to transnational women’s movements, international development agencies 
such as the World Bank are emphasizing gender equality and place related conditions on their 
funding. Bangladesh, similar to other developing nations, receives 80-100 percent of its national 
development budget through external funding, so such funding conditions, along with the pres-
ence of an active women’s movement, can have a huge impact on national social and political 
policy and programs. 
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than a jump starter for their presence in parliament. This is in large part due to 
the association of reserved seats as “women’s seats”, and of general seats as 
“men’s seats.” This is illustrated by the fact that the number of elected women 
has rarely surpassed the number of reserved seats (see Table 6.1). The quotas 
ultimately did not meaningfully support women’s political empowerment as 
they had intended. The three main criteria we come back to again are: the 
details of a quota policy, the fit of the policy with institutional frameworks, and 
the extent of support from political actors and elites. We look at these to try 
and understand the short comings of the gender quota in Bangladesh.
The national constitution of Bangladesh clearly outlines the details 
of women’s reserved seats in its initial formulation. Article 65 (3) of the 
Constitution determines the number of seats reserved for women, and the 
time frame for application. The article has been subject to many constitu-
tional amendments, all of which merely altered the number of seats and 
the quota expiration date, with little modification to how the seats were to 
be filled. The article has always been precisely worded and implemented, 
except when internal party struggles resulted in political crises and parlia-
mentary dissolutions.
Despite the clearly stated legal provision, the reserved seats system did 
not match the state’s electoral system for purposes of increasing women’s 
representation. Bangladesh’s First Past the Post electoral system requires 
voters to choose one candidate to represent a single-member district. The 
reserved seats were separated from these generally elected parliamentary 
seats, and additional constituencies were developed for women to represent, 
elected by political elites rather than voters. Given Bangladesh’s patriarchal 
society and single-member districts, the FPTP system discouraged parties 
from nominating women for general seats, as they considered women to be 
risk candidates likely to lose to any male opponent. More potentially effective 
reforms include altering the electoral system to proportional representation 
or mixed systems (as was done in Nepal) to serve multiple-member districts; 
or setting up women’s-only-districts and party candidate lists, in which only 
women candidates are allowed to stand for election in certain districts; or 
merely enabling direct elections into the reserved seats as demanded by the 
women’s movements. 
In addition to considering the many possibilities for meaningful reform, 
change also depends on the support and commitment of political elites. 
Pressure on elites usually has to originate from women’s organizations, 
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preferably a coalition of women’s groups, since power-holders otherwise 
have little interest in changing the status quo. In Bangladesh elites have not 
been sufficiently pressured to take meaningful action to address women’s 
parlia mentary underrepresentation. In fact, according to some scholars, 
the  reserved seats quota is implemented in a manner to benefit ruling 
elites rather than to empower women. Chowdhury (2003) argues that not 
only are women rarely nominated by parties, but those who are, tend to 
be relatives of either politicians or important party supporters, leaving the 
vast majority of women in Bangladesh without access to political power. 
Unsuccessful quotas in Bangladesh are the largely results of the women’s 
movement’s lack of involvement in formulating new reserved seats legisla-
tion, as well due to a lack of mechanisms for monitoring the impact of 
them on women’s representations.
All of the above have contributed to the failure of the reserved seats 
system in Bangladesh to accomplish meaningful increases in female political 
representation. There have however been a few accomplishments in the 
context of quota adoption in Bangladesh. The most important of these is 
the increase in grassroots-level pressure on the government to reform the 
quota provision. More recently the women’s movement has united under 
the umbrella organization Mahila Parishad to unanimously oppose the 
government’s token approach to female representation and to demand 
fundamental change. Another significant achievement was the increase in 
female candidates, mostly nominated by the ruling Awami League party, 
in the December 2008 elections. Of the 55 women who ran for election 
to general seats, 19 were successful. This is a relatively huge increase from 
the 7 women representatives elected in 2001 (see Table 6.1). However, 
Bangladesh’s  electoral history shows that it will still require a comprehensive 
gender quota system that fits the state’s electoral system and encourages 
parties to make proactive efforts to increase women’s status.
Rwanda
Rwandan Reserved Seats and its Innovative Features
In October 2003, Rwanda made history in its first democratic parliamen-
tary elections since the 1994 genocide by achieving near gender parity 
(48.8 percent female representatives) in its legislature, surpassing the perfor-
mance of Scandinavian countries that until then ranked highest in female 
24176.indb   162 16/09/11   11:38 AM
163
Chapter.6.–.Reserved.Seats.Quotas:.Bangladesh.and.Rwanda
representation. In September 2008, Rwanda once again shocked the world 
by electing a majority of 56.3% women parliamentarians (Zirimwabagabo 
2008), far exceeding the world average of approximately 19 percent 
 (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2009). Rwanda’s exceptional performance would 
not have been possible without the adoption and implementation of parlia-
mentary reserved seats for women. Today, Rwanda is part of a trend of quota 
adoption, most of which has occurred in the developing world, particularly 
within the past 15 years (Dahlerup 2006b). The following briefly discusses 
the historical background that frames the context within which the quota 
process emerged in Rwanda, the adoption and implementation of the quota, 
and some of the issues quota adoption has faced over the years. 
The Historical Context
In 1961 – one year before Rwanda gained independence from Belgium 
– Rwandan women received the rights to vote and to stand for elections. 
While the first female parliamentarian began serving in 1965, women’s 
parliamentary presence never exceeded 18 percent before the 1990s civil 
war, after which a transition government came to power for a decade as 
Rwanda gradually rebuilt itself following horrific crisis of the 1994 genocide 
(Mamdani 2001). The Rwandan women’s movement, which predated the 
genocide, as well as the women’s organizations that were created in its after-
math, played a key role in rebuilding the war-torn nation. In order to better 
understand the nature of Rwandan women’s organizing, mobilization and 
resistance, it is necessary to contextualize their role in society as well as the 
impact of the genocide on women. 
Rwandan women, similar to most of their African sisters, have been very 
active in the informal economic and public spheres, working primarily as  petty 
market traders and farmers. Women’s economic activities in post- colonial 
Rwanda resulted in their collective mobilization and creation of informal 
women’s organizations. Since independence women’s collective voices have 
continuously promoted women’s interests, including female parliamentary 
presence. Only four years after receiving suffrage, Rwandan women elected 
their first female representatives in 1965, achieving 18 percent female 
parliamentary representation that year (higher than most Western nations), 
without the help of quotas.
The social and political activities of Rwandan women increased drasti-
cally in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in the public sphere and in 
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reconstruction efforts. Constituting the majority of the population, Rwandan 
women took on the responsibility of rebuilding their nation. The gendered 
nature of the genocide and associated violence particularly victimized 
women, who were raped and sexually tortured for explicitly political, 
ethnically-motivated purposes (Powley 2004). The pitting of ethnic groups 
against one another engendered the rape of Tutsi women by Hutu men, 
who attempted to wipe out the Tutsis by impregnating their female victims. 
The mass rape and killing devastated both Tutsi and Hutu women, and 
consequently, Rwandan social structure – while Tutsi women were raped 
and killed, the husbands and brothers of Hutu women turned into rapists 
and killers. 
The post-genocide reconstruction was thus also gendered – built on 
the perception of women as forgiving and peace-building; more moral and 
less violent than men. Rwandan women represented peace and a change 
from the horrific recent events largely perpetuated by men. The long history 
of Rwandan women’s presence in the economic sphere, their particular 
gendered experience of the genocide, and their larger demographic and 
mass mobilization after the genocide contributed to their increasing public 
voice and legitimized their demand for further authority. Women’s capa-
bilities were also supported by the international community and Rwandan 
political elites, who saw women’s presence in political and social structures 
as a crucial element in the reconstruction of Rwanda. This situation contrib-
uted to the transitional government (1994 to 2003) parliament comprising 
25.7 percent women, and eventually to the adoption of a new, gender-
sensitive constitution which guaranteed women’s political presence. These 
factors resulted in just under 50 percent female representation in the first, 
post-genocide elections in 2003 (Powley 2005), making Rwanda the highest 
ranking nation in the world in terms of percentage of women MPs. As we 
have briefly described, a number of interrelated factors contributed to this 
– a horrific national crisis, an active women’s movement, the adoption of 
constitutional gender quotas, and innovative electoral structures (Tripp, 
Konate, and Lowe-Morna 2006; Jabre 2004).
Women’s Activism and the Post-Crisis State:  
The Adoption of Constitutional Reserved Seats
In July 1994 as the Rwandan genocide – which resulted in the deaths of an 
estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus in 100 days – was coming to 
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an end, the women of Rwanda, who now constituted about 70 percent of the 
population (Burnet 2008), stepped in to reconstruct their devastated country 
and provide services for the traumatized population. The women’s move-
ment, organizing under the umbrella organization Pro-Femmes, demanded 
that the new constitution being formulated respect women’s interests 
and adopt gender-sensitive provisions, namely, a quota system to ensure 
women’s representation in the government (Powley 2005). Their demands 
resulted in the inclusion of a minimum quota of 30 percent women in all 
decision-making positions, corresponding to 24 reserved seats for women 
in the national assembly from a total of 80 seats, in the draft of the new 
constitution (Schwartz 2005). These legal provisions resulted in near gender 
parity in parliament (48.8%) in the first post-genocide democratic election 
in 2003, increasing to a majority of women parliamentarians (56.3%) in 
2008, when women constituted 54 percent of the Rwandan population 
 (Zirimwabagabo 2008). This section examines in more depth the primary 
forces that led to quota adoption in Rwanda, including the role of the geno-
cide crisis in opening up avenues for women’s political representation.
We have described a combination of factors that led to Rwanda’s quota 
adoption. Notable among them was the presence of an active women’s move-
ment which mobilized strongly to lobby for the quota. As well, the grave 
social and political crisis facing the country engendered a strong desire by 
the political elite to champion gender equality and thus ensure the support of 
women who made up more than half the voting constituency. International 
and transnational agencies and advocacy groups also played a role, with their 
large presence in post-genocide Rwanda and their emphasis on gender justice 
as a mechanism for expanding democracy and development (Powley 2005). It 
is also important to note that at the time, emerging norms concerning female 
representation, as mandated internationally by the United Nations, and 
regionally by organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), played a key role in the gender 
and political discourses of states and civil society in many parts of Africa (Tripp 
2004). Widespread debates on gender quotas culminated in the 2002 African 
Union’s Constitutive Act providing a 50 percent quota for women in all of its 
structures.17 The SADC’s Declaration on Gender and Development set a target 
 17. At its second summit in 2003, the African Union (AU) endorsed and adopted the Protocol on 
the Rights of Women in Africa based on the African Charter for Human and People’s Rights, 
which called for equal gender representation (Xingwana 2004). This protocol came into force in 
November 2005 (Equality Now). 
24176.indb   165 16/09/11   11:38 AM
Electoral.Politics:.Making.Gender.Quotas.Work.for.Women
166
of 30 percent women in decision-making positions at all levels and in all struc-
tures by 2005. These developments served as a lobbying and mobilization tool 
for those advocating quota adoption within national and municipal political 
structures (Kethusegile-Juru 2004).18 
Interestingly, post-conflict societies in the developing world tend to 
be more supportive of quotas for female legislators and to the inclusion 
of women in political structures. For example, “of the 12 African countries 
with the highest rates of female representation in parliament, eight (Angola, 
 Mozambique, South Africa, Uganda, Rwanda, Eritrea, Burundi, and Namibia) 
have undergone liberation wars or civil conflict in recent years” (Tripp, 
Konate, and Lowe-Morna 2006, p. 119). All of these states have adopted 
some form of a gender quota, although not all have achieved critical mass. 
The main explanation is that countries dealing with the aftermath of upheaval 
generally work towards consolidating a new regime, in which constitutions 
and parliaments are re-established from scratch, making it easier to include 
women in the design, especially since violent conflict generally implicates 
males and thus leaves fewer men able to lay claim to decision-making 
positions (Tripp, Konate, and Lowe-Morna 2006). Thus, severe domestic 
crisis serves as a defining moment and a catalyst for change, where new 
opportunities emerge for women (and other marginal social groups) to gain 
political representation, particularly where there are organized and informed 
women’s movements (Paxton 2007). 
In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, “women immediately 
assumed multiple roles as heads of household, community leaders, and 
financial providers, meeting the needs of devastated families and communi-
ties” (Powley 2004, p. 5). As leaders in reconstruction, Rwandan women also 
became powerful unifying forces between the two ethnic groups of Tutsis and 
Hutus. The victorious Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) – a predominantly Tutsi 
political party – which had committed itself to a platform of reconciliation and 
unity, determined that women had to be central to the process of governing, 
reconciling, and rebuilding the country; hence it placed women in strategic 
and critical political posts (Powley 2004). This decision was also supported 
by the fact that few women had participated in the genocide and therefore 
women had more political credibility in terms of rebuilding the moral of the 
 18. Although Rwanda is not a member state of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), the rhetoric of gender quotas was nonetheless apparent in the developmental and political 
discourses across the continent, which in turn positively influenced country specific advocacy work.
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nation. The civil war had also drastically depleted the pool of male political 
candidates; they were either dead, had fled, or were morally compromised, 
and this disrupted patterns of political incumbency, leading to the demand for 
women in decision-making positions. Rwandan women stepped in, supported 
by the international and transnational communities mandated to support the 
inclusion of marginalized groups, including women, in political representation. 
Women’s organized responses to crises directly impact traditional 
assumptions concerning women’s roles. Wars and revolutions create signifi-
cant moments for reshaping beliefs and ideas, including the possibility for 
the emergence of women in political arenas traditionally monopolized by 
men, though this is not a given.19 In the struggle for independence or recon-
struction following domestic upheaval and war, previously marginalized 
constituencies often put forth alternative visions for society that can include 
the expansion of women’s rights. Initially, these efforts materialize in the new 
constitutions of the emerging state. In the Rwandan case, the post-genocide 
transitional government appointed a 12-member Constitutional Commission 
to draft the new constitution, three of whom were women, including Judith 
Kanakuze,20 a representative of the Rwandan women’s movement and a 
gender expert. The coalition of women’s movements, Pro-Femmes, also 
mobilized nationally, regionally and internationally to ensure that gender 
equality became a cornerstone of the new constitution, and a “30 percent 
quota for posts in all decision-making organs” was set, along with other 
commitments to gender equality, particularly at various levels of national 
development planning institutions (Powley 2005).
 19. Women’s entrance into politics following a domestic crisis is not a given even if they have proven 
themselves worthy actors in pursuit of peace, unity, and reconstruction. Feminists have documented 
many instances, including Algeria’s independence movement, the Iranian revolution, the French 
revolution and others, where women activists, fighters and revolutionaries were later excluded from 
public life and sent back to the “private” “domestic” sphere as males attempted to reestablish 
dominance over politics once the goal of the revolution/movement was achieved (Paxton 2007).
 20. Judith Kanakuze represented the Rwandan women’s movement at the Constitutional Commission 
based on her background as a consultant for the National Women’s Network. She pressed for the 
new constitution to require at least 30% female representation in parliament and in cabinet. Of 
Tutsi descent and a member of the Rwanda Patriotic Front Party, Ms. Kanakuze became a member 
of the new parliament as well as chairwoman of the Forum of Rwandan Women Parliamentarians, 
a cross-party parliamentary caucus that represents the interests of women. In parliament she 
was a member of the Committees on Gender and Promotion of Family and on Budget and State 
Ownership. She was re-elected to the 2008 parliament and served until her untimely death from 
illness in February 2010 (New Times, “MP Kanakuze is dead,” 8 February 2010, available from 
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/print.php?issue=14166&print&article=25642)
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The new electoral system of Rwanda thus guarantees women’s election 
at all administrative levels, ranging from district to provincial and national 
levels, and extends to all directly and indirectly elected positions, including 
appointed bodies such as the senate. The constitutional provisions are 
further bolstered by a parallel system of women’s councils and women-only 
elections, as further detailed below. At the national level, the constitution 
(Articles 76 and 82) reserves 30 percent of the seats at the Chamber of 
Deputies (the lower house) and the Senate (the upper house) for women 
(see Appendix B). The law regarding municipal politics also mandates that 
30 percent of members in all indirectly elected21 councils, at district and 
city of Kigali levels, must be women (Powley 2004). This focus on the 
local level resulted from a popular belief that women’s participation at 
the community level is fundamental to inclusive public policy and societal 
development; additionally, local level experience provides women with the 
necessary background to move up to more senior decision-making posi-
tions. This was also the assumption underlying the introduction of local 
level quotas for women in India and other South Asian states. All of these 
provisions are to a large degree the result of the Rwandan women’s move-
ment’s efforts and involvement in formulating the constitution, which also 
ensured that local level women’s councils were established specifically to 
train women politicians.22 
What Distinguishes Rwandan Quotas from other Existing Quotas? Influenced 
by the Ugandan gender quota project,23 the ruling Rwanda Patriotic Front 
adopted quotas consisting of constitutionally reserved seats for women in 
the national parliament, and for specified marginalized groups (including 
youth and the disabled); the legislation also detailed the mechanisms for 
implementing the quotas. The new Rwandan constitution, formulated with 
the input of gender expert Judith Kanakuze, was able, through innovative 
 21. In Rwanda, indirectly elected seats generally refer to seats whose holders are elected by an interest 
group, rather than by the general public as in direct elections. Women’s reserved seats are mostly 
allocated by women’s councils, which constitute an interest group from the women’s movement, 
as will be further discussed.
 22. This chapter mostly focuses on women’s reserved seats at the national parliament in Rwanda. For 
further examination of Rwandan women’s political participation at the local level, please refer to: 
Powley (2008).
 23. Uganda is among the first African states to introduce gender quotas, as early as 1989 (Tripp 
2004). For its parliament, Uganda reserved one seat from each of its 39 districts for women. The 
Rwandan refugees in Uganda who later formed the Rwanda Patriotic Front became familiar with 
this system and viewed quotas as a necessity for the new government (Powley 2004).
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strategies, to ensure women’s representation in all structures, and at all levels 
of government (Powley 2005). The following briefly describes the innovative 
measures used in Rwanda to ensure women’s representation at the local 
level, followed by a more detailed analysis of quotas at the national level. 
Since women’s local-level political representation was considered crucial 
to the reconstruction efforts, an innovative triple balloting system was 
implemented at this level. The system provides the local electorate with 
three ballots at the ballot box: one for general candidates; another for 
women; and another for youth, and voters select one candidate from each 
ballot. This system provides a space for women candidates even in contexts 
where so-called “traditions” and customs may hold women back from chal-
lenging male candidates (who are often also community leaders). Both men 
and women can still compete on the general ballot, and often more politi-
cally experienced women choose to run on the general ballot (Powley 2004; 
International IDEA and Stockholm University 2009). Women who win seats 
in local elections are organized into women’s councils at various municipal 
administrative levels.24 The councils, originally created in the aftermath of 
the genocide to assist with reconstruction efforts and local support efforts, 
have considerable legitimacy and play a key role in transitioning power to 
the local level elected bodies called cells, the base local administrative unit. 
These cells then elect women from among their members to administrative 
positions at the sector, district and provincial levels. This system helps ensure 
that female representatives, elected by women, are accountable to their 
constituency. They are often women’s rights activists or community organ-
izers who have been active in working to resolve women’s problems in their 
communities (Powley 2008).
The women’s councils operate at each level in parallel to general local 
councils and represent women’s concerns, and the head of the women’s 
council holds a reserved seat on the general local council to provide a link 
between the two bodies. Each city thus ensures the presence of at least 
one female elected representative in general meetings and programs. The 
system appears to have been carefully thought out to ensure women’s coun-
cils are not separated from general decision-making, even at the local levels. 
The main role of the women’s councils is to raise awareness about women’s 
concerns at the local level as well as to educate and train potential female 
candidates (Powley 2005).
 24. Rwanda divides its local administrative levels into cells, sectors, districts, and provinces.
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Chart 6.1 Linkage between local and national elections and how parliamentary 
reserves seats are filled in Rwanda
From each of the 12 provinces
An assembly is formed 
from the representatives 
of women’s councils
Indirect elections to parliamentary reserved seats: 
The assembly of Women’s Councils (sometime 
referred to as the Women’s Electoral College) 
chooses two women from each of the 12 provinces 
for the reserved seats of the Chamber of Deputies 
(= 24 women to fill the reserved seats)
Indirect elections: A Women’s Executive Committee 
is chosen from members at the sector level to 
represent the province.
Indirect elections: A District Women’s Council is 
composed from women elected at the sector level
Direct elections at local levels through triple balloting 
system (general, women, and youth ballots)
Women’s Councils
Aside from granting women a voice at the local level, the women’s 
councils also play a key role in maintaining women’s representation at the 
national level. An innovative measure in the 2003 constitution granted these 
women’s councils the responsibility to also elect the female parliamentarians 
for the reserved seats at the national level. Since then, a joint assembly of 
women’s council members from each local cell elects the female parliamen-
tarians for the 24 reserved seats. However, council members are not paid, 
and Powley (2005) argues that dividing their time between paid occupa-
tions, family responsibilities and council obligations leaves them limited time 
for their volunteer efforts, which may render the councils less effective. 
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The Rwandan election system utilizes innovative means to ensure 
women’s (and other politically marginal groups’) representation. Parlia men-
tary reserved seats for women are exclusively elected by members of the 
women’s councils – thus only women elect women. The flow chart below 
illustrates the electoral system and how women’s quotas are filled. 
In addition to these innovative strategies, the woman-friendly electoral 
system (List PR) enables the election of additional women MPs, beyond the 
minimum 24 reserved seats. For instance, in 2003, 15 additional women 
were elected outside the reserved seats (for a total of 39 female parliamen-
tarians); in 2008, 21 women won seats in addition to the 24 reserved seats 
(for a total of 45 female parliamentarians) (Tripp, Konate, and Lowe-Morna 
2006). Since the ruling Rwanda Patriotic Front won both elections by a 
landslide, the additional female parliamentarians are mostly members of 
this party.
The Implementation of Reserved Seats:  
Key Factors Underlying Rwandan Success 
The implementation process of the Rwandan reserved seats quota has been 
incredibly successful, particularly since in its first application in 2003 women 
were able to gain almost complete gender balance in parliament. The most 
important factor in this globally unprecedented success is the detailed 
wording of Article 76 of the 2003 Rwandan Constitution (see Appendix B) 
and the state’s unambiguous election law requirement for 30 percent 
women’s representation at all levels, including specifics of the method of 
election (International IDEA and Stockholm University 2010). Such specific 
legal directives have resulted in the smooth implementation of quotas in 
accordance with the law. A Gender Monitoring Office, established by Article 
185 of the new constitution oversees and ensures that quota implementa-
tion is respected at every level (Kanakuze 2004). The Rwandan quota law is 
also a good “fit” with the state’s multi-member districts, which are repre-
sented through a proportional representation electoral system. Although 
the PR system generally supports the selection of female MPs by their 
parties based on the proportion of total votes each party receives (the most 
common method), the Rwandan quota advocates chose instead to create a 
joint assembly of women’s councils (sometimes referred to as the women’s 
electoral college) from different levels of local councils, to elect women 
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parliamentarians.25 As noted in the previous section, since the members of 
this assembly are chosen by women’s representatives at the grassroots level, 
female members are accountable to the women’s constituency rather than 
to their political parties. 
The success of the Rwandan quota system is also credited to the key roles of 
several actors, namely the active women’s movement; Rwandan Patriotic Front 
 party leaders supportive of gender equality thanks to lobbying by women; 
international and regional debates by influential organizations on women’s 
political representation, and solidarity and support from the transnational 
women’s movement. The commitments of these actors translated the ideal 
of gender equal political representation into a meaningful process that gives 
political voice to the female constituency and results in full implementation of 
the quota law and the possibility of additional women MPs beyond the quota.
Aside from the efforts of the Rwanda Patriotic Front and other activists, 
the creation of a Ministry of Gender, the organization of women’s councils 
at the cell (the smallest local unit), sector, district, and provincial levels, and 
the legislation of a woman-friendly electoral system and legally mandated 
gender quotas (Powley 2005) have also effectively increased women’s 
representation at all levels of government. The new Rwandan constitution 
fully incorporates gender equality in 203 provisions and is a strategic tool 
for ensuring women’s presence in the various branches of government 
(Kanakuze 2004). To ensure women’s substantive representation, the law 
designated the establishment of a women’s electoral college drawn from 
experienced civil society actors on women’s councils to elect women to the 
24 reserved seats. This mechanism assures representation by women who 
have already demonstrated commitment to Rwandan women’s needs and 
assumes that they will be accountable to the female constituency since they 
are chosen by women’s representatives as opposed to male party leaders.
Concerning the effectiveness of female parliamentarians in actually repre-
senting the interests of women, Schwartz (2005) argues that women elected 
through reserved seats tend to commit to women’s interests more-so than 
women elected on the general ballots drawn from party lists. In general female 
 25. Although the assembly that elects women to the reserved seats in Rwandan national parliament is 
at times referred to as an electoral college, this body is very different from the American Electoral 
College, which is based on a more ambiguous system wherein it is not clearly defined as to who 
can become an electoral college members and how that happens. Unlike the American Electoral 
College, the body in Rwanda is elected by women’s representatives and not by elites or party leader.
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MPs tend to prioritize women’s interests more than their male colleagues do. 
Schwartz’s research analyzed the substance of Rwandan female parliamen-
tarians’ representation of women and women’s concerns in the first 
post-genocide parliament, elected in 2003. Through opinion surveys and 
interviews in 2004, Schwarz concluded that there is a difference in the perspec-
tives and approaches of “quota-women” and “party-women”. Although her 
research did not analyze bills or legislation under debate, the opinion surveys 
of parliamentarian show that quota-women see themselves as “grassroots 
politicians” elected primarily in order to represent the female population, 
whereas party-women did not feel as implicated in this responsibility. Schwartz 
found that party-women were mostly experienced politicians who had previ-
ously served in the transitional government, whereas quota-women tended to 
lack formal political experience, as most were recruited directly from their local 
provinces. Due to the unique election process for the reserved seats quota, 
these female representatives were also assumed to better understand the 
problems of women and children at the local level than the party-women, 
whose experiences can be quite removed from the grassroots.
As a way to build solidarity and cooperation among all female parlia-
mentarians, the Rwandan women serving within the Chamber of Deputies 
have established the Forum of Rwandan Women Parliamentarians, a cross-
party parliamentary women’s caucus, with the aim of brining the grassroots 
demands represented by quotas MPs to the attention of party MPs, and even-
tually turning women’s interests into laws and policies (Schwartz 2005). The 
large number of female deputies in the Rwandan parliament has increased 
their confidence in raising women’s issues in parliament. “…women are 
highly aware of their new numerical strength”, and view the quota as a 
guarantee of their parliamentary participation (Devlin and Elgie 2008, 
p. 245). Furthermore, women’s mere presence in politics is shifting the 
public’s perceptions about women’s status in the society, and encourages 
the political participation of future female generations.
Therefore, Rwanda’s national crisis engendered a situation whereby 
Rwanda was able to achieve historic levels of women’s representation, with the 
collaboration of activists, political elites and the international community. At the 
dawn of a new, more peaceful and equitable era in Rwandan and even African 
politics, the achievements of Rwandans in parliament are heralded by many, 
including the Rwandan president and the international community (Burnet 
2008). However, it is important to place such achievements in context and 
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identify any shortcomings for future lessons. This process has not been entirely 
problem-free; some of the issues needing attention will be discussed below.
Room for Improvement of Rwanda’s Reserved Seats: The Rwandan reserved 
seats provisions have not been completely flawless; some feminists consider 
them ineffective for actually addressing women’s interests and demands, 
while others criticize their implementation and enforcement mechanisms 
(Tripp, Konate, and Lowe-Morna 2006; Kanakuze 2004). One of the short-
comings of the Rwandan constitutional gender quota is its silence concerning 
the actual parliamentary positions that women elected through quotas may 
occupy. In this regard the quota provision does not specify, and thus does 
not guarantee, that the 24 women’s seats are in significant decision-making 
positions or committees. Feminist political observers argue that the presence 
of women in national legislature is not enough to truly represent women’s 
interests, if they are not granted seats on significant committees. In this 
particular aspect, as in other arenas of daily life, the traditional patriarchal 
social structure remains intact. This is largely a silent concern in Rwanda 
today, since the percentage of women in parliament is currently very high, 
and thus it is difficult to avoid having them on important committees. More 
significantly, the current President of the Rwandan Chamber of Deputies 
(the lower house) is a woman, Ms. Rose Mukantabana, who was elected 
by a landslide victory over her opponent, Mr. Abbas Mukama, by receiving 
70 votes from a total of 80-seat house.26 However should backsliding 
occur and the number of female MPs diminish, this could present a threat to 
women’s substantive representation.
With regards to women-friendly legislation, although it is argued that 
women representatives have gained more confidence in raising gender issues, 
a majority of the laws benefitting women’s rights were passed before the 
2003 quota adoption (Devlin and Elgie 2008).27 One real gain of women’s 
 26. Women of History, “Rose Mulantaba,” 9 October 2008, available from http://womenofhistory.
blogspot.com/2008/10/rose-mukantabana.html, accessed March 10th, 2011.
 27. Many of the most revolutionary women-friendly laws were passed by the Transitional National 
Assembly before women’s parliamentary presence reached almost 50 percent. These laws included: 
the Women’s Inheritance Act; the definition of rape as a category one crime; the right to breastfeed 
in the workplace, and others. Since 2003, female deputies have been instrumental in the passage 
of one more significant law concerning women’s rights, the Law on the Prevention, Protection and 
Punishment of Any Gender-Based Violence, which makes polygamy, among other things, illegal. 
This trajectory has led some scholars to argue that the number of women in parliament might be 
secondary to government commitment, and in this case the Rwanda Patriotic Front’s efforts to 
address women’s issues during the transitional government (Devlin and Elgie 2008).
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representation in political and decision-making positions is to ensure that 
women receive material benefits from the state equal to those of men. However, 
Rwandan women continue to lag far behind men in education, health, and 
employment, with little evidence that the poverty ratio between men and 
women has changed since women’s exceptional rise to power. Indeed it has 
been argued that there is a clear feminization of poverty (Kanakuze 2004).
Another major problem is the undemocratic use of the quotas by the 
Rwanda Patriotic Front. Many scholars argue that despite appearing more 
“democratic” through policies of gender equality and political integration, 
the current Rwandan state, dominated by the RPF, is becoming increasingly 
authoritarian.28 This stems in part from the post-genocide victory of the RPF 
party, which was then able to maintain a stronghold over the re-emerging, 
recovering state, eliminating opposition parties in every election by banning 
their existence (Tripp, Konate, and Lowe-Morna 2006; Burnet 2008; Human 
Rights Watch 2003).29 The women’s quotas have won the party considerable 
support among the female population; the reserved seats have thus increased 
the loyal constituency of the RPF as well supportive parliamentarians. “The 
top leadership posts held by women have primarily gone to pro-Rwanda 
Patriotic Front (RPF) Anglophone Rwandans” (Tripp, Konate, and Lowe-
Morna 2006, p. 122). Therefore, although the RPF does not directly elect the 
24 women who access the parliament through the quota, the authoritarian 
nature of the state and the party structure impacts female parliamentarians’ 
decision-making and at times hinders the development of democracy, which 
is what guarantees the advancement of women and of the country as a 
whole in the long run. If the regime is discredited as an authoritarian regime, 
then the women within its structure will likely suffer the same fate.
Conclusion
This chapter considered the impact of reserved seats to address women’s 
underrepresentation. Bangladesh and Rwanda both adopted constitutionally 
 28. According to Jennie Burnet, Rwanda’s increased authoritarianism under the dominance of Rwanda 
Patriotic Front presents a paradox for women’s increased political participation in the short 
term, since “as their participation has increased, women’s ability to influence policy making has 
decreased”. In the long term, however, she argues that, “the increased participation of women 
could prepare the path for their meaningful participation in a genuine democracy” (2008, p. 363). 
 29. The single party dominance of Rwanda Patriotic Front is also apparent when “both female and 
male representatives in government who fail to toe the Rwanda Patriotic Front line are forced to 
resign” (Burnet 2008, p. 381).
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mandated reserved seats quotas. While Rwanda was able to reach a critical 
mass of women in its national parliament in the first election following 
quota adoption, after nine general elections Bangladesh still lags far behind. 
Vast differences between these two states have impacted the processes of 
quota adoption, including differences between the institutions that support 
or hinder quota implementation, resulting in the marked success of the 
Rwandan quota on one hand and the failure of the quota to impact the 
demographic of parliament in Bangladesh in any significant way.
The women’s movements in Rwanda played a key role in organizing 
and campaigning on gender issues, including reserved seats and women’s 
presence at different levels of government and they kept an active pres-
ence during the drafting of the constitution. In part the circumstances of the 
horrific genocide created an environment within which women prominently 
entered the public sphere, where they were determined to stay. In  Bangladesh, 
a newly established state similar to Rwanda in its patriarchal traditions, the 
women’s movement in 1971 lacked the Rwandan movement’s cohesive 
political mobilization. Although Bangladeshi women participated in mass 
numbers in the independence struggle from Pakistan, after independence 
they were marginalized from the formal political structure. Despite women’s 
activities at the grassroots and NGO levels, which gained domestic and inter-
national support by focusing on direly-needed poverty eradication, they were 
unable to fully pressure the political elites and to present women’s demands 
when the new constitution was drafted in 2004. Thus, the quotas adopted in 
Bangladesh did not reflect the interests of the women’s movement. 
The implementation of quotas in these two states has also been 
heavily impacted by the wording of relevant legal provisions, and by the 
relative support and commitment of political elites to enhance women’s 
representation. One of the contributing factors to Bangladesh’s failure is 
the mechanism for filling women’s reserved seats, which constitutionally 
mandates parties to indirectly elect women to these seats. In contrast, in 
Rwanda the responsibility for electing women MPs for the quota falls to 
an assembly of women drawn from local-level elected women’s councils, in 
turn drawn from women’s rights organizations and advocacy groups. The 
Rwandan mechanism not only ensures that elected women remain account-
able to women’s organizations and grassroots interests, rather than to 
political elites; the empowerment of the female electorate has also encour-
aged Rwandan parties to nominate more women to run for the general 
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seats, to appeal to the majority female electorate by being gender equal. In 
Bangladesh the lack of real commitment by the entrenched male political 
hierarchy to gender parity in government is also evident in the failure to 
address aspects of the nation’s electoral system, which is based on single-
member districts and simple majority votes. Given the patriarchal elements 
of most societies, this system makes it harder to persuade political parties to 
nominate women, who are seen by party elites as risky, under the assump-
tion that men will generally get more of the popular vote. However, the 
assumption is questionable, as Bangladesh has had women prime ministers 
for almost two decades. 
Again it is clear that many factors are at play in the success of gender 
quotas. While we have analyzed the adoption and implementation of gender 
quotas, we have not had the scope to really consider what happens after 
women are elected into office. It is our hope that this particular study will 
contribute to a better understanding of the application of gender quotas for 
those working to increase the effectiveness in their design and implementation.
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Concluding Remarks
Important Steps for Successful 
Gender Quota Adoption 
Preparing to Launch a Gender Quota Adoption Campaign
Politicize and popularize the significance of increased women’s political 
 representation and its role on further democratization
Learn about the constitution, existing political structure, and electoral system 
of the country
Learn about the international treaties, conventions, and charters that the state 
has signed and ratified
Learn from the history of other gender quota cases
Build alliance between women’s organizations, other civil rights movements, 
activists and supportive public intellectuals
Build alliances with various transnational organizations
Consider all the possibilities and then identify the quota system that best fits 
the existing electoral rules
Train supporters who can organize and work for the gender quota campaign
Be prepared for the long haul
Launching the campaign
Steps to Successful Gender Quota Implementation
Quotas must fit well with the state’s electoral and political structures
Quotas must be clearly worded with unequivocal language concerning  
implementation
Clear and serious consequences for non-compliance with legislative quotas
Quota rules and legislations must be advocated and designed by those  
who are truly committed to addressing women’s underrepresentation
Continuously monitor the implementation process once the measure has been 
adopted
Final words
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Important Steps for Successful  
Gender Quota Adoption
This book intended to outline current discourses around women’s political 
participation, their access to political decision-making positions, and the 
significance of gender quotas in reversing historical and systemic discrimina-
tion that women face in their attempts to access the formal political sphere. 
While representative democracies are now globally accepted as the ideal 
form of government, thus far, men have through various strategies managed 
to limit women’s access to political and decision-making power. This world-
wide reality even in the context of older democracies and in contexts where 
women’s political rights have been legislated for decades has raised serious 
concerns among scholars and in particular feminists.
Having analyzed the various possible causes for women’s political 
underrepresentation, feminist scholars have realized that the structural and 
systemic discrimination against women in political parties and state insti-
tutions directly hinders their access to political decision-making positions. 
These findings have increasingly led many feminists to question the alleged 
democratic natures of governments and national parliaments (Phillips 1991; 
 Paxton 2007), and to explore the possible avenues to remedy the situa-
tion and pave the way for a democratization of parliamentary politics by 
increasing women’s representation. Particularly, these explorations have led 
in many nations to experimentation with the adoption of gender quotas, 
yielding a range of results. In this work, we have analyzed the most prominent 
types of gender quotas and the extent of their success and their shortcom-
ings, in order to suggest some preliminary guidelines for those interested in 
advocating for gender quotas to increase women’s political representation. 
Gender quota measures to reverse historical discrimination against 
women in accessing political positions, first appeared in the 1930s but fell 
out of favor only to reappear in the last quarter of the 20th century as the 
fastest and most practical channel for addressing women’s underrepresentation 
in political and electoral fields. Not surprisingly, across the globe gender 
quotas have faced much resistance from male politicians and party leaders, 
who have found ways to undermine them even after their adoption. This 
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has meant that gender quotas advocates have had to be extremely vigilant, 
seeking strategies to counteract resistance. While initial re-experimentation 
with gender quotas was primarily by Nordic and Western European coun-
tries, in the early 21st century it is mostly developing nations and emerging 
democracies that have adopted them.
Close examination of the situations in both old and new democracies 
reveals the importance of activism and careful strategizing, more so than a 
state’s level of democratic consolidation or economic development – factors 
that were stressed in earlier studies attempting to explain women’s under-
representation in politics. Recent studies indicate that level of democratization, 
development, and even culture play a minor role in the success of gender 
quota adoption. The most important factors appear to be the preparedness 
of women’s movements in terms of mapping the possibilities for institu-
tional reform, generating public discourse and support, and organizing and 
mobilizing the public towards this objective. Aside from women’s movement 
activism, the willingness or level of commitment of political elites also plays 
a key role in the successful adoption and implementation of gender quotas. 
As well, our research shows that viable women’s movements are able to capi-
talize on political restructuring opportunities that arise in the context of major 
political uprisings or post-conflict reconstruction, which provide occasion for 
the introduction of gender quotas in newly evolving political structures. 
On the whole, women’s rights activists are key actors in addressing 
women’s underrepresentation, and in taking advantage of political oppor-
tunity structures (POS)1 that present themselves at times of reconstruction. 
It is thus essential that national women’s movements are organized and 
strategically able to clearly articulate and implement their demands. In this 
regard it is crucial that representatives from women’s movements are at the 
negotiating table with political elites. Support and pressure from the transna-
tional women’s movement and other social justice networks are often quite 
significant in ensuring that the demands of local women are not silenced. It 
is also important to keep in mind that top-down quota reform, where input 
from women’s rights organizations has been absent, often results in weak 
measures that ultimately hardly increase women’s political representation 
 1. Political opportunity structures (POS) are defined as “consistent – but not necessarily permanent 
– dimensions of the political environment that provide incentive for collective action by affecting 
people’s expectations for success or failure”. The POS approach is useful for studying the interac-
tion between social movements and political structures since it examines how political actors take 
advantage of existing opportunities and create new ones (Chappell 2002, p. 9).
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or their political empowerment – top-down reforms often lead to gender 
quotas that primarily privilege the ruling elites, as the case of Bangladesh 
shows (Chowdhury 2003).
Below, based on the various case studies that we presented throughout 
this book, we outline key factors for gender quota advocates to consider, and 
the basic steps required to prepare the ground for successful adoption and 
implementation of gender quotas. A successful quota measure is one that can 
achieve its goal of politically empowering women and making them party to 
the decisions and policies that are made in their name; while preventing the 
behaviors and policies that systematically discriminate against women.
Preparing to Launch a Gender Quota Adoption Campaign
• Politicize and popularize the significance of increased women’s political 
representation and its role on further democratization: In order to build a 
national discourse on women’s political participation, quota advocates 
must know the history and situation of women’s political representation 
in their country. A first step is to document the extent of women’s under-
representation in parliament and other arenas of power, in order to then 
craft appropriate arguments for the importance of a critical mass of both 
genders to effectively represent both male and female constituencies, 
the two halves of the population. For instance, demonstrating how in a 
male-dominated parliament the reform of family law is often not taken 
up, or how various policies have consistently disadvantaged women. 
Often the importance of building and popularizing the discourse for a 
successful campaign is neglected. 
• Learn about the constitution, existing political structure, and electoral 
system of the country: It is vital to learn about the existing political 
structures, including political party ideology and organization, and how 
these institutions overtly or covertly disadvantage women. Furthermore, 
a meticulous knowledge of the existing electoral system is of particular 
importance as the quota experiences of other contexts indicate that 
there should be a good fit between electoral system and the type of 
gender quota adopted.
• Learn about international treaties, conventions, and charters that the state 
has signed and ratified: Since in today’s global world all nations strive 
to be members of the international community, and as members of 
the United Nations many states have signed a variety of UN moral and 
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legal guidelines such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW), or the Beijing Platform for Action, it is important to 
learn about them and the various ways they can be used as tools to 
pressure for quota reforms. Many governments sign and ratify these 
documents without actually incorporating them into domestic laws. 
However, these documents can provide quota advocates with leverage 
to pressure political elites.
• Learn from the history of other gender quota cases: Advocacy for gender 
quota adoption requires much research and analysis on the part of quota 
advocates. It is absolutely essential to study both successful and unsuc-
cessful gender quota cases from other countries and the reasons behind 
their success or failure, to avoid repeating their mistakes. A practical way 
to go about this is to organize workshops that bring together special-
ists in the field of women’s political participation, and quota advocates 
from other contexts to share their knowledge and experiences, and to 
provide information for media campaigns to raise public awareness on 
the positive significance of quotas. 
• Build alliance between women’s organizations, other civil rights move-
ments, activists and supportive public intellectuals: Demanding the 
introduction of gender quotas requires broad support from a range of 
women’s and other organizations that may differ ideologically on other 
issues. Unity among different women’s groups is essential, particu-
larly since gender quota adversaries often use a “divide and conquer” 
strategy. Build alliances and coalitions with diverse women’s groups and 
other civil society organizations concerned with social justice and human 
rights, and integrate them into the quota campaign. This can require a 
great deal of effort and engagement with key individuals affiliated with 
various organizations; focus on those whose concerns overlap with the 
campaign’s objectives of enhancing women’s political status (i.e. social 
justice and gender justice). The situation may require the re-politicization 
of other civil society actors or elites concerning the value of gender 
quotas and of their role in supporting quota adoption and implementa-
tion. For instance, it is vital to build linkages with women’s committees or 
caucuses of existing political parties or institutions, as well as securing the 
support of popular intellectuals and key political elites, since their active 
involvement frequently plays a role in the success of the quota campaign. 
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• Build alliances with transnational organizations: Transnational women’s 
and social justice organizations can provide important support for a 
quota campaign, including guidance on relevant international and bilat-
eral organizations, assistance in establishing communication networks 
with actors from countries that have successfully adopted gender 
quotas, and help counteracting possible repressive moves that aim to 
silence women’s rights activists. Transnational advocacy networks play 
an important role in educating and training local activists on how to 
effectively use United Nations and regional documents, and can provide 
a platform for campaigners to publicize their efforts internationally and 
demonstrate their legitimacy and level of support. 
• Consider all the possibilities and then identify the quota system that best 
fits the existing electoral rules: Before launching a quota campaign, 
advocates should consider the various possibilities and outcomes, identify 
possible obstacles, and anticipate how they may be resolved. Among the 
central issues to be considered prior to quota introduction are: a) whether 
gender quotas should be applied at the candidacy level or to the final 
make-up of the parliament, b) how and if the electorate should choose 
the female candidates/members, c) whether the quota is to be legally 
mandated (either through a constitutional amendment or reforming the 
nation’s election laws) or voluntarily adopted by the party leadership. All 
possible scenarios need to be carefully analyzed to anticipate how to 
avoid missteps which might allow adversaries to undercut the campaign. 
This will also help advocates to create a quota measure that fits with the 
existing political and electoral structures.
• Train supporters who can organize and work for the campaign: A successful 
quota campaign requires active involvement by many committed indi-
viduals who are well versed in the central arguments supporting quotas 
and who can persuasively transmit these arguments to the public at 
large. The process of campaigning for gender quotas is also by definition 
a process for training women to enter politics, and a public education 
campaign on the crucial role of public opinion in pushing the state and 
political elites towards a more inclusive democracy. To ensure public 
recognition and support of quota measures, advocates must develop 
mechanisms that enable exchange of feedback with the public. This 
helps ensure that what campaign spokespersons present reflect the 
views and desires of civil society.
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• Be prepared for the long haul: Be prepared for great resistance from the 
majority of male political elites, who in most cases will be the actors 
who ultimately adopt or reject proposed quota measures. A coalition of 
women’s movements has to carefully strategize and network with various 
key actors; this often takes a long time – even decades. For instance, in 
Turkey, KA-DER (The Association for Support and Training of Women 
Candidates) has been active since 1999 to address women’s under-
representation in national parliaments, through extensive media and 
lobbying campaigns on gender quotas. However its major victory came 
only 11 years later in a September 2010 referendum allowing affirmative 
action measures for women (without violating the principle of equality 
in the national constitution).2 Patience, persistence and constant strat-
egizing are important aspects of successful quota adoption.
• Launching the campaign: Once the ground-work is prepared:
1. Launch the campaign with the active involvement of a coalition of 
women’s movement(s), women activists, and other groups who are 
committed to the cause.
2. Attract media coverage (including new social media) on the issues: 
low levels of women in politics; impacts of this on the society 
at large. Work to bring to media and public attention to other 
countries’ successful quota adoption experiences and how these 
benefited women and society at large.
3. Provide a platform, for example organize a public, multi-media 
and speaking event that brings together various supporters, 
particularly women, from different political parties, and grants 
them a public forum. 
4. Lobby party leaders and male politicians. Remind them that women 
make up 50% of the electorate and it will benefit party leaders if they 
gain women’s votes by supporting women’s demand for gender 
quotas. (At this point advocates should be able to present evidence 
that women voters are in fact supportive of the campaign).
 2. The Turkish constitutional reform referendum carried out in September 2010 revises Article 10 of 
the constitution which enshrined the principle of equality before the law, by allowing legislation 
that would ensure equal rights of women. In other words, this revision makes taking measures to 
address gender inequality legal (Guzel Radikal, Hasan Celal, “Positive Discrimination for Women,” 
Today’s Zaman.10 March 2010, available from http://www.todayszaman.com/news-203830-
positive-discrimination-for-women.html).
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5. Clearly express to political elites and the public the goals of the 
campaign, an outline of how they are to be realized and the best 
scenario.
6. Keep the campaign alive through constant media coverage, work-
shops and conferences, and advocacy across the country in different 
constituencies to spread the message. The public at large needs 
continual lobbying as well on the benefits of gender quotas in order 
to build public pressure. 
7. Recruit the support and involvement of celebrities, popular artists, 
or other public figures to popularize the campaign’s demands. 
8. Quota advocates need to continue working throughout the quota 
adoption process and provide political elites with educated feed-
back, including modifications to ensure the best fit and insights 
from other countries’ experiences in gender quota adoption.
9. Even though the campaign is addressing women’s underrepresen-
tation, it should be clear that campaigners are demanding gender 
neutral quotas – that is, advocating for a quota to ensure that 
neither men nor women are underrepresented (ideally 50:50 repre-
sentation, or minimum of one-third of either gender). 
Steps to Successful Gender Quota Implementation
• Quotas must fit well with the state’s electoral and political structures: 
A good fit between the proposed quota type and the state’s electoral 
system is considered among the most vital factors in successful quota 
implementation, and as discussed above requires advocates to thor-
oughly examine the existing political and institutional structures, and 
take heed from others’ experiences. For example, as our case studies 
demonstrated, the list proportional representation electoral system best 
fits a quota system that applies to political party lists (whether legis-
lative or political party quota), while a majoritarian/plurality electoral 
system best fits a quota system that establishes women’s-only-districts, 
in which only women candidates are allowed to stand for election, or 
even a reserved seats quota which can be filled through direct popular 
elections (rather than through appointments). Political culture, ideology 
and party behavior are also important to understand for a successful 
implementation process, as is educating the public about the value of 
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the particular quota type and its complementarity with the electoral 
system and existing structures. 
• Quotas must be clearly worded with unequivocal language concerning 
implementation: The wording of all aspects of quota measures must be 
carefully constructed to avoid serious pitfalls that imprecise wording 
can create. Although it is very difficult to pinpoint why some quotas 
are more successful than others, as success is highly dependent on the 
given broader social and political context, almost all scholars agree that 
gender quotas must be clear and unequivocal concerning implementa-
tion. The more specific and detailed the wording of quota legislation or 
party quota mandates is, the more likely it is that implementation will 
be successful. 
The wording of the quota measure appears to be less significant 
regarding reserved seats as they apply to the final make-up of the 
national assembly rather than to the candidate recruitment or election 
stage. Nonetheless, reserved seats, similar to other quota types that 
have the objective of increasing women’s representation, must lead to 
women’s empowerment for political decision-making at large, and not 
act as a glass ceiling for women’s political representation as they have 
in a number of states. This condition was successfully met in Rwanda’s 
reserved seats quota as its constitution created the Gender Monitoring 
Office, with the objective to oversee and ensure quota implementation 
at every level of government, beginning with the local level bodies. Such 
training and preparation will provide the neces sary infrastructure for 
women to gain the necessary political experience and eventually lead to 
their participation at all levels of decision-making.  Rwanda’s success in 
truly empowering women with their reserved seats provision is evident 
by the fact that 21 additional women were elected to parliament in 
general election, with 24 elected through the reserved seats provision, 
resulting in a total of 45 female representatives (from a total of 80 parlia-
mentarians) in the 2008 parliamentary elections. 
It is also important to ensure that once women are in the parlia-
ment, they are incorporated into prominent committees such as budget 
and planning, and not only to ones that are considered “feminine” such 
as welfare. Indeed, quota scholars are advocating adoption of quota 
provisions that also take into account women’s appointment to powerful 
positions. 
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• Clear and serious consequences for non-compliance with legislative 
quotas: Strong sanctions for non-compliance are critical to the successful 
implementation of the newest and fastest growing type of gender 
quota: legislative quotas. This is clearly illustrated by France, which 
has a legislative quota of 50 percent, but to this day lacks the leverage 
to actually ensure parties  comply. Conversely, in Argentina quotas are 
detailed to the extent that non-compliant parties have forty-eight hours 
to revise their lists, after which a judge will move women candidates to 
higher positions on the lists (as discussed in chapter five). Thus we see 
successful quota implementation in Argentina but not in France. 
• Quota rules and legislation must be advocated and designed by those 
truly committed to addressing women’s underrepresentation: Through 
their networking and lobbying, quota advocates must carefully identify 
the motivations and levels of commitment of political elites who are 
ultimately empowered to adopt and implement the quota measure. The 
effectiveness of quotas to politically empower women can be under-
mined by party leaders who implement them as a symbolic gesture 
and nominate the minimum quota requirement of women, which in 
effect makes the quota act as a threshold on women’s representation. 
Conversely, actors such as women’s groups or committee members 
active inside political parties can play instrumental roles in effective 
quota implementation. Courts and state institutions that monitor proper 
implementation are also significant in either overlooking or penalizing 
non-compliance. 
For instance, as evident in the case of Bangladesh, political elites 
have illustrated little commitment to politically empower women, and 
hence reserved seats quotas are implemented in a matter that benefits 
ruling elites. Similarly French party leaders that have been mandated to 
do so, remain hesitant in nominating female candidates, while many 
Swedish party leaders have voluntarily adopted quota provisions, and in 
turn increased their electoral appeal among the electorate.
• Continuously monitor the implementation process once the measure has 
been adopted: Monitoring the implementation process and ensuring it 
does lead to increased numbers of women in parliament is as important 
as the adoption campaign. As illustrated throughout the book, quota 
implementation like adoption requires the active involvement of civil 
society, particularly since quota implementation often involves trial and 
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error. As we witnessed for Argentina and to some extent Indonesia, 
the respective national women’s movements quickly realized that 
the adopted quota could be strengthened to increase the number of 
women elected to office. Recognizing shortcomings in their quota’s 
construction, the Argentinean women’s movement managed to modify 
the quota so that parties had to nominate at least one women candidate 
for every two men (Semi-Zipper style) on party lists, and defined the 
legal provision concerning “seats parties expected to win” as “seats a 
party has up for re-election”. Similarly, Indonesian women realized the 
significance of rank order rules and demanded the Semi-Zipper style 
across all party lists; to date however the Constitutional Court has ruled 
that this would be unconstitutional. The Indonesian women’s move-
ment continues to strategize concerning ways to strengthen their quota 
measure. One tactic, championed by Constitutional Court Judge Maria 
Farida Indrati, is to pressure the Court, as discussed in chapter five. 
In sum, successful quota adoption and subsequent implementation 
involves a great deal of research, networking, and strategizing to run 
an effective campaign, and careful monitoring of the implementation 
process after a quota measure has been adopted. This is true whether 
a quota is voluntary, as with political party quotas, or adopted through 
legal reform as with legislative quotas or reserved seats. It is often argued 
that the adoption of gender quotas is meaningless without effective 
implementation.
Final Words
We hope that this book can serve as a tool for activists interested in 
addressing women’s political underrepresentation. This overview of gender 
quota debates and the various case studies is intended as a guide for action. 
We hope that we have managed to shed light on some theoretical and prac-
tical issues concerning gender quotas, and to provide interested activists 
with the necessary tools and arguments to further their demands for the 
enhancement of women’s political rights and women’s access to political 
decision-making positions.
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Glossary of Terms
Absolute majority: Refers to the number of votes that constitute more than half of 
the total votes of all eligible voters in a given constituency (50% + 1), including those 
absent from voting. See also plurality vote.
Affirmative action: Measures or policies enacted to benefit an underrepresented 
group, usually as a means to counter the effects of a history of discrimination. 
However, here we choose to refer to gender quota adoption as a “measure to counter 
discrimination”, since the term “affirmative action” has been (wrongly) interpreted 
by some to mean “positive discrimination” and is thus controversial. The criticism 
stems from the argument that any form of “discrimination” is unjust, even if it is 
“positive discrimination”.
All Women Shortlist (AWS): A measure adopted by United Kingdom’s Labour 
Party in the 1990s, mandating that in 50% of upcoming “inheritor” seats (seats 
vacant due to retirement) and in 50% of “strong challenger” seats (seats deemed 
most winnable), the party would put forward a short list of only women candidates, 
to ensure an increase in the election of women. 
Alternative Vote (AV): A preferential majoritarian voting system used in single-
member districts (SMD). Voters use numbers to mark their preferences on the ballot 
paper, and the candidate with an absolute majority (50%+1) of the votes wins. 
However, if no candidate achieves an absolute majority of first preferences, the least 
successful candidates are eliminated and their votes reallocated according to voters’ 
second preferences until one candidate has an absolute majority. Australia and Fiji use 
the Alternative Vote systems for their parliamentary elections.
Ballot structure: The way a ballot lists and/or groups candidates, and how voters 
are to vote. The ballot structure determines the degree of choice of the voter, as well 
as how much information is provided to enable an educated vote.
Block Vote (BV): A plurality system used in multi-member districts, in which voters 
vote for as many individuals are there are seats to be filled. The candidates with the 
highest total votes win the seats. Countries using Block Vote are Lebanon, Kuwait, 
and the Syrian Arab Republic.
Closed party list: Refers to the type of list a political party puts forth in a List 
Proportional Representation (List PR) system. In a closed party list, the ranked order 
of candidates on the list is fixed by the party itself, thus voters are not able to vote 
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for a particular candidate. Depending on the proportion of the votes received for 
the entire party in a given district, seats are allocated from the top of the list moving 
towards the bottom.
Constituency: The citizens of a given political district, or the geographical area that 
a particular elected official / Member of Parliament represents. See also District.
Critical mass: Critical mass with reference to women in politics denotes the 
minimum percentage of women representatives needed to impact an otherwise 
male dominated political arena in order to meaningfully address women’s issues and 
concerns. The international community considered 30% female representation in 
national legislatures the minimum “critical mass” needed for women to be able to 
influence politics in women’s advantage.
Democracy: A form of government in which the supreme power is vested in the 
people, exercised directly by them or by their elected agents (as in a representative 
 democracy), characterized by formal equality of rights and privileges, including freedom 
of association and freedom of expression, enshrined in a constitution. Increasingly, 
gender equality is emphasized as an important feature of democratic systems.
Democratic structure: A system that holds free, fair and open elections in which 
no major (adult) group is excluded.
Descriptive representation: In the broader context descriptive representation refers 
to the idea that elected representatives should represent gender, ethnic, and minority 
constituencies. Hence, in this work it refers to the  number of women holding political 
seats. Thus, an elected body should resemble a representative sample of the voters 
they are meant to represent, meaning 50% women and including various percent-
ages of ethnic, racial and religious minority constituents who are otherwise often 
excluded from decision-making structures. Women activists argue that this means 
any truly democratic parliament should include 50% women, since woman make 
up at least half of any nation’s population. See also substantive representation.
Developing countries: Refers to countries/nations with Low or Medium Human 
Development Index (HDI) rankings, while developed states are those ranked with 
High. See also Human Development Index (HDI).
Devolved assemblies: Refers to the process of decentralization, where some deci-
sion-making power is transferred from the central government to local and provincial 
assemblies. The Scottish Parliament and the Welsh National Assembly, established in 
1999, are instances of devolved assemblies in the UK.
District: Or riding, refers to the geographical area that a particular elected official/
Member of Parliament represents. The residents of a given political district are its 
constituency.
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District magnitude: Refers to the number of legislative seats assigned to a district. 
Countries may either utilize single-member districts (SMD), where districts are repre-
sented by one parliamentarian, or multi-member districts (MMD), where districts are 
represented by multiple parliamentarians. Rarely, a country’s electoral system treats 
the entire country as a single district for the parliamentary election.
Eduskunta: The name for the Parliament of Finland.
Electoral system: The system that translates people’s votes into seats. More specifi-
cally, the system determines how often elections may be held, who can participate 
in them and who can be elected, as well as the structure of the ballots and how 
the votes cast in an election are translated into seats won by candidates or political 
parties. The three general forms of electoral systems are proportional representa-
tion (PR), majoritarian/plurality systems, and mixed systems.
Electorate: Refers to the group of people entitled to vote in an election (same as 
voters).
Feminism: Refers to awareness of women’s subordinate status within a patriarchal 
society and the ideas and actions to change this situation towards gender equality. 
There are many different trends of feminism; however, all of them advocate advance-
ment of women’s social, political and all other rights and opportunities equal to those 
of men.
First Past the Post (FPTP): Refers to an electoral system in which the candidate 
with the most votes wins; not necessarily with an absolute majority of the votes. It is 
used for elections in single-member districts (SMD). Canada, India and United States 
are examples of countries that use the FPTP system for their legislative elections. This 
system is the simplest form of majoritarian/ plurality system.
Gender quota: A measure adopted to ensure that both sexes are represented in 
national (or local) bodies in reasonable percentage. In practice given that men domi-
nate the political sphere in all countries (except in Rwanda since 2008), a gender 
quotas is a mechanism to reverse the discrimination that women face as they attempt 
to access political positions in a given society. The intent is to help recruit women 
into political decision-making positions and to increase the very slow rate at which 
the number of women in politics is rising. There are three types of gender quotas: 
political party quotas, reserved seats, and legislative quotas. As further explained 
below some are adopted either through legal reform to the national constitution or 
election laws, or voluntarily adopted by political parties. Other terms for quotas that 
are voluntarily adopted rather than legally mandated are targets, soft quotas or 
informal quotas. 
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Human Development Index (HDI): Refers to a compound indicator of economic 
and social development (such as income per capita, infant mortality rate, average 
life expectancy, average years of education, political participation, etc.) established 
by the United Nations, which attempts to get away from purely monetary measure-
ments of development. To see UNDP’s Human Rights Reports and their rankings 
please visit http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/.
Incumbent: A candidate who is running for re-election. Often this person has a 
better chance of getting re-elected in comparison to a new candidate. 
International norms: Refer to documents and rulings that were compiled by the 
international community and its organizations (such as the UN) and accepted by its 
members. These norms include series of recommendations to be followed by govern-
ments on various social justice, human rights, and gender issues.
International IDEA: The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (http://www.idea.int).
Labor force: Refers to all adults who are either engaged in or are looking to be 
engaged in the economic activity of a country. Women’s participation in the labor 
force is considered an important factor in women’s empowerment and access to the 
public and political sphere. 
Labour Party: A British political party which was established at the end of the 19th 
century (1893) to represent the interests of the urban working class and managed 
to win enough seats to form a government in the 1920s. The last time they were in 
power was from 1997-2010. 
Legislative Quotas: Are legally mandated quotas, embedded either in the national 
constitution or electoral laws, requiring all political parties to nominate a certain 
percentage or proportion of women among their candidates. These quotas can be 
strengthened by sanctions for non-compliance. This is the newest form of quota 
system. Countries that have adopted legislative quotas are France, Iraq and Mexico. 
See also gender quota.
Legislature: Refers to a national assembly or parliament that has the power to 
legislate or pass, amend, and repeal laws.
List Proportional Representation (List PR): See Proportional Representation (PR).
Majoritarian systems: Refer to one of the main types of electoral systems used 
in single-member districts (SMD). Under majoritarian electoral systems, candidates 
must receive an absolute majority (50%+1) of the total vote, and an example of 
which is Alternative Vote (AV). Majoritarian systems differ slightly from plurality 
systems in that they intend to ensure an absolute majority for the winning candidate 
rather than merely the highest votes (plurality voting). 
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Majoritarian/ Plurality: Refers to the general type of electoral system in which can-
didates or parties with either the plurality (simply most number of votes) or majority 
(50%+1 of votes) win the election. See also majoritarian systems and plurality 
systems. Given that different countries may use different combinations of the two 
systems in different countries, the political literature uses majoritarian/plurality to 
refer to the general system. 
Mixed electoral system: Refers to the third type of electoral system which 
attempts to mix the positive features of both proportional representation and 
majoritarian/plurality systems. For instance, this could include allotting half of the 
parliamentary seats to be filled using the proportional representation system, while 
the other half is filled using majoritarian/ plurality systems. Some of the countries 
that use mixed systems are Germany, Mexico, and the Philippines. See also parallel 
systems. 
Multi-member districts (MMD): Refers to districts that are represented by mul-
tiple parliamentarians (opposite of single-member districts (SMD), which are repre-
sented by only one parliamentarian). See also district magnitude.
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs): Refers to civil society organizations 
that are formed with a purpose to address an issue or pursue an interest, often inde-
pendent of governmental influence. 
Non-Western countries: For the purpose of this paper, this category refers to 
countries that are not considered as part of the “West”. We have also used the term 
developed (and developing) countries despite the fact that we have reservations on 
the way these concepts have come to exist and are used in the literature dealing with 
development. See also Western countries. 
Nordic countries: Refers to the region in North Europe and the North Atlantic that 
consists of the five countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.
Open party list: Also at times called “free list”. In contrast to closed party lists, 
open party lists allow voters to indicate not just their favored party but their favored 
candidate within that party as well.
Parallel systems: Are the most common form of mixed electoral systems, in 
which two different elections are held in parallel but independent to each other; 
one according to proportional representation system and the other according to 
majoritarian/plurality. The sole purpose of parallel system is to combine the ben-
efits of the two dominant systems, and its results usually fall somewhere in between 
majoritarian/plurality and Proportional Representation systems. In Germany, for 
instance, half of the seats of the Bundestag (the lower house of parliament) are filled 
through List PR, and the rest are filled by plurality, using single-member constituen-
cies. Voters make two parallel marks on the ballots, one for the party list, and the 
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other for the individual candidate.
Parity Law (in French Parité): The Parité movement refers to the French feminists’ 
demand for fifty-fifty balance between men and women in all elected assemblies. On 
June 6th 2000, the French Parity Law was eventually passed, which constitutionally 
mandated that each party nominate 50 percent candidates of both sexes overall, 
but with no conditions regarding which districts female candidates should run for. 
(Another key disadvantage of this law was that its sanctions for noncompliance were 
weak, which resulted in many parties ignoring the legislation).
Parliament: See legislature.
Parliamentarian: A member of the national parliament.
Parliamentary seat: A position within a legislature or parliament, usually filled by 
an elected person.
Party Block Vote (PBV): Is a type of plurality system for multi-member districts, in 
which voters vote for party lists instead of individual candidates. The party with the 
highest amount of votes (plurality votes) wins all the seats in the district, and its list 
of candidates is adopted accordingly. Countries using PBV for parliamentary elections 
are Cameroon, Chad, and Singapore. 
Party magnitude: Refers to the number of candidates elected from one party in 
one district and usually applies to the list of candidates that a party presents to the 
electorate. When the party magnitude is greater than one (i.e. the party expects to 
win more than one candidate in a particular district) they are more likely to nominate 
more women or minorities for that district. 
Personal is political: Is a powerful phrase which was coined by feminist Carol 
Hanisch (1969) in her essay with the same title and refers to the theory that personal 
problems deserve political attention. This is due to the fact that many of the personal 
problems women experience in their lives are not their doing/fault, but are the result 
of systematic oppression. It is thus state responsibility to eliminate such forms of 
oppression or discrimination and address the issues that women face, even within 
the private sphere. For instance marriage and custody laws are not the making of the 
private sphere but laws of the nations.
Plurality systems: Refer to one of the main types of electoral systems, but differ 
from majoritarian systems in that plurality systems are used when more than two 
candidates or parties compete in a particular district, and often apply to elections for 
multi-member districts. Under plurality systems, candidates or parties must receive 
the highest number of votes (plurality or simple majority), without necessarily 
securing absolute majority of the vote as required by majoritarian systems. The 
two most common types of plurality system are Bloc Vote (BV) and Party Bloc 




Plurality vote: Or “simple majority” refers to the highest number of votes received 
by the leading candidate or party in an election between three or more candidates or 
parties. See also absolute majority.
Political opportunity structures (POS): Refer to opportunities that present them-
selves in a political environment that enable collective action for political reform, ranging 
from institutional to legal reform (for instance arising post revolutions, at the end of civil 
war, with the signing of a peace treaty, etc). The POS approach is useful for studying 
the interaction between social movements and political structures since it examines how 
political actors take advantage of existing opportunities or create new ones.
Political participation: Encompasses many broad activities that influence politics 
and decision-making in either direct or indirect ways. Direct political participation 
in formal politics includes voting, running for political office, holding political office, 
or joining a political party; while indirect political participation includes involvement 
in civil society activities either at the local or national levels, campaigning for a just 
cause that one believes should be a government priority, or even participating in 
public awareness raising activities, such as activism through the media or holding 
demonstrations. 
Political party quotas: Refer to party specific measures, usually adopted volun-
tarily, to increase the proportion of women (or minorities) among party candidates or 
elected representatives, mostly through setting a percentage, proportion, or numeric 
range for party lists that are put forth during elections. Examples of parties that have 
voluntarily adopted gender quotas are the UK’s Labour Party, the Social Democratic 
Party of Germany, and the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) of Morocco. See 
also gender quota.
Political party: A political party is made up of groups of individuals with similar 
ideologies, to promote a vision and advocate particular policies and platforms of 
actions that are deemed to address what they view as the priority issues of the nation 
and for running the state.
Politics: Although politics may be defined in variety of ways, such as the process of 
collective decision-making, at its core it is about the distribution of resources among 
the nation based on various perspectives. The proponents of democracy and social 
justice advocate distribution of national resources as fairly as possible, with an eye to 
protect the interest of future generations as well; while on the other hand, neoliberals 
argue that market should decide how the wealth of a nation should be distributed. 
Proportional Representation (PR): Is one of the main types of electoral systems 
in which seats in the parliament are distributed to candidates or parties in propor-
tion to the votes that they receive. This system mostly applies to districts that are 
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represented by more than one representative in the parliament, or multi-member 
districts; and favors parties more than independent candidates. List Proportional 
Representation (List PR) is the most common type of electoral system, in which 
each party puts forth its list of candidates in a particular district for competition. List 
PR can be either with “open” or “closed” party lists. Countries that use this system 
include Sweden, Argentina, and Indonesia.
Quota: See gender quota.
Representative democracy: Refers to a form of government in which citizens elect 
representatives to represent their interests in the political decision-making apparatus. 
It is expected that the interests of the majority are represented in the legislature. See 
also democracy.
Reserved seats: Refer to setting aside a number or percentage of parliamentary 
seats specifically for women. Women may be either directly elected to these seats, or 
appointed to them, generally by the executive branch. Countries with reserved seats 
quotas are Rwanda, Afghanistan and Jordan. See also gender quota.
Riding: See district.
Semi-Zipper style: Similar to Zipper style quota, it refers to a ranking rule for a 
quota implementation often applied to closed party lists. However, instead of alter-
nating between men and women’s names (as in the regular Zipper style), a Semi-
Zipper ensures that one in every three candidates listed must be a female, as was 
practiced in Indonesia.
Simple Majority: See Plurality vote.
Single-member districts (SMD): Refers to districts that are represented by only 
one parliamentarian (opposite of multi-member districts (MMD), which are repre-
sented by multiple parliamentarians). See also district magnitude.
Single Transferable Vote (STV): Is a type of proportional representation system 
in which voters mostly vote for individual candidates (although a party-list option is 
possible). In this preferential voting system, voters rank as many candidates as there 
are seats for election according to their preference in their multi-member district. 
Once a vote threshold is set, those candidates who receive the threshold in the first 
round are declared elected and all  excess votes are redistributed or transferred to other 
candidates according to the percentage of second choice that the voters marked. 
This process continues, until all the district seats are filled. Ireland and Malta are the 
two countries that use STV.
Soft quotas: Refer to informal targets of a minimum number of women to be 
nominated on party lists. These quotas are not legally mandated but rather a promise 
often at the party level. See also gender quota.
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State feminism: Includes the institutionalization of women’s interests by estab-
lishing consultative bodies overseeing the implementation of equality legislation 
and policy. Such state machinery (ranging from women’s commissions to agencies) 
has the objective of addressing women’s interests at the state level and prioritizing 
women’s equality in decision-making. The Nordic countries benefit from extensive 
state feminism and social welfare policies, as the women’s movements demanded 
direct state action to address women’s demands. 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs): Refers to policies implemented by 
international funding agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank (WB) in developing countries, often advocating withdrawal of state 
funding for services (education, health, electricity, etc.) and subsidies (on food) 
which were intended to benefit less-privileged segments of society. These agencies 
that have been advocating a neo-liberal economic perspective and the belief that 
the market is the most efficient mechanism for development since the 1970s make 
the implementation of SAPs a condition for granting loans to developing countries.
Substantive representation: Refers to the content and issues/draft laws that rep-
resentatives (in this case female representatives) bring to the attention of the parlia-
ment which pertains to their constituency (in this case women), and encourage other 
delegates to vote for the draft law or the issue brought to their attention. Or as Pitkin 
(1972) argues “acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive 
to them”. Some feminists argue that substantive representation follows descriptive 
representation, in that “it takes women to represent women”.
Tokenism: Involves women’s appointment to only a limited amount of reserved 
seats (usually not exceeding 10 percent) by political elites. Women’s representation 
in such token amounts is often used by the states to seem more gender equal, lacking 
the sincerity to truly empower women.
Two-Round System (TRS): Is a majority/plurality system in which once voters 
have cast their first ballot, choosing one candidate or party among several, a runoff 
is held between the two candidates or parties with the best showing (the second 
election is avoided if in the first round a candidate or party receives a pre-determined 
amount of votes (often absolute majority of the votes or 50%+1). This system may 
also take a plurality form in that more than two candidates contest the second round, 
and the ones with the highest number of the votes (plurality or simple majority) are 
elected, regardless of whether they won an absolute majority. This system can be 
applied either to single or multi-member districts and is used by countries like Iran, 
Cuba, and Egypt for their parliamentary elections.
Universalism: Refers to the ideal that all members of the society are treated equally, 
regardless of gender, race or ethnicity. However historically in many established 
democracies, such as France, universalism was based on the notion of the “abstract 
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individual,” which was often associated with men and led to women’s exclusion from 
the political sphere. In France this association was made with the justification that 
only men have the capacity to reason and make moral judgments.
Varannan damernas: Term given to the Zipper style quota adopted by various 
Swedish parties in the 1990s, in which parties alternated men and women’s names 
on party lists, hence ensuring equal division between both genders. The supporters 
of this measure tactfully emphasized its equality provision rather than the fact that it 
was essentially a 50 percent quota.
Vernacularization: Term popularized by anthropologist Sally Engle Merry referring 
to the way activists understand international human rights norms and practice them 
at the local level in their own specific contexts. According to her, rights talk gets 
translated into practice according to the vernacular used at the local level.
Western countries: The term “West” alludes to a political region rather than a 
geographical one. Geographically, Western countries are located on the different 
continents of Europe, North America, Asia, and Australia. While politically these states 
are stable representative democracies, with relatively high socio-economic positions 
the political representation of women varies considerably in these countries. See also 
non-Western states.
Women-only districts: Refers to a provision of some reserved seats type of quota, 
in which certain districts are reserved only for female candidates, in order to ensure 
that those districts will only return women representatives. In this regard, voters 
are to vote only for female candidates and male candidates from these districts are 
required to run in other districts.
Zipper style quota: The Zipper (sometimes referred to as Zebra style) of quota 
refers to a ranking rule for a quota implementation often applied to closed party lists, 
in which names of the candidates alternate according to gender. Indonesia used a 
Semi-Zipper style in which one in three candidates listed must be a female.
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Dates of Global Women’s Suffrage  
and Right to Stand for Election
Unless otherwise indicated, the date signifies the year women were granted the right 
both to vote and to stand for election. The countries listed below currently have 
a Parliament or have had one at some point in their history. Available from Inter- 
Parliamentary Union: http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm (accessed May 25, 2011)
1788 United States of America (to stand for election)
1893 New Zealand (to vote)
1902 Australia*
1906 Finland
1907 Norway (to stand for election)*
1913 Norway**
1915 Denmark, Iceland*
1917 Canada (to vote)*, Netherlands (to stand for election)
1918 Austria, Canada (to vote)*, Estonia, Georgia1, Germany, Hungary, Ireland*, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russian Federation, United Kingdom*
1919 Belarus, Belgium (to vote)*, Luxembourg, Netherlands (to vote), New 
 Zealand (to stand for election), Sweden*, Ukraine
1920 Albania, Canada (to stand for election)*, Czech Republic, Iceland**,  Slovakia, 
United States of America (to vote)
1921 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belgium (to stand for election)*, Georgia1, Sweden**
1924 Kazakhstan1, Mongolia, Saint Lucia, Tajikistan
1927 Turkmenistan
1928 Ireland**, United Kingdom**
1929 Ecuador*, Romania*
1930 South Africa (Whites), Turkey (to vote)
24176.indb   201 16/09/11   11:38 AM
Electoral.Politics:.Making.Gender.Quotas.Work.for.Women
202
1931 Chile*, Portugal*, Spain, Sri Lanka
1932 Brazil, Maldives, Thailand, Uruguay
1934 Cuba, Portugal*, Turkey (to stand for election)
1935 Myanmar (to vote)
1937 Philippines
1938 Bolivia*, Uzbekistan
1939 El Salvador (to vote)
1941 Panama*
1942 Dominican Republic
1944 Bulgaria, France, Jamaica
1945 Croatia, Guyana (to stand for election), Indonesia, Italy, Japan1, Senegal, 
Slovenia, Togo
1946 Cameroon, D.P.R. of Korea, Djibouti (to vote), Guatemala, Liberia, Myanmar 
(to stand for election), Panama**, Romania**, The F.Y.R. of Macedonia, Trini-
dad and Tobago, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia
1947 Argentina, Japan1, Malta, Mexico (to vote), Pakistan, Singapore
1948 Belgium**, Israel, Niger, Republic of Korea, Seychelles, Suriname
1949 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile**, China, Costa Rica, Syrian Arab Republic 
(to vote)*
1950 Barbados, Canada (to vote)**, Haiti, India
1951 Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Nepal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
1952 Bolivia**, Côte d’Ivoire, Greece, Lebanon
1953 Bhutan, Guyana (to vote), Mexico (to stand for election), Syrian Arab Re-
public**
1954 Belize, Colombia, Ghana
1955 Cambodia, Eritrea2, Ethiopia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru
1956 Benin, Comoros, Egypt, Gabon, Mali, Mauritius, Somalia
1957 Malaysia, Zimbabwe (to vote)**
1958 Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Lao P.D.R., Nigeria (South)
1959 Madagascar, San Marino (to vote), Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania
1960 Canada (to stand for election)**, Cyprus, Gambia, Tonga
1961 Bahamas*, Burundi, El Salvador (to stand for election), Malawi, Mauritania, 
Paraguay, Rwanda, Sierra Leone
1962 Algeria, Australia**, Monaco, Uganda, Zambia
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1963 Afghanistan, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Iran (Islamic Republic of), 
 Kenya, Morocco, Papua New Guinea (to stand for election)
1964 Bahamas**, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Papua New Guinea (to vote), Sudan
1965 Botswana, Lesotho
1967 Democratic Republic of the Congo (to vote), Ecuador**, Kiribati, Tuvalu, 
Yemen (D.P. R.)
1968 Nauru, Swaziland




1973 Andorra (to stand for election), Bahrain*, San Marino (to stand for election)
1974 Jordan, Solomon Islands
1975 Angola, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Vanuatu1
1976 Portugal**
1977 Guinea Bissau
1978 Nigeria (North), Republic of Moldova1, Zimbabwe (to stand for election)
1979 Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Fed. States), Palau
1980 Iraq, Vanuatu1
1984 Liechtenstein, South Africa (Coloureds + Indians)
1986 Central African Republic, Djibouti (to stand for election)
1989 Namibia
1990 Samoa
1993 Kazakhstan1, Republic of Moldova1
1994 South Africa (Blacks) 
2002 Bahrain**
2005 Kuwait 
* Right subject to conditions or restrictions 
** Restrictions or conditions lifted
1. Reference to several dates reflects the stages in the granting of rights. It is not uncommon, in countries 
previously under colonial rule, for women to have been granted the rights to vote and be elected by 
the colonial administration and to have had them confirmed at the time of accession to indepen-
dence. Similarly, it is not uncommon, in countries that were formerly part of a federation and in which 
women were entitled to vote and be elected under the federal legislation, for women to have had 
these rights confirmed under the Constitution of the newly independent State.
2. In November 1955, Eritrea was part of Ethiopia. The Constitution of sovereign Eritrea adopted on 23 May 
1997 stipulates that “All Eritrean citizens, of eighteen years of age or more, shall have the right to vote.”
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Rwanda’s Electoral Rules as it pertains 
to Women’s Representation  
(Articles 76, 82, & 185)
Besides setting a minimum of one-third of decision-making positions at all levels 
of government (including local and ministerial levels) for women, the 2003 
constitution also dictates the composition of the national parliament as follows. 
The careful wording of these articles is essential to the effective implementation 
of the Rwandan reserve seats for women. To read the Rwandan constitution in 
its entirety, please refer to http://www.rwandahope.com/constitution.pdf
 • According to Article 76, for the Chamber of Deputies (or the lower 
house), the 80 members, representing 12 provinces for five-year terms, 
are elected in the following manner:
 – 24 deputies (30 percent of the total) are reserved for women, to 
be elected by the Women’s Council (also called the women’s elec-
toral college,1 thus not through direct elections) from women-only 
ballots. The Article states that female members are “elected by 
a joint assembly composed of members of the respective District, 
Municipality, Town or Kigali City Councils and members of the 
Executive Committees of women’s organizations at the Province, 
Kigali City, District, Municipalities, Towns and Sector levels.” These 
24 seats are distributed across the state so that two women are 
elected from each province and the city of Kigali. (The composition 
of the assembly that elects Rwandan female representatives is further 
explained below).
 – 2 deputies are elected by the National Youth Council
 – 1 deputy is elected by the Federation of the Associations of the Disabled
 – 53 deputies (the remainder) are elected directly through the closed 
List PR system (Powley 2005). There is a 5% threshold of the popular 
 1. Although the assembly that elects women to the reserved seats in Rwandan national parliament is 
at times referred to as an electoral college, this body is very different from the American Electoral 
College, which is based on a more ambiguous system wherein it is not clearly defined as to who 
can become an electoral college members and how that happens. Unlike the American Electoral 
College, the body in Rwanda is elected by women’s representatives and not by elites or party leader. 
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vote to prevent the representation of very small parties (Meierhenrich 
2006). In other words any party that receives less than 5 percent of 
the total popular vote does not receive any seats in the parliament. 
 • Article 82 The Senate shall be composed of 26 members serving for 
a term of eight years. 30 percent (8 seats) of its 26 members shall be 
women who are appointed or indirectly elected by various electoral 
colleges. 
 • Article 185 established a Gender Monitoring Office to ensure quota 
implementation and equal gender opportunity at every level. According 
to this article:
“The Gender Monitoring Office shall be an independent public institu-
tion whose responsibilities include the following:
 – To monitor and supervise on a permanent basis compliance with 
gender indicators of the programme for ensuring gender equality 
complementality in the context of the vision of sustainable develop-
ment and to serve as a reference point on matters relating to gender 
equality and non-discrimination for equal opportunity and fairness;
 – To submit to various organs recommendations relating to the 
program for the promotion of gender equality and complementality 
for national development.
The Gender Monitoring Office shall submit each year its program and 
activity report to the Cabinet and submits copies thereof to other State 
organs determined by law. The law shall determine its functions, organiza-
tion and operation.”
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The goal of reducing gender inequalities in political representation has been 
elusive in many different kinds of political systems, even though women have 
made substantial progress in other areas, such as education, employment and 
healthcare. This wonderfully accessible book argues that gender quotas are an 
important strategy to improve women’s political representation in legislatures 
and political parties and it lays out the history of this approach across the globe. It 
suggests however, that gender quotas are themselves not an ‘easy fix’ to gender 
discrimination since similarly designed quotas have had different outcomes 
across cases. The book’s comparative approach untangles the various factors 
which need to be considered in designing, lobbying for, and implementing gender 
quotas so that they can be effective. This volume is tremendously useful and 
informative for activists and scholars across the globe and does a masterful job 
explaining divergent outcomes both within regions and across them. While 
teasing out some shared experiences, it encourages coalitions of activists to 
develop context-appropriate strategies to craft effective campaigns to end 
women’s exclusion from political decision-making. Authors argue that although 
increasing countries are successfully and creatively using gender quotas, some of 
the wealthiest long-standing democracies still continue to experience greater 
legislative gender inequalities.    
 Diane Singerman, Co-Director of Middle East Studies at American  
 University, and author of Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture, and Urban  
 Space in the New Globalized Middle East
In the march towards inclusive democracy and addressing women’s historical 
exclusion from electoral processes, gender quotas have emerged across the North 
and the South as a major tool for redress. This book outlines successes as well as 
shortcomings of the various types of gender quotas as they intersect with electoral 
systems. In simple and lucid terms, Electoral Politics makes a valuable contribu-
tion to understanding the complexity of gender quotas by drawing upon eight 
case studies from across the globe. It is one of few scholarly works in the field 
geared towards diverse stakeholders, including scholars, practitioners and activ-
ists. Setting out lessons learnt and means to overcome systemic obstacles, it 
provides a clear guide to devising context specific strategies for increasing 
women’s presence in electoral politics. 
 Charlotte Bunch, Founder of the Center for Women's Global Leadership,  
 Rutgers University, and author of Passionate Politics: Feminist Theory in  
 Action and  Demanding Accountability: The Vienna Campaign and Tribunal for  
 Women’s Human Rights
Women  Living  Under  Muslim  Laws
